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Abstract  
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems have been in existence for over 2 decades yet 
businesses are still losing billions of dollars annually in the implementation of software 
designed to reduce costs and increase profitability. The inability to manage risks is an area 
that contributes to these losses, specifically due to uncertain outcomes when dealing with an 
interconnected construct such as risk, and a research gap at the tactical and operational levels 
between risks and controls.  
 
A comparative case study approach, encompassing 12 different organisations was adopted to 
explore emerging patterns at the project implementation level, and from this three 
contributions emerged. After observing risks behaving in a hierarchical fashion with 
predictable results, Hierarchy of Risk models representing different implementation stages 
were constructed. Although these models are still in their formative stages, it may prove 
useful in furthering our understanding of the close inter-relationship between different risks, 
where they occur in ERP implementations and the implications of managerial choice when 
determining risk prioritisation. A second finding is that no direct linear relationship appears 
to exist between risks and controls. Rather, this counter-intuitive finding suggests that it is 
additional factors including risk categories, implementation stages, prior control decision 
making and the hierarchical flow-on effect of impacts as a consequence of identified risks. 
Finally, by combining the Hierarchy of Risk models and the risk-to-impact-to-control 
relationship, a method of reverse engineering portfolios of control was discovered.  This 
potentially offers an explanation as to how portfolios of control can be constructed, and why 
they are essential in ERP implementations. 
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Introduction 
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1.0 Introduction 
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) implementations are some of the most complex and 
risky Information Systems (IS) projects available as they involve an entire organisation 
committing to a protracted process of business change (Klaus et al., 2000; Robney et al., 
2002). ERP systems represent the concept of an integrated system designed to increase 
efficiency by integrating business processes, and sharing common resources across an 
organisation (Hanseth et al., 2001; Jones et al., 2006; Markus & Tanis, 2000).  While the 
main reason for implementing these systems was “...to enhance control over processes within 
an organisation” (Hanseth et al., 2001, pp.35), additional technical and business reasons 
include improvements in efficiency (Jones et al., 2006) and increases in rationalisation and 
hierarchical control (Hanseth et al., 2001). This in turn increases the effective management of 
a number of business functions including cost cutting, increased efficiency and the sharing of 
common resources (Hanseth et al., 2001; Jones et al., 2006; Markus, & Tanis, 1998).  There 
are also benefits associated with system maintenance as the integrated nature of an ERP 
means there is only one interface, making it easier to maintain.  For this reason, ERP systems 
are used to replace technological aspects of businesses which may be outdated to reduce 
maintenance costs and increase the availability of new skills and product support (Brehm et 
al., 2001; Light, 2001; Markus & Tanis, 2000).   
 
Although these systems appear to offer compelling advantages, the results are often less 
desirable and include high cost, long installation time-frames and high levels of failure. In 
2011, projections of $47 billion of annual revenue yielded disappointing results: 61.1% of 
projects took longer than expected, 74.1% went over budget and 48% failed to realise at least 
50% of the original desired benefits (Panorama Consulting Group, 2011).  In addition to 
implementations that experience the problems listed above, the following list of ERP failures 
by Kimberling (2011) and the Panorama Consulting Group (2011) highlight the financial 
implications of these large scale and very public failures (Table 1.1).     
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Table 1.1:  Large ERP failures and / or lawsuits  
Year ERP Vendor ERP Customer Value 
2011 CSC, BT and Fujitsu UK Government $18.7 billion 
2011 Epicor Software Corporation New York City  $760 million 
2011 Oracle Montclair State University $35 million 
2010 IBM and SAP Queensland Health $60 million 
2010 JDA Software (i2) Dillard’s, Inc. $246 million 
2010 SAP and Deloitte Consulting Marin County, California $30 million 
2010 Capgemini and SAP Dorset County in the UK $25.63 million 
2008 SAP Waste Management $100 million 
2003 EDS British Sky Broadcasting  $1 billion 
2000 Oracle Corporation Tri Valley Growers  $20 million 
1999 SAP, Siebel, and Manugistics Hersey Foods  $112 million 
1999 IBM and SAP NZ Police $110 million 
1996 Andersen Consulting and SAP FoxMeyer Corp $1 billion 
(Computer World, n.d; Kanaracus, 2011a; Kanaracus, 2011b; Kimberling, 2011; Krigsman, 2009; Leslie, 2008; 
Panorama Consulting Group, 2011 ) 
 
In essence, businesses are losing billions of dollars annually in the implementation of 
software designed to reduce costs and increase profitability (Zhang et al., 2005). 
 
This research adopts the concept of IT-related risk to ERP implementations, and aims to 
examine the control of risks at the project implementation level as this has been identified as 
an ongoing reason for ERP implementation failures (Aloini et al., 2007; Markus, 2000). Here 
risk is defined as a problem that has not yet happened but may cause an organisation to 
experience significant negative impacts (e.g. technical, financial, human, operational, or 
business loss) in the course of implementing an ERP system either internally or externally 
(Aloini et al., 2007; Sumner, 2000).   
 
The concept of risk is closely related to the concept of critical success factors (CSF), which 
has already reached significant importance in the field of ERP research (e.g Kuang, 2001; 
Somers & Nelson, 2004; Sumner, 1999).  The use of CSF as a prescriptive means of avoiding 
risks is however limited. Indeed, this fragmented view on risks has been noted as a missed 
opportunity and an area of pressing business need (Markus, 2000). In addition, prior research 
addressing risks in ERP projects has mainly focussed on risk identification and assessment 
and lacks any prescriptive means of actual risk mitigation.  One powerful approach to risk 
mitigation is exercising control (Du et al., 2007); where ‘control’ refers to any attempt to 
motivate individuals to behave in a manner consistent with organisational objectives (Ouchi, 
1978). 
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With this in mind, risk and control have been likened to two sides of the same coin and 
analysis of one without the other fails to fully address risk mitigation within ERP projects. 
Indeed the purpose of controls is to mitigate and reduce risks so that they are within 
acceptable limits (Albadri & Jordan 2003; Gallivan 2001). Thus far, research addressing risks 
and controls has focussed on IS development teams (Henderson and Lee 1992) and individual 
software development projects (Choudhury & Sabherwal 2003; Ropponen & Lyytinen, 
2000). All of these studies identified a common link between risk assessment, control of 
those risks and the effects on organisational performance. However, apart from two 
exploratory conference papers (Vanderklei et al., 2010; Vanderklei, 2013) (see Appendix k & 
Appendix l for full copies of these papers), there is little on risk and control within the 
context of ERP projects with its specific characteristics as outlined above. Investigating risk 
controls is further complicated because, during IT projects, risks do not remain static but 
change as a function of prior decisions and behaviour (Markus 2000).  To further complicate 
matters, the dynamic nature of risks does not easily lead to a stable risk pattern, as second-
order consequences of human problem-solving behaviour might lead people to misdiagnose 
the causes of problems and apply attempted (control) solutions that actually make the 
situation worse (Markus & Tanis, 2000). 
 
 Methods of controlling risks in ERP implementations are still in the formative stages with 
studies having concentrated on either risk mitigation at the strategic level (Finney & Corbett, 
2007) or risk identification and prioritisation at the tactical and operational levels (Aloini et 
al., 2012; Sumner, 2000).  Part of this can be attributed to the complex interconnected nature 
of ERP risk factors, where risks occurring early in an implementation have the potential to 
influence different risks later in that same implementation (Aloini et al., 2012).  Additionally, 
contrary findings about how risks can be controlled (which includes singular and portfolios of 
control) have contributed to the formative state of theory-based research examining the 
relationship between risks and controls at the project implementation level (Gopal & Gosain, 
2009). 
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Therefore the following research questions arise: 
How does the relationship between different risks change during the different stages of an 
ERP implementation? 
 
How can Project Managers (PMs) map risks to controls across different stages of ERP 
implementations? 
 
1.1 Structure of Thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides a theoretical 
background of the key constructs, and will be used to define and explore our understanding of 
ERP systems, risks, controls, risk management and stages of implementation in the context of 
ERP projects.   This is followed by an explanation of the methods used in the collection and 
codification of data, the criteria used in the selection of organisations and personnel to 
interview, individual case descriptions and limitations. The risks identified in each of the 
cases and a compiled risk registry make up the findings section and will be analysed in the 
discussion using the contextual lens of the research questions.  This is followed by 
conclusions drawn from the discussions and the identification of any areas that may benefit 
from future research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Word count: 48,875 
(Excluding Table of Contents, Abstract, References and Appendices) 
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Chapter Two: 
Theoretical 
Background 
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2.0 ERP Systems 
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems have been part of the corporate landscape since 
the late 80s and were described by Davenport as being the “most important development in 
the corporate use of technology” (Davenport, 1998 pp 1).  Although ERP systems started 
appearing at this time, earlier evolutions included Capacity Requirements Planning (CRP) in 
the 70s and Manufacturing Resource Planning (MRP and MRPII) in the early 80s  
(Muscatello et al., 2003; Umble, 2003).   These Enterprise systems (ERP, CRP and MRP) 
evolved in response to the problems associated with data duplication and loosely coupled 
systems offering organisations few methods of analysing data (Rizzi & Zamboni, 1999).  
ERP systems have maintained a major presence (while retaining the ability to evolve over 
time) because ERP systems are neither company nor technology specific. Rather ERP is the 
term assigned to integrated computer software systems designed to connect multiple parts of 
the business together.  Essentially data gathered in one area of a business can be made 
accessible and comparable to other business units enabling a finer degree of analysis to be 
conducted (Markus & Tanis, 2000).  Specific characteristics of ERP systems include: 
 
Integrated – the system is seamless and data passed from one area of a business to another 
without repetitive input. 
Packages – leased rather than bought from a vendor and produced as a one size fits all.  This 
means that a company can either change the software to suit the organisation or will have to 
change the organisation to fit the software. 
Best practices – ERP solutions are up to date industry best practices based on feedback, 
experience and exposure to successful companies  
Some assembly required – some degree of business process analysis and redesign will be 
required for installation.  Companies wishing to install ERPs will also need to produce and 
update interfaces into other systems, be they legacy or customised. 
Evolving – because of their universal use they will face a number of upgrades and updates 
during their lifetime. 
(Markus & Tanis, 2000) 
 
While there are similarities between the characteristics of ERP products themselves, 
variations based on which component to implement do occur and these variations in-turn 
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influence the selection process when determining the most suitable ERP product to use (J 
Verville, 2003). These variations become more apparent when we consider the broad 
functionality supported by various ERP packages (Table 2.1) 
 
Table 2.1: Functions supported by ERP packages 
Financials 
Functions supported by ERP systems 
Accounts receivable and payable 
Asset accounting 
Cash management forecasting 
Cost-element and cost-centre accounting 
Executive information systems 
Financial consolidation 
General ledger 
Product-cost accounting 
Profitability analysis 
Profit-centre accounting 
Standard and period-related costing 
 
Operations and Logistics 
Inventory management 
Materials management 
Plant maintenance 
Production planning 
Project management 
Purchasing 
Quality management 
Routing management 
Shipping 
Vendor evaluation 
Sales and Marketing 
Order management 
Pricing 
Sales management 
Sales planning 
Human Resources 
Human-resource time accounting 
Payroll 
Personnel planning 
Travel expenses 
(Umble, 2003) 
 
Based on the large array of options available, deciding which solution is a best fit for the 
business involved is of vital importance and incorrect choices have been identified as a major 
component in ERP implementation failure (Verville & Halingten, 2002).   
 
While this may give the impression that one ERP package with all of the above listed 
functionality has the capacity to fit any environment, this is not true.  Different systems 
contain different core components, complexity, are capable of different levels of 
customisation and consequently differ significantly in cost (Scheer & Habermann, 2000).  A 
package that contains high levels of functionality, require high degrees of customisation and 
IT knowledge to implement and run, and cost millions of dollars to implement would not be 
appropriate for a small to medium business with middle to low levels of internal IT expertise.  
To facilitate different requirements, different ERP systems contain different levels of 
complexity and functionality, and have been broken into a number of different tiers levels, 
each encompassing different organisational profiles and vendors.  An example from 
Panorama Consultancy Group (2011) of a three tier structure with vendors can be seen in 
table 2.2. 
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Table 2.2: ERP systems listed by tier  
Sample Vendors 
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 
SAP 
Oracle 
Oracle eBusiness Suite 
Oracle JD Edwards 
Oracle Peoplesoft 
Microsoft Dynamics 
Epicor 
Sage 
Infor 
IFS 
QAD 
Lawsons 
Ross 
ABAS 
Activant Solutions Inc. 
Baan 
Bowen and Groves 
Compiere 
Exact 
Netsuite 
Visibility 
Blue Cherry 
HansaWorld 
Intuitive 
Syspro 
(Panorama Consulting Group, 2011) 
 
 
While this provides a listing of the different products and their approximate classifications, 
no mention is made of how these classifications were made.  There are a number of methods 
used internationally which include estimating requirements based on revenue, number of 
employees, number of concurrent users, and number and location of sites (Burns, 2011; 
“ERP: What Tier are you in?,” n.d.; Robinson, n.d.).  Differing studies using different criteria 
have failed to advance our understanding as shown in table 2.3 which looks at the different 
definitions used in the UK and USA. 
 
Table 2.3:  Different Tier definitions 
Tier  UK USA 
 Concurrent 
Users 
Employees Revenue 
(in 
millions) 
Concurrent 
Users 
Employees Revenue (in 
millions) 
Tier 
1 
100-1000+ 1000+ 
 
200+ n/a 500+ 200+ 
Tier 
2 
50-500 200-2000 100-500 n/a 50-500 10-200 
Tier 
3 
30-200 50-1000 20-200 n/a 1-50 1-10 
Tier 
4 
1-40 20-200 1-50 n/a n/a n/a 
 (Robinson, n.d.) (“ERP: What Tier are you in?,” n.d.)(Burns, 
2011) 
 
This problem extends to New Zealand and Australia as an overall lack of peer reviewed 
definitions exist on how ERP packages are defined.  One explanation is that the demarcation 
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between tiers has been blurred as ERP companies adapt their products to encompass small to 
medium enterprises in an effort to enlarge market share (Rashid et al., 2002).  The ability to 
cater to different markets does not appear to have assisted organisations wishing to embark 
on an ERP implementation with software selection as inadequate selection remains a major 
cause of ERP implementation failure (Aloini et al., 2007).  
 
While the main reason for implementing these systems was “...to enhance control over 
processes within an organisation” (Hanseth et al., 2001, pp.35), additional technical and 
business reasons include improvements in efficiency (Jones et al., 2006) and increases in 
rationalisation and hierarchical control (Hanseth et al., 2001). This in turn increases the 
effective management of a number of business functions including cost cutting, increased 
efficiency and the sharing of common resources (Hanseth et al., 2001; Jones et al., 2006; 
Markus & Tanis, 2000).  There are also benefits associated with system maintenance as the 
integrated nature of an ERP means there is only one interface, making it easier to maintain.  
For this reason, ERP systems are used to replace technological aspects of businesses which 
may be outdated to reduce maintenance costs and increase the availability of new skills and 
product support (Brehm et al., 2001; Light, 2001; Markus & Tanis, 2000).  Unfortunately, the 
benefits outlined have failed to manifest themselves in all instances with the number of failed 
implementations still encompassing a major proportion of these projects.  While there are 
business benefits to be made from implementing an ERP solution, they are still proving to be 
risky projects. 
 
Extending the definition of risk provided in the introduction, ERP systems act as activity 
based control systems where input into the system will result in statistical outputs allowing 
control to be exercised. During the implementation of an ERP, this formal structure is not in 
place and therefore an activity view of control is neither appropriate nor possible at this time.  
Rather, a behavioural view of control is most appropriate (Soh et al., 2010).  This implies that 
when a controller exercises control over a controllee, they are taking some action in order to 
regulate or adjust the behaviour of the controllee (Kirsch, 1996). The behavioural view 
further presumes that the controller uses certain control mechanisms to exercise control 
within given situations (e.g. implementation dates, procedures) (Soh et al., 2010) and that risk 
is not treated as a rational choice and probability concept, but associated with the threat of a 
bad outcome. It also suggests that decision makers tend to act in a loss-aversive manner 
instead of a rational one (Lyytinen et al., 1998). Risk is a necessity for continuous business 
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improvement, and the purpose of risk management is not to eliminate all risks but to help 
managers make sense of their situations by identifying the risk, assess its impact, exclude bad 
choices and intervening to reduce, or avoid the risks (Bancroft et al., 1998; Lyytinen et al., 
1998).   
 
Although the concept of control is established and has been used to examine outsourcing 
(Gopal & Gosain, 2009) and software development (Harris et al., 2009), methods of 
controlling risks in ERP implementations are still in the formative stages (Aloini, 2012; 
Sumner 2000). While control modes can be categorised as Formal (Behavioural and Output) 
and Informal (Clan and Self) (Kirsch, 2004), specific controls that are useful in managing IT-
related risks are as varied as the risks themselves (Markus & Tanis, 2000).  Aloini et al., 
(2012) and Lyytinen et al., (1998) examined a variety of risk management models and 
theories (e.g. PRINCE2, PMBOK, The Australian Standard, PRAM, RAMP, SHAMPU, 
SAFE, Boehm’s Software Risk Approach and others) and concluded that despite great 
variations and drastic differences, managerial risk strategies share a standardised format. 
These include “how to inquire and observe, how to organise and interpret observations, and 
how to subsequently launch managerial action” (Lyytinen et al., 1998, pp. 236). The Lyytinen 
et al., (1998) Risk Management Approaches Model (Figure 2.1) was constructed using this 
standardised format and is a socio-technical, control-centric model with the ability to foster 
decision-making in situations where complete information is not always available (Alter & 
Sherer, 2004). This model depicts one event or state (risk) and three ideas and principles (risk 
identification and analysis, heuristics, and risk resolution and control) which collectively 
make up the risk control process.  Attention shaping and intervention planning components 
guide the process by linking risks to potential managerial interventions with the help of 
heuristics (Lyytinen et al., 1998).  
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Figure 2.1: Risk Management Approaches Model 
(Lyytinen et al., 1998, pp. 236)    
 
2.1 Risk identification and analysis  
The first principle of risk identification and analysis in the Risk Management Approaches 
Model has received extensive coverage (Aloini et al., 2012). ERP implementations represent 
an excellent context for examining the interplay between different risk factors, because they 
cross departmental boundaries (Vandaie, 2008), and are prone to risks (Aloini et al., 2012).   
Two methods associated with risk identification and analysis in ERP projects are Critical 
Success Factors (CSF) and Risk Factor (RF) analysis.  Although studies have been conducted 
which group CSF and RF analysis as interchangeable (Aloini et al., 2007), there have been a 
number which treat them as two separate literary tracks covering similar concepts, and while 
this apparent cross-over has ensured the topic is covered extensively, it has led to some 
degree of confusion over what each term actually means.  The following section will examine 
what each of these terms covers and explore similarities and differences between the two. 
 
2.3 Critical Success Factors in ERP implementations 
CSF research in management literature can be traced back to the early 60s when Daniel 
(1961) looked at the informational needs of managers from different industries and 
determined that their information needs were not being met.  Specifically, the information 
passed on did not assist in making managerial decisions.  Daniel concluded that factors 
critical to the success of the business from the perspective of the manager, should be used to 
customise the data flow so that the information received was useful.  In turn this would assist 
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by reducing the overall amount of data and consequent clerical duties, allowing managers to 
become more productive in their given areas.  This was further augmented by Rockart (1979) 
in the late 70s who studied the day-to-day data needs of chief executives.  Rockart (1979) 
found that the nature of executive positions meant that there were frequent changes to data 
requirements, and could be attributed to changes in industry, stage of growth, location, 
strategy and the perspective of the researcher  (Dezdar & Sulaiman, 2009; Rockart, 1979).  
Although Rockart describes CSF as a management tool that centred on “…information needs 
for management control…“, no mention is made of methods of control available to those 
managers (Rockart, 1979, pg88).  One problem identified when trying to consolidate CSF 
research was identified by Dezdar and Sulaiman (2009) when they examined the different 
classifications used to describe CSF (a full list of classifications by Dezdar & Sulaiman 
(2009) can be found in Appendix ).  Table 2.4 shows the many different categories given to 
Top Management Support and Commitment, the highest ranked CSF in the Deldar and 
Sulaiman study (A full list of the CSFs and different classifications used can be found in 
Appendix f). 
Table 2.4: Different CSF Classifications used to describe ‘Top Management Support and 
Commitment’ 
Critical Success Factor Different Classifications used to describe this CSF 
Top management support and commitment Top management/executive involvement 
Top management/ executive commitment 
Top management/executive awareness 
Top management/executive participation 
Company-wide support 
Company-wide commitment 
Dedicated resources 
Employee recognition and incentive 
Funds support 
(Dezdar & Sulaiman, 2009) 
 
 
Using Dezdar & Sulaiman’s (2009) classification as a guide, a comparison was done of CSF 
research completed by Nelson & Somers (2001) (Appendix g), Finney & Corbett (2007) 
(Appendix h), Nah et al., (2003) (Appendix i) and Akkermans & van Helden (2002) 
(appendix j).  Each of these studies compiled findings from a mix of primary and secondary 
research and proposed a list and ranking system of CSF within ERP projects.  These studies 
have been compared in the following table (Table 2.5).   
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 Table 2.5: Comparison of CSF rankings between different studies 
(When a study had multiple risk factors capable of being compared with the Dezdar and Sulaiman (2009) list, all 
risks that fell within that category were listed with their respective risk rankings.  When comparing for lowest, 
highest and average rankings with items containing multiple numbers, the lowest number was used.)  
 
Possibly the most obvious finding is that apart from five categories which consistently ranked 
within the top ten across all of the studies, there appears to be little cohesion between the 
other factors in these studies.  The top five CSFs are listed in table 2.6. 
  
Critical Success Factor 
categories (Dezdar & 
Sulaiman, 2009) 
Somers 
& 
Nelson 
(2001) 
Finney 
& 
Corbett 
(2007) 
Nah et 
al 
(2003) 
Akkermans 
& van 
Helden 
(2002) 
Critical Success Factor 
rankings 
Lowest 
ranking 
Highest 
ranking 
Average 
ranking 
Top management 
support and commitment  
1, 12 1, 26 1 1, 12 1 1 1.00 
Project management and 
evaluation  
5 6, 8, 
14, 18, 
24 
4, 7 5 4 6 5.00 
Business process 
reengineering and 
minimum customization 
16, 17 3, 4 4, 5, 8 16, 17 3 16 9.75 
ERP team composition, 
competence and 
compensation  
2, 13 5, 9, 
16, 24, 
26 
3 2, 13 2 5 3.00 
Change management 
programme  
7, 19 2, 13 5, 7 7, 19 2 7 5.25 
User training and 
education  
14 4 12 14, 15 4 14 11.00 
Business plan and vision 4, 15 6, 8, 
11, 14, 
25 
7 4 4 7 5.25 
Enterprise-wide 
communication and 
cooperation  
3, 6 11 6 3, 6 3 11 5.75 
Organizational culture  23 27 1, 5 23 1 27 18.5 
Vendor support  9, 20, 
21 
27 6 9, 20, 21 6 9 18.75 
Software analysis, testing 
and troubleshooting  
11 19, 21, 
22 
9, 10 11 9 19 12.5 
Project champion  10 10, 26 2 8 2 10 7.5 
Careful Selection of ERP 
Software 
8 15 12 10, 18 8 15 11.25 
Use of consultant  22 7 3, 6, 10 22 3 22 13.5 
Appropriate business and  
IT legacy systems  
23 12, 20 9, 11 23 9 12 16.75 
System quality  23 17 4 23 2 17 16.75 
User involvement 23 23 12 23 23 23 20.25 
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Table 2.6: Top ranked CSF by average across different studies  
CSF Average CSF rating 
Top management support and commitment  1 
ERP team composition, competence and compensation  3 
Project management and evaluation  5 
Change management programme  5.2 
Business plan and vision  5.6 
(Akkermans & van Helden, 2002; Dezdar & Sulaiman, 2009; Finney & Corbett, 2007; Nah et al., 2003; Somers 
& Nelson, 2001) 
 
When examining the data sources of these studies, the differences appear to be a natural 
extension of Rockart’s original work (1979).  It was noted that different companies within 
different industries, stage of growth, location, project, strategy and stakeholder group will 
produce different CSF (Rockart, 1979).  It may be that this analysis has identified CSF 
specifically relating to ERP projects and removed the additional variables associated with the 
specific businesses involved.  While at face value this may appear a possible explanation, 
research looking at key issues for IT executives has identified additional variables which 
have been shown to influence the factors deemed critical to IT Executives on a yearly basis.  
Established research by the Society of Information Management (who have examined key 
issues for IT Executives since 1980) have found that although certain key issues remain at the 
forefront of IT Executive concerns, the priority with which they are placed can and frequently 
change from year to year.   
 
If we look at table 2.7, the ranking of Business Process Re-engineering is either very low 
(third in the studies by Finney & Corbett, 2007 and Nah et al., 2003) or very high (16 or 17 in 
studies by Akkermans & van Helden, 2002 and Somers & Nelson, 2001). 
 
Table 2.7: Rankings of Business process reengineering 
 
 
 
 
 
Critical Success Factor 
categories (Dezdar & 
Sulaiman, 2009) 
Somers 
& 
Nelson 
(2001) 
Finney 
& 
Corbett 
(2007) 
Nah et 
al 
(2003) 
Akkermans 
& van 
Helden 
(2002) 
Critical Success Factor 
rankings 
Lowest 
ranking 
Highest 
ranking 
Average 
ranking 
Business process 
reengineering and 
minimum customization 
16, 17 3, 4 4, 5, 8 16, 17 3 16 9.75 
23 
 
Table 2.8: Top 10 IT Management Concerns between 2003 and 2010 
IT Management Concerns 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 
Business Productivity and cost reduction 1 1 7 4     
Business agility and speed to market 2 3 13 17 7  5 7 
IT and business alignment 3 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 
IT reliability and efficiency 4 6       
Business process re-engineering 5 4 18 15 11 5 10 10 
IT strategic planning 6 7 3 8 4 4 4 2 
Revenue-generating IT innovations 6 8       
IT cost deduction 8 5 7 4     
Security and privacy 9 9 8 6 3 2 3 3 
Globalization 10 15       
*cells with blank data indicate that the issue was not asked in that year’s survey 
 
In table 2.8, Business Process Re-engineering has fluctuated in popularity between a high of 
18 in 2008, to a low of 4 in 2009 with differing values in the years preceding.  Without 
confirmed statistics on the year/s the data was gathered for the studies, or the Business 
Process Re-engineering ranking for those years, it may be that this could have been an 
influencing factor based on the year the data was gathered.  Irrespective of the reasons for the 
ranking differences, there is enough evidence to suggest that an approach looking solely at 
frequency to determine the ultimate rankings of CSF over a prolonged period may be too 
simplistic an approach.  Based on the literary findings, the disparities found would suggest 
that additional research examining CSF rankings involving additional constructs will add 
significantly to this area. 
 
2.3 Risk Factors in ERP Projects 
As has already been noted, there are a number of studies which have identified CSFs and 
collated them into lists and this same treatment (although to a lesser degree) has been 
afforded risk analysis in ERP projects.  Like CSFs, comparisons were made between different 
risk factors in an effort to find the most common risks occurring in ERP projects and create a 
master list on which ERP implementation can be based (Aloini et al., 2012; Sumner, 2000).  
Apart from the reoccurring issues with categorisation as noted by Dezdar & Sulaiman, if we 
compare the Dezdar & Sulaiman CSF (2009) categories with that of Sumner (2000), the 
similarities between CSF and Risk factors appear to be quite strong (Table 2.9). 
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Table 2.9: Comparison of CSF to Risk factors  
CSF Risk Factors 
Top management support and commitment  Lack of senior management support 
Project management and evaluation  Lack of full time commitment of customers to project 
management and project activities 
Organizational culture   
Change management programme  Lack of proper management control structure 
Business plan and vision   
Enterprise-wide communication and cooperation  Ineffective communication 
ERP team composition, competence and 
compensation  
Lack of business analysts with business and technical 
knowledge 
Business process reengineering and minimum 
customization  
Failure to redesign business processes 
 
Project champion  Lack of champion 
Vendor support  Failure to mix internal and external expertise effectively 
User training and education Insufficient training and reskilling 
Lack of sensitivity to user resistance 
Careful Selection of ERP Software 
 
Failure to adhere to standardised specifications which the 
software supports 
Appropriate business and IT legacy systems  Attempting to build bridges to legacy applications 
Software analysis, testing and troubleshooting   
System quality   
Use of consultant  Insufficient ‘internal’ expertise 
User involvement Insufficient training of end users 
(Dezdar & Sulaiman, 2009)   (Sumner, 2000) 
 
While the two lists of factors compare, fundamental differences can be found in the way the 
factors are framed and their application.  Framing represents the delivery of the choices in 
either a positive or negative manner (Zickar & Highhouse, 1998), and is in line with the 
assessment given by Alter and Sherer (2004) when describing ERP critical success factors as 
factors that increase the chances of a positive outcome, and ERP risk factors increase the 
chances of a negative outcome.  The second way that risk analysis differs is that the 
following studies have placed less emphasis on ranking risks by frequency, but rather have 
analysed risks based on a number of different criteria including risk categories and the stage 
in which they would be expected to occur within an ERP implementation (Sumner, 2000).   
 
One additional form of analysis draws on the interconnected nature of risks and proposes a 
hierarchy of risks, where a risk appearing early in an ERP implementation can have a direct 
effect on risks at later stages. The Hierarchy of Risks structure was tested against a single 
case and delivered promising results with further research proposed (Aloini et al., 2012).   
 
Based on a comprehensive literature review and an empirical investigation of multiple case 
studies, Sumner (2000) identified both risk factors and risk categories associated with ERP 
projects (Appendix d), thus refining the general concept of IT-related risks towards ERP-
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related risks. These include factors associated with organisational fit, skill mix, management 
structure and strategy, software systems design, user involvement and training, technology 
planning, project management and social commitment (Sumner, 2000). As a consequence of 
the ERP focus, and identification of ERP specific risk factors and categories, the risk factors 
and categories as described by Sumner (2000) will be used in this research.  The categories 
and definitions of each of the risks identified in Sumner (2000) are as follows: 
 
2.3.1 Organisational Fit 
This first category refers to all risks associated with the organisational environment, 
including changes of scope or objective.   
 
1. Failure to redesign business processes to fit the software 
ERP systems are highly complex, and some debate exists between the need to 
customise the software to the business or the business to the software (Luo & 
Strong, 2004; Markus & Tanis, 2000).  Business process redesign is essential 
(Aloini et al., 2007), and in instances where customisation is unavoidable 
(especially when a process is deemed by a business to be a competitive 
advantage), IT has been identified as a valuable tool to enable this to happen 
(Tsai et al., 2010).   
 
2. Failure to follow an Enterprise-wide design which supports data integration 
This risk refers to the need to have a co-ordinated process when it comes to 
ERP implementations instead of separate modular implementations where the 
intention is to couple the different components after go-live. 
 
2.3.2 Skill mix 
This category includes both insufficient numbers of staff, as well as skill shortages of those 
staff present. 
 
3. Insufficient training and reskilling of IT workforce 
This is an area that is often underestimated as the requirements to both budget 
and time are often higher than expected.  This risk encompasses all training 
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requirements needed to ensure IT staff are trained in the use and development 
of the new ERP initiative (Sumner, 2000).   
 
4. Insufficient ‘internal’ IT expertise 
Internal IT expertise refers to the needed internal IT skills of the project team 
(Aloini et al., 2007).  Peng and Nunes (2004) identified that members of the 
senior management team are also affected because they are neither experts or 
users so will typically lack systems experience. 
 
5. Lack of business analysts with business and technical knowledge 
Business analysts with business and technical skills have a large bearing on 
the success of the project (Aloini et al., 2007).  Additionally project team 
members need to have a deep knowledge of the processes. 
 
6. Failure to mix internal and external expertise effectively 
External consultants are necessary to the success of an ERP implementation as 
they fill in any skill gaps and the relationship will be long term and inter-
dependant (Brehm & Markus, 2000).  As a consequence, it is important to 
form a skill balanced team of internal and external experts as the engagement 
of external expertise plays a major role in diminishing risk (Aloini et al., 
2007). 
 
7. Lack of ability to recruit and retain qualified ERP systems developers 
This risk encompasses two aspects important to an ERP project.  The first is 
recruitment, and looks at the ability of an organisation to find appropriately 
trained staff for the ERP implementation.  This can be difficult as staff with 
the required skills can be hard to find, and when found can demand high 
wages.  The second component is retention, and involves the use of incentives 
and bonuses to keep qualified ERP systems developers in the business. The 
benefits of retention can be felt in ongoing implementations as experience is 
important in ERP implementations (Parr & Shanks, 2000) 
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2.3.3 Management structure and strategy 
This category includes all risks associated with the senior management team 
 
8. Lack of senior management support 
Empirical evidence examining project implementations in general have 
identified strategic issues associated with senior management support to be 
most important at the beginning of the project (Parr & Shanks, 2004).  Further 
research suggests that Strategic support is essential throughout the life of a 
project (extending past go-live) and ensuring that support is present is 
essential to its success (Aloini et al., 2007; Peng & Nunes, 2009; Pinto & 
Slevin, 1987). 
 
9. Lack of proper management control structure 
Proper management control structure is used to identify systems in place to 
avoid excessive amounts of duplication of effort (Sumner, 2000). Poor 
controls can significantly affect project success, especially in the early stages 
of an implementation.  Tools to aid in this process include risk management 
activities (i.e. risk registries), but only if done correctly (Aloini et al., 2007).  
Risk registries have also been credited as creating an illusion of control if not 
used correctly (Drummond, 2011). 
 
 
10. Lack of champion 
A Project Champion is vital to a projects success, especially in both the early 
stages, and during the implementation.  Their role is to lead the project, with 
one identified key function being as a driver for end user training (Aloini et 
al., 2007) 
Appointment of a Project champion needs to be early and they need to be 
empowered to be able to make decisions (Parr & Shanks 2000). 
 
11. Ineffective managerial communication 
Communication is a necessity on all levels, with clear articulated goals and 
vision to be effective (Aloini et al., 2007).  One method of instigating 
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communication at the managerial level is with risk registries.  Unfortunately 
risk registries are often seen as an administrative overhead for project 
managers and are either not used, or not used to the full extent (Patterson & 
Neailey, 2002).   
 
2.3.4 Software systems design 
This encompasses all risks associated with scope and requirements 
12. Failure to adhere to standardised specifications which the software supports 
Failure to adhere to standard specifications by introducing systems 
modifications can lead to failure (Markus & Tanis, 2000).  If modifications are 
required, it needs to be planned from the beginning of the project to be 
effective, or it can lead to problems (Aloini et al., 2007) 
 
13. Lack of integration 
The project needs to be based on an enterprise wide design.  Any attempts to 
implement separate functionality with the goal of eventual integration should 
be avoided (Sumner, 2000). 
 
2.3.5 User involvement and training 
Factors involving users and they interact with the project including communication, 
participation and training can all affect an ERP project. 
 
14. Insufficient training of end users 
End user training is important for the success in ERP system implementations 
success (Aloini et al., 2007) but insufficient training can be bought about by 
initial failures, leading to a lack of confidence and higher levels of user 
resistance to the system (Peng and Nunes, 2009) 
 
15. Ineffective end user communication 
End user communication achieves goals outside of the obvious requirement to 
keep users informed.  Aloini et al (2007) stated that communication is a 
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necessity, and that end user communication has the ability to improve users’ 
expectations, and also helps in planning for training. 
 
16. Lack of full time commitment of customers to project management and project 
activities 
This risk covers both a lack of individuals being release for the project, and 
personnel with inadequate skills being allocated to the project team. (Parr & 
Shanks, 2000) 
 
17. Lack of sensitivity to user resistance 
User commitment is essential and this can be fostered by managing resistance 
(Aloini et al., 2007). There are increased chances of resistance at go-live 
because of factors such as an unwillingness to change (Peng & Nunes, 2009). 
 
18. Failure to emphasise reporting 
The ability to produce reports is a fundamental component of ERP systems, 
and ensuring end user participation in the generation and design of reports is 
essential (Sumner, 2000) 
 
2.3.6 Technology planning / integration 
This is the only technical risk category and encompasses technological risks which include 
ways in which the technology fails to meet requirements. 
19. Inability to avoid technological bottlenecks 
Technological bottlenecks occur when organisations wishing to retain and 
interface multiple systems experience delays when attempting to bridge the 
ERP system with legacy applications. (Sumner, 2000) 
 
20. Attempting to build bridges to legacy applications 
This can lead to problems with non-engagement as users continue to use the 
old systems (Aloini et al., 2007) 
 
(Sumner, 2000) 
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As indicated in the introduction, IT related risks are highly dynamic in the sense that they 
vary throughout a project as a function of prior decisions and behaviour, which might lead to 
unintended behaviour and consequences (Alter & Sherer, 2004; Markus, 2000). With ERP 
implementations in particular, residual risk might increase over time (contrary to 
conventional IT projects) as ERP systems tend to be continuously enhanced and further 
integrated with other systems, increasing complexity, which in turn increases their failure-
proneness (Markus, 2000).   
 
2.4 Risks across the different stages of an ERP implementation 
The process view of ERP implementation sees implementations as a sequence of stages 
where the outcome of each stage can be examined, as well as the cumulative outcome across 
all of the stages (Markus & Tanis, 2000; Somers & Nelson, 2004). Many different models of 
ERP implementation have been created (see Parr & Shanks (2000). This research is using the 
enterprise systems experience cycle by Markus and Tanis (2000), which includes a planning 
stage as well as a post-implementation stage (see Figure 1). The purpose of this framework 
was to explain ERP success, which also makes it very useful in trying to understand actions 
and effects related to ERP failure and associated risks in each stage. The four stages of this 
model are: 
 
Project Chartering: This stage details the activities performed prior to project and funding 
approval.  Activities include business case development, ERP selection, identification of the 
project manager and scoping documents which include proposed budgets and timeframes 
(Parr & Shanks, 2000). Typical risk factors comprise the lack of top management support and 
championship and the lack of a proper management structure for the project (Sumner 2000). 
This is also confirmed by Nah and Delgado (2006) and Parr and Shanks (2000), who found 
that top management support and championship was the most important activity during this 
stage.  Other risks include selection of inappropriate software, inadequate contracting with 
vendors and consultants, Failure to recognise the need for business change, underestimating 
change management requirements, misunderstanding of reporting requirements (Markus & 
Tanis, 2000) 
 
The Project (Configure and Rollout): This stage is focused with getting the system and end 
users up and running (Markus & Tanis 2000). Parr and Shanks (2000) found that it was 
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crucial to have a balanced project team and the best people available in this stage. This stage 
is marked by its focus on the hard, technical tasks of installing the system rather than softer 
social tasks such as change management. Typical risk factors to be addressed are failure to 
redesign business processes, failure to follow an enterprise-wide data design, lack of business 
analysts, failure to adhere to standardized specifications and the lack of data integration 
(Sumner 2000).  Additional factors include inadequate IT training, project team not 
representative of the entire organisation, poor training, external experts with inadequate 
knowledge and inadequate end-user training. 
 
Shakedown: The shakedown stage includes all those activities associated to the system going 
live in an organisation until all initial problems have been resolved. It ends when normal 
operations resume and control is passed from the project team to the respective operational 
managers (Markus & Tanis 2000). In this stage any control issues unresolved from earlier 
stages would appear, typically taking the form of performance issues and disruptions in 
productivity (Muscatello & Parente, 2006). Typical risk factors include insufficient training 
and re-skilling of the IT workforce in new technology, insufficient internal expertise and 
failure to mix internal and external expertise effectively (Sumner 2000). Additional factors 
include business disruption, difficulty diagnosing performance problems, building and 
maintaining workarounds, data input errors, inadequate end user training. 
 
Onwards and upwards: This has been identified as the stage in which the benefits of an ERP 
system implementation will be felt within an organisation. This stage takes the organisation 
from the commencement of normal operations to eventual replacement – be that with an 
upgrade or different product. Typical activities during this stage include continuous business 
improvement, additional user skill building and assessments of the post implementation 
benefits.  The degrees in which businesses engage in system enhancement appear unknown. 
Parr and Shanks (2000) noted that there was no marked enhancement phase in the 
implementations they examined with the possibility that this may be a common occurrence.  
Failure to embark on product enhancements was considered a common risk, and includes 
other such as insufficient documentation and loss of knowledgeable personnel (Parr & 
Shanks, 2000). 
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2.5 Heuristics 
Heuristics is introduced as the intervening principle because complex situations as 
experienced in ERP implementations will seldom provide all the necessary information 
(Lyytinen et al., 1998). Heuristics as a concept can roughly be defined as a ‘rule of thumb’ 
and the term denotes a solution to a situation where all required information may not be 
available. When similarities to other resolved situations are discernible, aspects of that 
solution can be used instead of a logarithmic approach which requires all conditions to be 
met.  
Lyytinen et al., (1998) further describe the process as both objective and subjective. 
Objective analysis describes the process of acting upon what can be seen (Wolf, 1978), and is 
the trigger mechanism in the idea or principle of observation. Subjective analysis is based on 
continuous learning and experience (Wolf, 1978), and describes the process of matching risks 
to risk resolution and control techniques using heuristics as a lens to focus personal 
experience or interpretation (Lyytinen et al., 1998).  
 
When searching for empirical research on the use of heuristics or any other interceding 
constructs between risk and control, a review of risk management literature in ERP 
implementations by Aloini et al., (2007) compiled a list of types of project failures and noted 
an intermediary of ‘effect’ in the correlation between risks and why they fail. ‘Effect’ is used 
as an identifier for factors which could impact an implementation (e.g. budget exceeded) 
(Aloini et al., 2007), and is similar in definition to the Lyytinen et al., (1998) use of ‘impact’ 
analysis. These two terms are used interchangeably and denote a many-to-one relationship in 
which each risk may have many impacts on a business and these will lead to specific types of 
project failure (Aloini et al., 2007). While no connection is made between risks, impacts and 
controls, the use of heuristics as a lens is an area where further research may increase our 
understanding of the relationship and bridge the gap between risk identification and risk 
control. It is for this reason that the concept of heuristics marries so well with risk 
management encompassing risk control (Lyytinen et al., 1998), and why this model was 
chosen to examine the relationship of risks and controls in this research.  Additionally, impact 
analysis will also be explored as a potential interceding construct in an attempt to give this 
relationship structure as project managers are familiar with the term and have used that 
analysis in risk registries to calculate risk severity by the assignment of a numerical value 
(Patterson & Neailey, 2002). 
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2.7 Risk resolution and control 
A link between risks and controls was established by examining statistics relating to IS 
project failures and concluding that the failure rate could be diminished if projects improve 
their usage of controls (Liu et al., 2008).  Risks and controls have also been envisioned as 
being different sides of the same coin, and the purpose of controls is to mitigate and reduce 
risks so that they are within acceptable limits (Moller, 2005; Gallivan & Depledge, 2003). 
 
2.7.1 Control in ERP projects 
Similar to risks a behavioural view of control is adopted. This view implies that when a 
controller exercises control over a controlee, the controller is taking some action in order to 
regulate or adjust the behaviour of the controlee (Kirsch 1996). The behavioural view further 
presumes that the controller uses certain control mechanisms in the exercise of four different 
modes of control, which may broadly be divided into formal and informal controls (Kirsch 
1997). Each control mode can be implemented through multiple control mechanisms and 
combined into a portfolio of control (Choudhury & Sabherwal, 2003, Kanellou & Spathis, 
2011; Kirsch, 1997). It should also be noted that the same general control mechanism can 
support more than one control mode (Table 2.10). Formal controls are comprised of two 
modes, output and behavioural based controls. Output controls are mechanisms in place that 
define appropriate output targets (e.g. sales targets) and are concerned with what has been 
done as opposed to how it is done. Behavioural controls are different in that the outcome is of 
secondary importance to the method in which it was achieved and details an approach or set 
of instructions which are designed to result in a standard set of outcomes (e.g. procedures and 
instructions) (Choudhury & Sabherwal 2003; Eisenhardt 1985; Elofson 1994). Informal 
controls consist of clan and self-control. Clan control is likened to the cohesive practices of a 
group and is typified by the degree to which all members of a group are committed to 
achieving group goals (Ouchi, 1979). Self-control is solely reliant on an individual’s ability 
to monitor and control their own behaviours, with appropriate rewards and sanctions as 
required (Albadri & Jordan 2003; Harris et al., 2009). 
 
The concept of control is an established area of research and has featured in a number of 
studies examining outsourcing and software development (e.g., Choudhury & Sabherwal 
2003; Dibbern et al., 2008; Eisenhardt, 1985; Harris et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2008). However, 
methods of resolving identified risks in ERP projects by exercising control is still in the 
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formative stages with studies having concentrated on either risk mitigation at the strategic 
level or risk identification and prioritisation (Aloini et al., 2012). Within risk management, 
control has been described as a stage following risk assessment (Du et al., 2007). In general, 
the types of control potentially useful in managing IT-related risk are as varied as the risks 
themselves (Markus, 2000). This is further complicated by the fact that control attempts are 
not invariably successful as they vary greatly according to the context, what type and to what 
extent control has been used (Remus & Weiner, 2012). Nevertheless, perceived control 
should be seen as a powerful factor influencing both risk perception and decision-making (Du 
et al., 2007). 
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Table 2.10: Control mechanisms  
Control mode Control mechanism Examples of control mechanism 
Outcome 
control 
Mechanisms to explicitly specify desired 
outcomes  that were assessed later 
Mechanisms (including IS) to evaluate the 
quality and timing of outputs delivered by 
the vendor 
Defined target implementation date and/or 
budget 
Expected level of performance 
Defined project milestones  
Behaviour 
control 
Mechanisms by which the controller 
explicitly specified rules, procedures, or 
processes for the controlee to follow 
Mechanisms to facilitate direct observation 
of the controlees behaviour 
IS designed to help the controller monitor 
behaviour of the controlee 
Development methodology 
Job description 
Supervisor-subordinate hierarchy 
Work assignment 
Rules & procedures 
Clan control To promote shared goals 
To promote and assess adherence to shared 
beliefs and values 
Coalitions of individuals with shared 
ideologies 
Socialization 
Hiring & training practices 
Implemented rituals and ceremonies 
Self control To encourage or motivate the controlee to 
exercise greater self-control 
Individual empowerment 
Self-management 
Work autonomy (who / how)  
Self-set goals, self-monitoring, and self-
rewarding 
(adapted from Kirsch (1997) and Choudhury & Sabherwal (2003) 
 
While there is a gap in identifying and selecting control modes for mitigating risks within 
ERP projects, prior literature on control in IS development, such as Choudhury and 
Sabherwal (2003) and Elofson (1994) can assist in selecting appropriate controls. One 
problem found with control selection was the unpredictable effect that controls implemented 
for one risk may have on another.  Indeed it was found that some control measures in place 
have the ability to control more than one risk and that the same risk may be controlled in two 
different ways by different organisations (Gopal & Gosin, 2009; Lyytinen et al., 1998).  This 
hierarchical concept has not, however, been explored thus far in research.  Gopal and Gosin 
(2009) explored outsourcing and the performance effects of controls and found that controls 
implemented for one risk may have negative effects on another risk.  Conversely it is argued 
that some controls can be put in place to control more than one risk (Lyytinen et al., 1998).  
While these individual control modes have specific characteristics with regards to the 
properties of the risks they address, the use of multiple controls or portfolio of controls has 
been identified as an important concept (Kirsch, 1997). Control portfolios are the use of 
multiple controls at the same time to control risks, and can include the use of formal and 
informal control mechanisms simultaneously (Gopal & Gosain, 2009). Furthermore, Kirsch 
(2004) explored the dynamics of control during large IS projects and found that control is 
exercised differently for each stage following certain patterns, such as “collective sense 
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making” “technical winnowing” and “collaborative coordinating”. More importantly, some 
factors trigger changes in control choices from one project stage to another and emerging 
issues in one stage trigger changes to controls in other stages. Even though this research was 
based on custom-developed applications, these finding may also have important implications 
for this research, in particular with regard to similarities in terms of the scope of large IS 
projects and as some of these factors, such as performance problems are often perceived as 
risks. 
 
2.8 Summary 
The literature review on risk, control and ERP implementation projects shows that in each 
single field there is already a significant volume of research, which could frame the 
underlying research questions of this study and help explaining the findings. In particular, 
Markus and Tanis (2000) Enterprise System Experience Cycle will be used to frame the 
investigation of risk controls according to different stages and changes across stages, the 
conceptualization of risk management by Lyytinen et al. (1998), the comprehensive list of 
risk factors compiled by Sumner (2000) will be used to further explain how risk control is 
exercised in each stage, and why control changes across stages. 
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Chapter Three: 
Research 
Design and 
Methodology 
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3.0 Research Model 
From the literature review the following model has been developed to describe the constructs 
of ERP implementation stages, their associated risks and means of controlling/resolving that 
risk (Figure 2). This model combines stage transition and iteration when examining risks and 
controls in relation to the stages of an ERP implementation. The stage transitions are 
illustrated in the progressive steps going from stage 1 “project chartering” through to stage 4 
“onwards and upwards” and include unidentified risks. Iteration is used to step through risk 
identification at each of the different ERP implementation stages and when a risk is 
discovered, either an appropriate control measure is found to counter this risk or in certain 
circumstances it is left uncontrolled and is addressed at a later stage. The inclusion of 
unidentified and uncontrolled risks in stage transition is based on Sumner (2000) where it was 
found that unidentified or unaddressed risks had a cumulative effect on successive stages in 
an ERP installation. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Proposed research model 
 
A qualitative research design is applied by answering questions about how and why 
organisations exercise control in regards to identified risks during different stages of an ERP 
project. This approach is in line with previous research in this area (Kirsch 2004; Sumner 
2000) and will draw upon the processes described in Eisenhardt (1989). In line with Kirsch 
(2004) this approach can be characterized as “soft positivism”, described as a means of 
revealing both “pre-existing phenomena and relationships” as well as the ability to “surface 
39 
other constructs..., in the manner of interpretivists or grounded theorists” (pp. 378).As this 
research is designed to investigate pre-existing phenomena (e.g. ERP risks and controls) 
whilst retaining the ability to explore additional constructs (e.g. how risks and controls 
relate), this approach was deemed most appropriate.  A comparative case study strategy, as 
used by Robey et al., (2002) was also adopted because of the difficulty found with identifying 
the boundaries between ERPs and their implementation contexts, and the enhanced ability to 
examine phenomena across different cases.   
 
In total, 15 face-to-face interviews were conducted comprising 12 different personnel from 
12 different organisations, and these interviews were divided into two groups.  Three 
exploratory interviews were conducted in the development of the interview protocol and were 
used to clarify the research questions, refine the scope of the research and remove any 
disconnect between the many different academic definitions used and those used in practice.  
An example of this was the need to include more definitions (e.g. control and risk) and the 
preference of ‘impact’ as opposed to ‘effect’ when describing how risks can influence the 
business.   The developed interview schedule (see Appendix a) was guided by the principles 
proposed by Langley (1999) and Yin (1994), and incorporated Sumner’s (2000) risk 
categories and the Lyytinen et al., (1998) Risk Management Approaches Model.   
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3.1 Data Collection 
The findings were collected using three methods 
 Interview - Semi-structured questionnaire 
 Interview – Structured questionnaire 
 Documentation 
 
The following tables summarises information about the companies (Table 3.1 and Table 3.2).  
While some of the company information was sourced directly from the respondents, a 
majority was sourced externally prior to the interviews and confirmed during.  These 
included physical sites, employee numbers, company age and industry.  It should be noted 
that the Group 1 interviews do not contain ERP or Model Used information.  This was 
because these initial interviews were used in the formulation of the interview schedule and as 
a means of gaining feedback from highly experienced practitioners to see how well academic 
understandings and definitions fitted with real world practice.   
 
All interviews (with permission from interviewees) were recorded with notes and 
observations made in an attempt to ensure accuracy of information.  Internal documentation 
was also obtained which was used to augment the notes taken.  
Due to technical difficulties, one of the interviews failed to record (Case 7 (ITM6)) but notes 
were made directly after (within 15 minutes) when the technical problem was discovered.   
 
3.2 Interview selection criteria 
The selection process used to identify personnel suitable for interview selection was based on 
a number of criteria.  The overlying prerequisites were that the interviewees had to have been 
involved in some aspect of risk control within tier one or tier two ERP projects completed 
either after 2007 or currently still in progress. While it was not a requirement, it was found 
that all participants had been involved in successful implementations and these were chosen 
by the participants as the focus of the interviews.   
 
The only participants where this was not their last implementation were ITM3 and ITM6.  
ITM3 was in the initial stages of the implementation and ITM6 had been involved with two 
consecutive implementations that were completed closely together.  The first of which was a 
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successful local installation and the second an unsuccessful off shore implementation (both of 
which were discussed).   
As with ITM6, a majority of the participants had also been involved with multiple projects 
(both ERP and other implementations) during their careers (see Table 3.2) and these 
experiences were noted and explored during the interviews.  Most noteworthy was that while 
all interviewees (except consultants) held senior management roles within their respective 
companies, all participants had adopted Project Management roles during the ERP 
implementations.  This allowed them to work closely with the projects as well as retaining 
access to executive level information, giving them the unique opportunity to observe and 
participate at both the Executive and project team levels (Table 3.2).   
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3.3 The Interviews 
The interviews were broken into two groups 
Group 1:  Exploratory interviews used to map the subject area and create the interview 
schedule 
Group 2. Interviews using the developed interview schedule 
 
Table 3.1: Interview Group 1  
Exploratory interviews used to map the subject area and create the interview schedule 
 
Interview 
I.D Job Title Project Role Industry 
Previous Experience 
  
 
      ERP Systems Other systems 
ITM1 Group IS Manager 
Project 
Manager Construction 10** 50+ 
ITM2 IT Director 
Project 
Manager 
Software 
Development 5** 50+ 
ERPC1 
Senior ERP 
Implementation 
Consultant and ERP 
company Director 
External 
Consultant 
Technical 
Services 50+ 10** 
 
Table 3.2: Interview Group 2  
Interviews using the developed interview schedule 
 
Interview 
I.D Job Title Project Role Industry 
 
Installations 
in current 
company 
Previous Experience 
  
 
      
 ERP 
Systems 
Other 
systems 
ITM3 Managing Director 
Project 
Manager 
Wholesale 
Trade 
 
3 5** 50+ 
ITM4 IT Manager 
Project 
Manager Manufacturing 
 
3 3 50+ 
ITM5 IT Director 
Project 
Manager Manufacturing 
 
12 15** 50+ 
ITM6 IS Manager 
Project 
Manager 
Wholesale 
Trade 
 
1 1 50+ 
ITM7 IT Manager 
Project 
Manager Manufacturing 
 
1 10** 50+ 
ITM8 IT Manager 
Project 
Manager 
Wholesale 
Trade 
 
3 10** 50+ 
ITM9 IT Manager 
Project 
Manager Manufacturing 
 
1 1 50+ 
ERPC2 Senior Consultant 
Project 
Manager Manufacturing 
 
1 50+ 50+ 
ERPC3 Senior Consultant 
Project 
Manager Manufacturing 
 
1 50+ 50+ 
* approximate estimations given by respondents 
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3.3.1 Group 1: Exploratory interviews used to create the interview 
schedule 
The exploratory stage included interviews with the Regional IT Director of a large multi-
national construction company, the Regional IT Director of a large multi-national software 
development company and an ex-Director \ Senior ERP consultant from one of the large ERP 
vendors.  These interviews were used to test the many theories used in the construction of this 
research and in the creation of an interview schedule (see Appendix a) which was used in the 
second group of interviews.  In particular areas explored were the definition of ERP systems, 
how these ERP systems were implemented (any implementation models used), risk 
categories, control mechanisms and methods, how these concepts relate to each other and any 
opinions or observations these individuals had regarding their experiences. 
 
3.3.2 Group 2. Interviews using the developed interview schedule 
The interviews conducted using the interview schedule were held with 9 participants over a 
course of 12 interviews which  on average took just under 2 hours each.  Each participant was 
encouraged to draw upon their previous experiences with these experiences explored in the 
nature of semi-structured interviews. The following is an outline of each company with 
details on the nature of the project they faced, the ERP system and implementation methods 
used and any identified critical success factors.   
 
 Indicates the use of a pseudonym to describe the company name and / or the Project 
Manager interviewed 
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3.4 Case descriptions  
The first section contains details of the business cases for implementation, and identifies ERP 
system selection, implementations models used and Critical Success Factors 
The second section contains the actual risks (events) and controls as recalled by the 
interviewees. 
The final section will be used to display collated data from organisational documentation; 
predominately risk registers detailing risks, the controls used to mediate these risks and the 
heuristic bonds bridging risks, impacts and controls.  This section was augmented with data 
from the interviews in an attempt to further confirm the findings through triangulation. 
 
Table 3.3: Organisation descriptions 
Project Locations Employees Industry ERP Company 
Age (yrs) 
Model Used 
ITM1 Multi-national 5,000+ Construction - 20 - 
ITM2 Multi-national 20,000+ Software - 20 - 
ERPC1 Multi-national 10,000+ Consultancy - 20 - 
       
ITM3 Multi-national 100 Textile Custom 10 Prototype 
ITM4 Multi-national 50,000 Building SAP 100 Bancroft 
ITM5 Multi-national 700 Manufacturing JD Edwards 100 Bancroft 
ITM6 Multi-national 30,000 Wholesale SAP 80 Bancroft \ Ross \ 
PPM 
ITM7 Multi-national 800 Textile JD Edwards 100 Prototype 
ITM8 Multi-national 500 Manufacturing Tier 2 30 PPM 
ITM9 Multi-national 350 Manufacturing JD Edwards 50 Prototype 
ERPC2 Multi-national 150 Agricultural Lawsons 10 Bancroft \ Ross \ 
Markus and Tanis \ 
Custom 
ERPC3 Multi-national 100 Building JD Edwards 50 Bancroft \ Ross \ 
Markus and Tanis \ 
Custom 
 
 
 
 Indicates the use of a pseudonym to describe the company name and / or the Project 
Manager interviewed 
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3.4.1 Case 4 (ITM3) 
Company Name - Textile Trading International (TTI)* 
Interviewee - Mr Tony Holder* 
 
This interview was conducted with Mr Tony Holder*, the regional site Managing Director of 
the wholesale trade company Textile Trading International*.  TTI have approximately 50 full 
time staff and have been operating for over 10 years as an international textile wholesale 
operation with offices in New Zealand and the UK.  Mr Holder joined the company six 
months prior to the ERP implementation and was the major driving force behind the adoption 
of an ERP system within that company.  The main reason given for the haste was that there 
were no integrated systems in place with all pricing and stock control done via MS Excel 
spread sheets requiring data to be entered multiple times by different operators.  The systems 
in place had evolved over a number of years and was recognised as a major business risk by 
the managing director, in particular it had been identified as being directly responsible for the 
lack of control by the managers over the financial position of the company.  This lack of 
control was deemed directly responsible for sales and currency trading losses experienced 
within the company.  The solution sought was to implement an ERP system to allow greater 
control by the company with different ERP solutions evaluated by the Managing Director and 
UK based IT Manager including SAP, Oracle and custom solutions.  Which option to choose 
was identified as another major risk as none of the options explored had any experience in 
this business arena so picking companies based on prior successes was not possible.  Nor 
were they able to contact or identify software solutions used by their successful competitors 
as although some initial software development had occurred in the area of ERPs, 
development of existing systems had stopped in the 90s and what little existed was already in 
use and did not offer a business solution to the problems faced nor a means of fostering any 
competitive advantage. This was especially critical because this area of the textile industry 
had been in decline and had not been particularly successful.  What was identified as needed 
was to “change the paradigm a bit and that meant understanding exactly what and why and 
how”. 
 
After analysing SAP and Oracle it was determined that there would be little benefit to 
implementing an off-the-shelf product as the modules selected and the customisation required 
to get the ERP system and the business processes aligned would potentially be the same as a 
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custom build.  Additionally due to the lack of experience in this field there was still the 
possibility that the fit might not reflect optimum business practices resulting in compromises 
and the further possibility of greater business process changes required.  An additional 
problem was that technical resources for implementing SAP or Oracle could potentially 
balloon the costs of the implementation to a figure far in excess of any perceived ROI to be 
gained from such a system. 
 
An alternative custom solution was found in the shape of a local software development 
company. Software Development are a development company that had enjoyed a long 
working relationship with the Managing director, especially in his previous capacity 
managing software development at another company.  Although during his time this 
relationship did not extend to the role of a client, a high degree of trust had been established.  
While this relationship was one of the reasons for their inclusion as an ERP option, 
unanimous agreement was needed from both the Managing Director and the IT Manager 
before a decision would be made, and the IT manager had already established a preference 
for either SAP or Oracle to be implemented.  Being from the UK he had no experience with 
this local company and minimal knowledge of the language used so a high degree of 
scepticism existed that they would be able to outperform either of the 2 ERP specialist 
companies.  He had previous experience with implementing ERP systems (SAP) in the past 
and was aware of the huge implications and ramification of a wrong choice.  On the deciding 
2 week visit over from the UK, a meeting was arranged 2 days before the IT manager was to 
return to the UK to visit this company to assess them as an option.  While they were classed 
as a custom software company, the solution proposed was not a complete new build but 
rather based on existing modules created by Software Development and already successfully 
in use at other companies.  The existing modules consisted of an entire financial layer and 
base behavioural modules with additional behaviour required dependent on the identified 
business processes currently in place.  While showing both the Managing Director and the IT 
manager their system, Software Development struck a chord with the IT manager when they 
demonstrated a solution that they had implemented successfully into bakeries.  The IT 
Manager had personally been involved with such a project earlier in his career in the UK 
which had failed due to specific required business processes which were unable to be mapped 
with the tools available in the solution used.  Seeing first-hand how innovatively Software 
Development had solved the problems the IT manager had previously though 
insurmountable, the trust the Managing Director had in them as a solution provider and the 
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high degree of access to both Software Development and external programming resources 
convinced the IT manager that Software Development were a serious contender.  Their 30 
minute meeting turned into a 3 hour demonstration with the IT manager downloading a copy 
of their software the next morning, and made the decision to use them soon after.  The 
decision to use Software Development was made and implemented in a 2 stage process.  
Stage 1 was a preliminary prototyping stage which would encompass the creation of a 
prototype module containing desired functionality of an area identified as being potentially 
the most difficult to create, Stage Two was the actual implementation. 
 
ERP system 
Textile Trading chose a custom ERP solution for two major reasons.  The first was that there 
appeared to be no ERP solutions specifically designed for their industry so any off-the-shelf 
solution would lack best industry practices.   
“…the systems that were there were variations of stock systems that other people had 
built and they’re taken to a certain degree but…stopped development of them about 
15 years previous.” 
 
The second reason given was that all off-the-shelf solutions would require extensive amounts 
of unknown customisation resulting in a solution that still may not have offered a complete 
fit.   
 “If we had picked up an existing package and implemented it, we think we would 
have ended up with a particular … stock focus, not a sales focus, which is where we 
want it to be and secondly, we wanted to be able to understand why things were like 
they were. 
 
It was envisioned that customisation would also have implications on implementation costs 
which would require continuous modifications. 
…”We evaluated a package and the people said that they could modify it for an 
hourly rate, but they didn’t actually know what we wanted modified and the 
specification of what they had was such that we couldn’t tell what they had and I 
don’t think they actually knew what they had either and so we ended up deciding that 
it was better just to start from scratch and … work from there.” 
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They performed a series of implementations, the first of which was in New Zealand.  This 
first project was new for the company and treated as a pilot implementation with the option of 
rolling out to other locations if it was successful 
 “It was a pilot…and we wrote the system from scratch.” 
 
Although Mr Holder had not had experience with ERP systems prior to the implementation, 
he had made a point of finding out about other implementations  
“…I spoke to a lot of people about what they’re doing and where they’re at and …I 
see these guys installing big ERP systems and they go on and on and on.” 
 
and this knowledge forewarned him about issues associated with off-the-shelf ERP systems.  
Additionally he had worked in a software development company and this made him aware of 
other viable alternatives 
“…I think most ERP systems are a mix of existing modules that have to be plugged 
together and the plugging there’s almost as much writing of software code as there is 
in writing it from scratch.” 
 
Implementation Model 
Although Tony did not have a formalised implementation plan in mind when implementing 
the ERP system, he did have an idea of what needed to be achieved  
“…So did I have a step plan – not actually.  I had a plan that said, “Identify the 
modules.  Specify the requirements of the modules.  Get the software developed and 
test it and do some back to back work to make sure the results are coming out okay 
and then work out what the data is that we’re bringing across and work out a 
conversion strategy to get it across at the end of the period and then go for it” 
 
Based on the loose plan described, the method resembled that of a prototype model which 
included the following steps: 
 
1. Gather requirements 
2. Rapid development (3 months) 
3. Evaluation 
4. Implementation and testing 
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Within the overall framework these were the steps identified  
1. Identify the modules 
2. Specify the requirements of the modules 
3. Get the software developed 
4. Test it 
5. Convert data and import 
6. Go live 
 
The initial prototype was developed just prior to writing and included development of an 
aspect of the business they deemed to be the most complicated.   
“…when we first started we weren’t sure whether we could make the thing work or 
not, so … we specified a prototype and we prototyped what we thought was one of the 
hardest parts of the system to do…” 
 
The reasons given for this were twofold.  The first was that the project would get terminated 
if the prototyped component did not work. 
“…if the prototype didn’t work we were going to kill it off”… 
 
The second was to see how well the implementation company worked with Textile Trading 
and to get some assurances that the implementation company were willing and capable of 
developing changes and fixes quickly if needed 
 “…that we could get changes – the developers could make the changes at a rate that 
was acceptable to balancing the risks…” 
 
As with a prototyping model, the intention of a prototype is to create interactive functionality 
with little regard for coding best practices (coding designed to lower system overheads and 
create a security focused infrastructure) 
“We went to the prototype knowing it was a prototype … we … didn’t use that code.” 
 
Critical Success Factors 
No formal CSF analysis was carried out at any stage during this implementation.  There were 
however some key areas identified during the implementation that when addressed had 
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ongoing positive impacts on the implementation.  In retrospect they were identified as having 
been critical in the success of the project.  
They included: 
 Vendor support 
 Careful selection of ERP Software 
 Business process reengineering and minimal customisation 
  
51 
3.4.2 Case 5 (ITM4) 
Company Name - Building Supplies International (BSI)* 
Interviewee - Mr John Clarke* 
 
Building Supplies International (BSI) are a multi-national company in the building industry 
who have been operating for over 100 years and currently have in excess of 50,000 
employees worldwide.  Mr John Clarke is one of their IT Managers who has assumed the role 
of one of the project managers for the implementation, with his focus being risk and change 
control management.  This case follows the ERP implementation and resource amalgamation 
of three satellite offices and was conducted in three parts spanning the first stage of an ERP 
implementation.  Although there was a business need to consolidate SAP resources between 
different offices, the impetus to proceed was created by the acquisition of one of these 
Companies from a competitor. With the acquisition comes the loss of access to existing SAP 
resources and hence the need to implement an ERP solution to accommodate their current 
needs and to align it with the rest of Building Supplies International. 
All offices are currently using SAP and are configured and supported in the following manner 
(refer to figure 3.2 “Current Situation”).  Company A are located in New Zealand and are 
fully owned by Building Supplies International but have their SAP resources hosted by 
Company B.  Company B are located in Australia, are majority owned by Building Supplies 
International and in addition to hosting Company A, also host their own SAP resources.   
Company C are the new addition to the Building Supplies International brand and are fully 
owned by Building Supplies International.  While they currently have their SAP resources 
hosted by their previous owners externally, it will change in the near future as intellectual 
rights to that environment are lost (Figure 3.2).  While the core ERP implementation is set to 
be completed on Company C, the proposed solution is to integrate all three companies into a 
data centre located in Australia as shown in figure 1 “Desired Outcome”. This will include 
finding an existing data centre to host their hardware, moving SAP resources for Companies 
A and B and recreating the SAP environment for Company C in that Data centre.  SAP 
personnel will be sourced from Company B to administer the environment with business 
processes examined and redesigned over the three companies to enable systems integration. 
52 
 
Figure 3.2: Current Situation and Desired Outcome in the analysed ERP implementation. 
 
The default implementation model for both SAP and Building Supplies International is the 
Bancroft Model (1996). The project is currently in transition between Planning (Project 
Chartering) and the As Is analysis (Project) stage and has included input from the steering 
committee, CIO advisory team and the Board of Directors from all three companies involved. 
The project is currently scheduled to be completed late 2011 with the first stage 
encompassing the data centre setup and migration scheduled to cut over mid-2011.   
 
ERP system selected 
This company is an established SAP organisation with corporate licenses and internal SAP 
expertise.   
“SAP is a global standard for [Building Supplies International]” 
 
As a consequence, no selection process was undertaken. 
 
Implementation Model 
Building Supplies Ltd is a SAP site so use the Bancroft model for their implementations.  
There were never any disputes as to which model to use as SAP specifies explicitly the steps 
identified in the Bancroft model as default in all implementations.  The only point of 
contention for Building Supplies Ltd was the use of external support for the implementation 
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project.  The companies wishing to provide support for the implementation informed 
Building Supplies Ltd that they would be running the implementation their way and that they 
would be bringing in their own processes and structures for the implementation.   
“… didn’t want to know how we do things… their theory is if they come into a project 
they take control…” 
 
Building Supplies Ltd refused saying they had sufficient internal experience to perform the 
implementation on their own. 
“… we say these are the rules and … this is how we configure SAP…” 
 
Critical Success Factors 
Building Supplies Ltd have a highly formalised project structure which incorporates lessons 
learnt on previous implementations to determine critical factors for their company when 
implementing new ERP systems.  These critical factors are deemed so important that if they 
are not signed off at the beginning of the project, the project will not be allowed to proceed.   
“… We have to make sure everyone agrees…” 
 
The way that they approach a project is that critical success factors form the basis of their 
expected outcomes and they use this process to establish their benchmarks for evaluating the 
success of the project 
“ …  critical success factor …you …normally do it at the beginning of the project … 
because it defines what the business wants to get out of it … what we are doing is 
designing the end goal … “ 
 
One indication of their intention of setting the platform of control in the initial stages of the 
implementation was with the establishment of a number of behavioural controls in the form 
of procedures 
“…Yeah, at the start it will be a lot of procedural work….” 
 
Two areas which were considered critical to the success of the project and were part of the 
project setup were with the project champion and use of consultants. 
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An appointed project champion prior to the start of the project is a mandatory component of 
their ERP projects and emphasises the importance that signing off of critical factors is to all 
projects 
“If we can’t name who the person’s going to be … the champion, we don’t go 
ahead…” 
 
The use of external consultants was not considered a priority for BSI.  They have a company-
wide open license and have been using the solution for a number of years internally.  This has 
enabled the business to have sufficient in-house experience and resources to undertake the 
project and to not have to fully engage external contractors.  This has led to problems because 
in their dealings with consultant companies large enough to handle such a project, they have 
found they are not generally willing to do so if they are not in control 
“… their theory is if they come into a project … they take control and we said, “No, 
we’re in control.  You’re going to be there to help us”.  And they said, “Oh no, we’re 
not interested”...” 
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3.4.3 Case 6 (ITM5) 
Company Name - R&D Manufactures* 
Interviewee - Mr David Johnson* 
 
Mr David Johnson is the IT Director of a research and design company R&D Manufactures, a 
company manufacturing specialised technical equipment to a global market.  R&D 
Manufactures began trading over 100 years ago and were bought by Global Products (not real 
name) in the 70’s to be the manufacturing arm of their business.  Although still owned by 
their parent company, R&D Manufactures operate under a different name and sell their 
products internationally to not only their parent company, but competitors as well.  This is 
due to the specialisation of their products and longevity of the company resulting in R&D 
Manufacturing being one of only two major specialist manufacturing companies in this area 
internationally. 
Mr Johnson joined the company in the early 2000’s to lead the selection and implementation 
of a new ERP system.  The company was using an MRP system and had decided to upgrade 
due to the age and maintenance requirements which included a Cobalt database backend.    
With no company standard on system requirements it was up to the implementation team to 
select and implement an ERP system specifically based on their requirements.  This lack of 
ERP standard was a deliberate companywide decision and all regional units are given the 
opportunity to evaluate and implement systems that would best suit their specific needs based 
on market configurations and funding models.  Although there has been a move towards 
centralisation and standardisation of IT systems and processes, evaluation and 
implementation of ERP systems is still made at the regional level.  After evaluating three 
separate products, JD Edwards was eventually selected and implemented with subsequent 
implementations occurring throughout New Zealand and Australia.   
 
ERP systems 
The key reasons given for the need for a new system were product rationalisation 
“…one of our issues is we carry too much of too many different things, 
so…production rationalisation is something that we are…looking at.” 
 
and eradication of data duplication and financial savings. 
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“…we believe we can save $100 million…through standardising systems and 
centralising or changing reporting lines and structures – we’ve got a lot of duplicity 
in our organisational structure.” 
 
The process taken when choosing which system to implement was done in a thorough and 
methodical manner.  The company were aware that there was a strong possibility that any 
system chosen would be rolled out to other offices so there was a need to ensure that any 
choice would be compatible and cost effective.  The commitment to this process was 
signalled with the hiring of the new IT Manager whose major focus was to replace the 
existing legacy system 
“I was brought…in…to find a system to replace…our old legacy…ERP.  It wasn’t 
really an ERP, it was more of an MRP system – a very…early stage transactional 
processing system built on a cobalt database.” 
 
The short listed products were chosen based on systems currently in use in their European 
and American offices, with the final selection being JD Edwards. 
“We issued an RFP to…a specialised manufacturing tool…in Europe.  Oracle…and 
we also went to J D Edwards as being the third.” 
 
Since that selection and successful first implementation, JD Edwards has been successfully 
implemented in an additional twelve sites with further planned.   
 
Implementation Model 
Although there have been a number of different implementations within the business with 
different implementation partners who have used their own implementation processes 
“…we’ve had different methodologies for the [different] projects…” 
 
the variations appear to be based on the same model – namely the Bancroft model 
“… [all implementations were] essentially the same; it’s a waterfall process of assess 
requirements…and then detailed process mapping of ‘as is’ and ‘to be’ and then 
prototyping of the system against the ‘to be’ process, testing and go live.” 
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While the ERP implementation model was formulated and implemented at the insistence of 
their external partners, the long-term benefits to the business have manifested in their ability 
to better self-manage further projects  
“[for our] first two implementations…we had to rely on a whole lot of people and 
external help to get that done, but by the time we got to Australia we knew and my 
team and our business knew a lot more about how to roll out and manage 
implementations.” 
 
Critical Success Factors 
CSF analysis was a factor in all of the nine implementations carried out by this company, 
although to varying degrees.  In the initial project it was understood that they lacked internal 
resources and was the reason for David’s initial employment 
“I was initially brought on to lead the selection of a new ERP…” 
 
While this approach was sound, there were pitfalls identified with this approach.  Namely that 
although David was an employee with previous ERP experience, his experience within the 
business was limited and this was identified as being critical to how effective he would be 
able to function as the leader of the new implementation.  With this in mind David was 
bought into the business with sufficient time to become accustomed to the internal culture 
and to gain an understanding of what, how and why things were done as they were. 
 
Other critical factors identified were the use of external expertise in the form of consultants 
and the need for a high quality system.  These two factors led into each other and were 
derived from their requirement to be Sarbanes Oxley compliant. 
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3.4.4 Case 7 (ITM6) 
Company Name - Wholesale Traders (WT)* 
Interviewee - Mr Tony Smith* 
 
Mr Tony Smith* is the CIO of Wholesale Traders*, a wholesale trade organisation which has 
been operating nationally since the early 20’s and employees over 30,000 people.  Wholesale 
Trade evolved over time through growth and acquisition to the point where a number of 
different systems were in use offering very little managerial control at the executive level. 
Issues of cost control were identified in both production and delivery.   In addition to this, 
inefficiencies were noticed with sporadic orders from smaller customers resulting in multiple 
deliveries and a general lack of control over transportation costs.  To remedy this lack of 
control the implementation of an ERP system was proposed and a number of different options 
were explored with SAP eventually chosen.   
 
ERP systems 
Wholesale Traders embarked on an ERP implementation for two major reasons 
1. Need to update current software which did not afford sufficient reporting to 
allow a complete picture to be draw of the state of the business  
2. The need to implement a system which would remove the silo mentality which 
had been allowed to grow as a consequence of disparate systems which were loosely 
coupled. 
 
The systems in place had been allowed to expand manually as the company had grown to the 
point where information was scattered and getting a complete snapshot of the company’s 
performance was not possible.   
 
The selection process involved in picking their ERP was extensive and involved the 
evaluation of three different products 
 SAP 
 JD Edwards 
 2nd Tier product aimed at their industry 
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One of their primary considerations was the ability of the software to be able to be rolled-out 
to retail outlets with whom they supplied.  These outlets would not have end users with high 
levels of technical ability and would need to have a system in place that could effectively be 
used without extensive intervention.  These outlets would also be paying for the system 
themselves so another factor to be considered was cost as they would be operated as 
standalone systems tied into the main ERP. 
 
Implementation Model 
The implementation model used was adapted from their external consultants and was a 
variation on the Bancroft Model which included the As Is and To Be stages.  
 
Critical Success Factors 
Wholesale Trades found the process of critical success factor analysis to be more of an 
academic exercise, and that they pulled into the project most of the major critical success 
factors that affect most projects.  From this pool they were able to dismiss some and those 
that were left were moved into the risk registry so they could be continually monitored. 
 
While CSF enjoyed limited use as a managerial tool, initial analysis was used to create what 
was understood as the objective of the implementation, namely to create a system capable of 
providing accurate timely information for decision making purposes. 
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3.4.5 Case 8 (ITM7) 
Company Name - Textile Manufactures International (TMI)* 
Interviewee - Mr Kevin Turner* 
 
Mr Kevin Turner* is the IT Manager of Textile Manufactures*, a multi-national company 
which has been operating for over 100 years and has offices in New Zealand, Australia, 
United Kingdom, USA and China, and employs over 800 people.  Although all offices 
operate under the same banner, individual regions are left to operate as standalone units 
making their own decisions on software and systems.  Although it was the intention to roll 
out the selected ERP system to change the business process design and move away from a 
silo mentality to more of an integrated approach to all of the regions, this was quickly 
abandoned as strong and compelling arguments were made in opposition.  Primarily these 
arguments centred on cost related issues as IT was still viewed as a cost centre and the 
benefits to be gained from implementing a large system when a lower cost system would do 
was such that unanimous agreement was not gained.  There was discussion about the 
functionality, or rather lack of, the lower cost systems would provide but the structure of the 
company meant that these decisions could not be forced through so this resulted in a 
continuation of the status quo.  Although not desirable this did have the effect of simplifying 
the situation so that any potential implementation issues from other sites could be ignored 
allowing the implementation team the ability to concentrate on the individual site.   The 
reason given for the need to implement a new ERP system was the lack of control with 
product costs and pricing resulting in unknown losses and less that accurate profit results.  
Prior to the ERP system they had used legacy systems for approximately 14 years with one IT 
person in place as administrator.  This lack of IT focus was seen as impairment to the 
business progressing so were all  
 
Mr Kevin Turner was bought into Textile Manufacturing specifically for the ERP project, 
starting initially as a business analyst and moving into the Project Management role for the 
implementation.  Throughout the process they were assisted by Deloittes who acted as their 
implementation partner.  RFP’s were requested from three companies, SAP, JD Edwards and 
one other.  The number was reduced to two (SAP and JD Edwards) with their relative merits 
relevant to this project evaluated.  Kevin had worked with SAP in his previous employment 
and was well aware of the product and the methods of implementation used and this 
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information was used to reduce the selection to the eventual candidate – JD Edwards.  SAP 
was removed from contention because of the scope of the product, the resource requirements 
needed for the implementation and the degree of in-house skills required maintaining the 
product post-implementation.  SAP was deemed to be too big a product (especially as there 
were no other sites to consider) and Kevin was convinced that it was not a match for Textile 
Manufactures culture and users – simply put “it was going to be too much for the business”.  
Using this Kevin convinced the rest of the selection panel that this was the case.   
 
At the ownership level it was common knowledge there was interest in a buyout of the 
company and that they were currently in the due diligence stage.  After presenting their 
decision about ERP choice, members of the ERP selection committee were bought before 
their potential parent company to debate their choice as the parent company were using SAP.  
Having been involved with both successful and unsuccessful ERP implementations, Kevin as 
a member of the selection committee was aware of the implications of changing ERP choice 
after due diligence so challenged both the suitability for their site and the assurances given to 
them by their potential parent company of the costs in terms of installation and degree of 
support they would receive.  After some terse discussions JD Edwards was implemented 
successfully within the business.  The buyout from the parent company was not successful 
(due to reasons other than ERP selection) and the company were happy with their ERP choice 
and felt somewhat justified in their strict adherence to the selection process. 
 
ERP systems 
Selection of the ERP system to use was identified as a major component of the 
implementation and a factor that would have huge implications on the success of the project.   
 
Although their existing personnel were involved with the selection process it was expected 
that those with intimate familiarity with the business would probably not have had exposure 
to different Tier one products, and as such would need a high degree of guidance when being 
asked to select the product that best matched their business. 
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“So you know if you’ve got someone who has been a legacy system for 14 years and 
you throw in an implementation team expected to make decisions on a tier one 
product you know it’s just a recipe for disaster.  But the … consultants we had 
surrounding them at the time were the conduits to making those decisions and then 
above that it was project management and programme management…you know what 
you know. “ 
 
With this in mind Kevin’s experience placed a major part in the selection process  
“So I started off as a Change Management Analyst, then … a Warehouse Business 
Analyst and then … a Freelance Contractor … and then to their SAP applications 
team.” 
 
As a consequence of his experience with SAP and the selection process undertaken in the 
RFP, he was able to discern early on in the process that SAP would not be a good fit with the 
organisation.  
“We initially had them at the start of the RFP and then I sort of convinced the guys 
that for this business - this culture, our users - it was going to be too much...”  
 
The reasons given to the business for the recommendation to not use SAP were due to its 
complexity and cost 
“…my background in SAP helped and again to bring something like that into the 
business like [Textile Manufactures] I just said, “We’re setting ourselves up for 
failure”, not just the ongoing operation costs but they are highly consumable…” 
 
While this was confirmed in the RFP process there was opposition to this from the company 
currently in the due diligence process of buying Textile Manufactures.  Because they had 
SAP in place it was assumed Textile Manufactures would also pick that product to increase 
compatibility between the companies and to reduce any further costs and interruptions should 
they have to change to SAP in the future. 
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“So at the 11th hour once we had already gone down the path of the three preferred 
vendors – the final preferred vendor, business case and justification why, the CFO 
and I got hauled up to [the perspective parent company] to explain why we were 
going down this path and not SAP…” 
 
Textile Manufactures and Kevin however were adamant that JD Edwards would be the best 
fit for their business and engaged in vigorous debate to ensure the process was upheld and the 
product chosen implemented.  
“…with the CEO we had a fair amount of debate over his approach in all of this and 
bypassing the due diligence that we had taken on it, so he eventually backed off, but it 
was a real tense time...”  
 
Implementation Model 
The model used for the implementation was a compilation adapted by their implementation 
partner 
 “[Our implementation partner] had a model… it was a rapid implementation in nine 
months. “  
 
One of the advantages of this method as touted by their partners was its hands-on approach 
which emphasised continuous improvements 
“… very hands on in terms of that continuous improvement type of methodology ... “ 
 
Although it resembled the Bancroft model in that it incorporated the “as is” and “to be” 
stages 
“… we did the planning, we did a bit of ‘as is’ and ‘to be’ business process…” 
 
there were similarities from a strategic point of view with the Markus and Tanis model 
“…that was what we call the ‘terms of reference’, but it was really a project charter.” 
 
Even with this basis they still considered themselves to be “lucky” that the implementation 
succeeded.   
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“… we’re a bit lucky in that … we were a little bit over budget…on the scale of things 
we were pretty happy with that, but…there’s no guarantee you’re going to get that 
same result…” 
 
Critical Success Factors 
One problem identified with consultant firms specifying critical success factors applicable to 
an organisational project is one of logistics.  With only a limited time on site it was 
understood that external consultants would not be able to identify critical success factors for 
their business 
“… you only give these guys a day on site to understand your business…they don’t 
have enough time to lift the covers…” 
 
Textile Manufactures found that the only way for them to effectively establish critical success 
factors for the project was to go through a question and answer process establishing what was 
important to the business 
“I wasn’t prepared to go through and write a document line for line, so I went to 
market, got something pre-loaded around software RFI [Request for Information] 
RFP’s [Request for Proposal]… and just went through.  So there were three different 
parts:  there was a survey, there was the RFI and there was the final RFP.  So with 
the survey I just walked around with that document and said, “Guys, tick off what’s 
not relevant,” 
 
From that process they felt they were able to effectively establish what was critical and 
subsequently referred back to this as a valuable part of their initial analysis  
“… That was quite good and we used that to refer back to as well…” 
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3.4.6 Case 9 (ITM8) 
Company Name - This and That Manufacturing (T&TM)* 
Interviewee - Mr John Broadman * 
 
This and That Manufacturing* are a multi-national apparel manufacturing company with 
offices in New Zealand, Australia and China.  Although operating under the same banner, all 
offices operate as separate businesses and only share data at the corporate level, with the data 
shared being predominately accounting data in the form of inter-business charges relating to 
staffing allocations. This silo mentality (resulting in a lack of big picture awareness amongst 
staff) was indicative of the job requirements. The nature of the work dictated that employees 
were more creative than technical and resulted in problems with the creation of technical 
super-users and the overall emphasis technology played within the business.  This had a 
secondary effect of engaging staff without any business process exposure resulting in 
difficulties when trying to design how a new system should work within the business.  The 
scepticism relating to the benefits IT can bring to the business had not been helped by a 
number of high level failures with different systems implemented in the past.  Mr John 
Broadman took on the role of IT manager just prior to the ERP implementation and was 
aware of the credibility issues IT were facing as a direct result of underperformance in the 
past.  They already had an ERP system in place but found their current tier one solution to be 
overly complicated to operate (a 50 page manual was used solely for invoice input), highly 
expensive to maintain and at over 14 years old, in dire need of updating both in software and 
hardware configurations.  Another driving force had been recessionary pressures placed on 
the business which had resulted in a 50% reduction in workforce.  Simply put, the system in 
place was too old, too big, too complicated and too expensive to be able to justifiably 
continued use.  The solution found was to downgrade the ERP system for a tier one solution 
to a tier three solution specific to their industry.  This had the added benefit of requiring less 
modification and potentially fixing some of the issues they were experiencing with the 
current system’s inability to cope with industry specific requirements.  The project plan was 
to replicate the key functionality present in the SAP system into the new ERP system with a 
projected five year payback period.  One of the key CSF’s identified at the onset of the 
project was that of “project creep” where the original scope of the project is allowed to grow 
as more functionality is added during an implementation.  To achieve the payback period and 
restore IT confidence project creep from additional functionality requirements during 
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implementation were taken directly to the executive team with an overview of the impact of 
those changes.  As 99% of requests were turned down for the project and put aside as future 
modifications possibilities, John was able to keep the project within the required timeframe.   
 
While this project was a success, a subsequent implementation within the same year at a 
different office using the same technology failed and these two projects were used as 
comparisons during the interview.  The main difference identified between the projects was 
staff commitment and buy-in.  In the first implementation the prize was a move to a better 
system with high levels of commitment from all concerned.  The staff did not like the current 
system and were aware they were moving to a system that would be easier to use, the 
executive team were committed to realising the business benefits and the IT manager was 
determined to make the first implementation in his office a success.  After the success of the 
first project the system and its configuration were rolled out to some of the satellite offices in 
an effort to reduce costs associated with software maintenance and licensing.  A second 
project went well but a third project resulted in an implementation which was deemed to have 
failed.    
 
In this third office, they already had an ERP system in place which had been designed for that 
specific business.  Although this system was not viewed as a viable candidate elsewhere, it 
was well suited to what they did and universally liked.  Members of staff were given the 
opportunity of viewing the new system and it was unanimously agreed that the new system 
was not as good as the old.  While there was commitment to making the project happen at the 
executive level, it was accompanied by a sense of complacency because it was thought less 
would be needed as implementations had all been successful up to this point. A market upturn 
had also created increased pressure on the implementation team to spend less time on the 
project as other areas of the business were getting busier and staffing numbers still remained 
low.  This manifested itself in a number of ways which when viewed in hindsight had been 
critical in the project failing, these included 
Lack of internal resources included both team member availability for the implementation 
and that of the project managers. John’s time involvement was reduced further by increased 
commitments within the business and John felt burnt out by the requirements of the previous 
fast implementations where he had been required to fulfil all rolls within the implementation 
team in addition to his own within the organisation. Resistance to change was a major factor 
in the failure of the third implementation due largely to the perception of the product being of 
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less value than the system already in place, and the lack of drive at both the executive and 
project implementation levels.  
 
ERP systems 
This company had an existing SAP ERP solution in place and although the system was 
working.   
“…the solution we had was working…” 
 
they decided to move away from that solution due to a number of different reasons. At the 
forefront was the issue of cost.  In addition to the on-going support costs, low levels of both 
IT investment and internal levels of IT knowledge had resulted in the system being allowed 
to age to the point where significant resources would have been needed to get the system up 
to date.  The attraction of moving away from their pre-existing ERP was made easier by the 
feeling that their ERP did not fit well with their organisation  
 
Implementation Model 
The implementation model was based around a need to implement quickly.  While no 
definitive business reason was given to John for the three month implementation timeframe, 
examination of previous IT projects sheds light on the very tight timeframes given.  Prior to 
John’s employment there were a number of failed IT projects and confidence in their ability 
to deliver a project with such wide business ramifications was not high 
“…so there was a perception that IT had failed in the past and I think that was one of 
the reasons why there was a “These are the dates,”” 
 
Critical Success Factors 
Prior to this position, John had worked in the UK on complex implementations (while large, 
not ERP) and had subsequently completed post graduate qualifications in project 
management so was aware of critical success factor analysis.   
“…I’ve looked at a lot of that research into the critical success factors…” 
 
Even so CSF analysis was not formally utilised because of the perceived difficulties 
identified with this approach 
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“…critical success factors are things that you should be able to plan right at the start 
as to how you are going to get around all of those…in practice I think that that is 
very, very difficult …” 
 
The difficulties stemmed from the lack of common overall process awareness within the 
business.  With high levels of staff turnover, awareness of the data and informational needs of 
those in other areas of the company was almost universally non-existent.   
“…so the company halved in size.  Our staff turnover had risen a bit and because of 
that we were getting a lot of people in without the knowledge …” 
 
the usefulness of identifying CSF without being able to identify measures the business can 
take to ensure things got done was of limited value.   
“…it wasn’t something where I formally … went to a Consultant … and said, “Right, 
give us a list of the CFS and look through them,” but yes, certainly it comes from your 
experience and … that would be what really drove the risk register.” 
 
Another problem was that John felt there was not a lot of useful literature on the subject due 
to the contrary and often time’s ambiguous information available. 
“…the other thing is a lot of the literature on project management doesn’t necessarily agree 
and a lot of it is not very specific…” 
 
The ability to provide measures to prevent problems proactively was identified as a construct 
requiring a combination of history about how the business operates and how the product will 
affect a business.   
“…most of those do come … from history from projects, knowing that if you don’t do 
that, it’s not going to happen…” 
 
In this project a clear distinction was made between CSF and risks.  Anything that would 
affect the project or would be needed to correct the project to ensure a successful outcome 
was placed in the risk log. 
“…that is actually the function of the risk log.  That’s pretty much exactly what 
should go in the risk log, something that is going to put the project at risk…by 
definition you’re asking, “Is it something that will put the project at risk?”…” 
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3.4.7 Case 10 (ITM9) 
Company Name - Industrial Manufactures* (IM) 
Interviewee - Mr Stephen Lee * 
 
Industrial Manufactures* are a manufacturing company that have been operating for over 75 
years.  They had used a custom application which was managed by their existing IT Manager 
but with his impending retirement and lack of both internal and external resources to maintain 
the system, an alternative was needed.  Mr Stephen Lee was employed specifically to 
implement the new system with his role to change post implementation to IT Manager.   
 
ERP systems 
The selection of ERP centred on a detailed RFP process which was sent out to five different 
vendors.  The requirements were for each of the vendors was to demonstrate a solution to a 
core business problem deemed the most difficult by Industrial Manufactures.  These 
demonstrations were presented to 25 different members of staff who were pulled out 
specifically for this task.  Although the time commitment from staff was large, this was done 
with the expressed purpose of ensuring full commitment from staff after it was made plain by 
Steve that IT would take responsibility if it didn’t work however if the system did not fit it 
would be the businesses responsibility.  
 
Implementation Model 
Their chosen model was one that both the external consultants and organisation agreed upon, 
and was a hybrid adaptation of a number of models including the Bancroft et al. (1998) as-is 
and to-be stages.  Which implementation model to use was highly important for IM as within 
the company it was acknowledged that even with a good product, a bad implementation will 
result in a bad product 
“…we put it all to one side and didn’t look at the software again and concentrated on 
the implementation part because it doesn’t matter how good your software is, if it is 
implemented badly then you get a bad system.” 
 
After evaluating implementation teams, they changed their choice of product because of the 
implementation team that came with the model.  While they had a preference for SAP as a 
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product, it was felt that the implementation team and model would not be compatible with 
their organisation  
“…we don’t want the SAP implementation people, we want the JDE implementation 
people.  And we ultimately wanted JDE’s implementation people with the SAP 
software but that was never going to happen because they don’t know the software so 
we went JDE.  All over implementation.  And fit to our business.” 
 
 
Critical Success Factors 
Critical success factor analysis was not formally done at the beginning of the implementation. 
“We didn’t identify them [critical success factors] formally…” 
 
They did however get some direction advice from their consultants on some aspects of 
project management 
“…..having mile stones, and making sure you have very much agreed business 
requirements…” 
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3.4.8 Case 11 (ERPC2)  
Company Name - Primary-Business (PB)* 
Interviewee - Mr Bob Scambury* 
 
Primary-Business (PB) are an organisation dedicated to consolidating and processing primary 
products in a rural setting.  Although quite a young company, PB had expanded rapidly and 
from an information and technology usage perspective, had resulted in the development of 
isolated systems necessitating the manual transfer of data.  This process resulted in delayed 
and error prone data being used to make business decisions, an unacceptable option for key 
stakeholders charged with the continued growth of the company.   
Lawson’s had been selected to handle the financial management components of PB, and as a 
result of the success of this system it was decided to utilise Lawson’s for a majority of their 
other organisational information needs.  Mr Bob Scambury was engaged as a project manager 
to assist the internal project manager with the implementation. 
 
Although Lawson’s is used as the main system, different systems are still used in other areas 
of the organisation and it is their intention to migrate all systems to using the one ERP in the 
future.  
 
ERP systems 
While this was a full implementation, PB had already installed Lawson’s ERP to handle the 
financial components of the business, so the selection of which ERP solution to use was 
never in doubt. 
 
Implementation Model 
The different stages used in this project were  
1. Strategy 
2. Selection 
3. Scope 
4. Reiterating through a cycle of prototypes, build and test 
5. Go-live 
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This method was described as the prototyping method, and when questioned about the use of 
this methodology, Bob responded that many of the decisions you need to make are made for 
you in rapid prototyping.   
“…there are quite a few people that use it for ERPs because a lot of the decisions 
make themselves.  They can be made very easily by a consultant without consulting or 
asking a lot of questions…” 
 
This situation suited environments where the level of experience internally was not conducive 
to high levels of accurate requirements gathering during the planning stage 
“…People just didn’t understand enough about the system to come up with a sensible 
answer, or come up with the wrong answer and we would have to backtrack it…so we 
would ask them what they need and then go away and configure it and present it back 
to them and say that this is the system actually working - if this is what you wanted? 
And nine times out of 10 it is so you can effectively worry about the other 10% at 
another time ...” 
 
In this case however, it is not a pilot prototype where you present a prototype and if it works 
build the system for real.  Rather they built up the system as they went, getting an 
incremental sign-off after demonstrating usability and look. 
”… its not like a pilot implementation, its building up a configured system…” 
 
While they used prototyping in this implementation, overall there is no one method that the 
consultants are required to use, and the decision is based on the experience and composition 
of the organisations project team.   
 “…so we would work with the vendors on their approach…we do have our own 
methodology but in practice the real methodology we use will depend on the 
experience and skills of the team members in the implementation…” 
 
Critical Success Factors 
Critical success factors were outlined in the documentation and explained as a generic list 
that can be used as a means of assessing the project.  It was explained that the following list 
was not a complete list of all possible CSFs as they will vary from project to project, but it 
was a “good starting point”.  The factors included 
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 Managing the risks involved  
 Communication  
 
 Firm, realistic requirements  
 Project planning and monitoring  
 
 Experience of project management  
 Appropriateness of skills of project team  
 Project team morale  
 Project team resources – quantity, skill and power  
 Contractual relationship with supplier  
 
 Adequate formalised testing  
 
 Organisational change management  
 Clear business objectives and outcomes  
 Committed ownership  
 Senior management buy-in and trust  
 Managing the expectations of stakeholders  
 Appropriate functionality in software  
 
 Extent of user involvement  
 
 Establishing linkages with other projects  
 
The factors that they applied to this project  
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3.4.9 Case 12 (ERPC3) 
Company Name – All About Construction (ABC)* 
Interviewee - Mr Vince Boyes* 
 
ABC are an international company in the construction industry, with offices throughout 
Australasia, Europe, Asia and the US.  With multiple divisions and a number of different 
businesses within each division, ABC are a large company with a high number of different 
solutions in place.  This case centres on one of those companies within a division and 
examines a major ERP upgrade.  The system in place was a number of years old and a 
number of versions out of date, and the resulting solution was a major upgrade project which 
share many of the characteristics of a companywide ERP rollout.  Although a number of 
decisions have been already made which include a preselected ERP solution and much of the 
business process reengineering and other design work, as with other companywide rollouts 
there are still aspects of design and reengineering which need to be completed.   
“[the risk management process] does apply to both, just to a lesser extent on some of 
that design stuff.  …” 
 
Mr Boyes is a functional consultant with extensive experience both in New Zealand and off-
shore 
“…That’s been here in New Zealand and off-shore as well…” 
 
who was contracted as a project manager and was charged with guiding the internal project 
manager through the process, which included risk management activities such as risk registry, 
scope and milestone monitoring.  
ERP systems 
The existing system was SAP, and as this was an upgrade no additional selection process was 
needed. 
 
Implementation Model 
While the contracting firm had a formal model available, it was not used in this case.  ABC 
had an existing preference and which model used during the project was not that important to 
the contractors. 
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“…We’ve always taken those sorts of things [implementation models] to be used as a 
guideline but not necessarily followed to the ‘T’…” 
 
While the model for this upgrade was already established, when asked about other projects 
and the models used Vince explained that the model they would normally use was a 
prototyping model and had been designed for smaller economic environments such as New 
Zealand.  It did not have the high overheads as would be seen in larger environments such as 
the USA. 
“…What we find is that a lot of those model are very useful when you have a very, 
very large implementation, in the states you have implementation of 40,000 
people …it’s just a different level here in New Zealand” 
 
When deciding whether that model is appropriate in other implementations, Vince 
commented that the model is determined to a large degree by the organisations needs and 
product selection, with another important criteria being cost 
“…some clients are not prepared to pay for it, in term of some of the analysis you 
need to go through….” 
 
Two aspects of ERP implementations which were consistently identified as areas of cost 
cutting were 
1. Reducing the scope of the project 
2. Not continuing with improvements to the system post implementation 
 
Cutting back on the scope of the project was customarily done but splitting the project into 
different implementation - do this now, and do that in the next stage 
“…It gets pulled back because they get the final cost … into stage 2.  The problem 
with that is that stage two never happens because they have spent so much money on 
getting the ERP system in, that they are starting to balk at the cost of doing on-going 
work…” 
 
The problem with this approach is that companies that have balked at the cost of the initial 
implementation seldom continue and finish the different stages 
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“…Companies are not following up with that post implementation improvements that 
would give them that added value…” 
 
The gains from the additional enhancements is where the real value is added and the ROI can 
be realised.  This is an aspect of implementations that  
“A lot of education needs to go into telling them …that the systems is not done.  They 
need to … look at putting enhancements into it and building on that… it seems to me 
that there has been a reluctance to do this from some organisations…”  
 
Critical Success Factors 
No formal critical success factor analysis was completed on this project. 
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Chapter Four: 
Findings 
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4.0 Overview 
The research findings have been divided into two parts with part one (Interview Findings) 
examining the data gathered during the semi-structured component of the nine interviews, 
and compiled using the Sumner (2000) risk factor definitions.   
 
Part two (Risk Registry Findings) is made up of the compiled risk registries and features risk 
registry entries from both organisational risk registries and additional analysis gathered from 
the case interviews.  The risk registries were compiled using the Sumner (2000) risk factor 
and risk category definitions with the Lyytinen et al., (2000) Risk Management Model used 
as a coding framework.  
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4.1 Interview Findings 
4.1.1 Case 4 (ITM3) 
Company Name - Textile Trading International (TTI)* 
Interviewee - Mr Tony Holder* 
 
Risks 
There was an overarching risk control strategy in place throughout the life of this project.  
This strategy was built on the belief 
“…that if we were working with a product that enabled us to modify things quickly 
and we were working with developers who could modify things quickly … then we 
would get away with it.” 
 
1. Failure to redesign business processes 
This company had operated in a silo mentality environment since it began and redundant 
processes were evident throughout the business  
“…you ended up asking an awful lot of questions …; why do it that way; why don’t 
you do it this way, because that doesn’t seem to make sense?  And a lot of the things 
didn’t make sense, but it was just the way that they had been taught and the way it 
continued on …” 
 
Due to this silo mentality, if information was being processed incorrectly the only personal 
able to tell were the users.   
“…often you would get, “This isn’t right”.  “Why isn’t it right”?  “I don’t think that’s 
the right answer”.  “What is the right answer”?  “I’m not sure”.  “Okay, well let’s sit 
down and work through this”. 
 
Business process reengineering was therefore a priority for the business and one of the 
driving forces behind the project   
“…So my business problem was that about 10 percent of the system’s knowledge 
underpinning my business was on the IT system and about 90 percent of it was on 
spreadsheets that individual people knew how to run… I think it was incredibly high 
risk because you were so dependent on individuals to know what they were doing and 
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to factor things in and that was the prime motivation for installing an ERP system.  
We had so much off our main system that our business was at huge risk.” 
 
This risk remained prevalent throughout the project.  The reluctance to share information due 
to the assumption that the new system would fail and a lack of knowledge of how their role 
impacted other functions within the organisation were major contributing factors.  Through 
perseverance the vendors succeeded in understanding the technical aspects of the business to 
the point where inaccuracies were found in published technical specifications within the 
industry 
“…we found a bug in the [technical] calculations … which everybody else has in 
their system … we found … and … fixed … 150 years of everybody else doing it 
wrong … “ 
 
5. Lack of business analysts with business and technical knowledge 
Although Tony had knowledge of both the business and the technical solution, he was the 
only one and this resulted in problems with some of the fundamental coding used in the 
system.  The codes used were created at the prototyping stage, changed straight after and then 
changed again two years after implementation as they were still not working 
“The coding system that we put into place for product coding changed completely 
after that prototype, we had it completely wrong and it was a fundamental of the 
system, our initial thinking wouldn’t have worked and so we had to modify that and to 
be fair after we went live – about two years after we went live, it still wasn’t working 
quite right and we had to modify it again or refine it…” 
 
2. Failure to follow an Enterprise-wide design which supports data integration 
Going from systems and processes that were inefficient and inaccurate to an integrated 
environment posed a major problem when moving data across from one system to another.   
“…the biggest risk was actually getting the data off our old system and getting it 
across in a timely enough manner so that we could start again …” 
 
This was accentuated by the reluctance of their previous software supplier to assist in the 
process which meant they had to work it out for themselves. 
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“…because you’re moving off your [old] system they’re not really terribly interested 
in helping you, so you had to actually work out for yourself what everything meant…” 
 
8. Lack of senior management support 
While this project did not suffer from lack of a champion with John and the IT manager 
driving the project forward. 
“…I was the guy, ‘the champion’ and he was probably the ‘2IC champion…” 
 
one problem that did come up was their inability to force the financial controller to submit the 
chart of accounts.   
“…the Financial Controller for the group decided that he didn’t have time to do it 
and he had to get really monstered in to it – screaming match stuff… he was told he 
had a deadline for doing it; he didn’t do it; we pushed him; he didn’t get there and so 
I put the chart of accounts together for the company which really upset him and 
backed him into a corner and then he came up with his own.  But that was about three 
weeks from going live date and that put real pressure on us, because that is something 
that should have been done a lot earlier, but he was dragged, kicking and screaming 
into it.” 
 
14. Insufficient training of end users 
Although there was an emphasis on starting the training of staff early on in the 
implementation 
“[Staff] got involved in the prototyping stage and then probably the three months 
prior to going live … “ 
 
problems occurred, especially in the later stages of the implementation because the modules 
they were using to train staff were test modules which frequently contained problems 
“…you would get a cut of the system and things weren’t quite right and you know you 
sort of go through staff giving up…” 
 
which led to problems trying to engage the staff . 
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“Problems arose trying to engage and train staff on test modules as these modules 
frequently broke down.  This coupled with a resistance to change resulted in steps 
being taken to ensure staff are taught how to use it…” 
 
Even with this emphasis on training before go-live there was still resistance because of the 
assumption that the system would fail. 
“Some of them did and some of them were dragged kicking and screaming to it and it 
probably wasn’t until we went live – in fact, it was probably about two or three weeks 
after we went live that they realised that it wasn’t going to go away.  You know people 
always think…I’ve heard the computer systems don’t work, so this will be another one 
of them and so it will go away before I need to learn it” 
 
There was still end user issues relating to using the system after go live  
“…everybody wanted assurance of what they were doing was right and they weren’t 
stuffing anything up…” 
 
17. Lack of sensitivity to user resistance 
Problems occurred with getting staff to fully engaging in the training, especially in the later 
stages of the implementation because the modules they were using to train staff were test 
modules which frequently contained problems.   
“…you would get a cut of the system and things weren’t quite right and … staff 
[were] giving up…” 
 
which led to problems trying to engage the staff . 
“Problems arose trying to engage and train staff on test modules as these modules 
frequently broke down.  This coupled with a resistance to change resulted in steps 
being taken to ensure staff are taught how to use it…” 
 
While steps were taken to ensure staff participated 
“They were forced into it …” 
 
there was still resistance  
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“Some of them did and some of them were dragged kicking and screaming to it and it 
probably wasn’t until we went live – in fact, it was probably about two or three weeks 
after we went live that they realised that it wasn’t going to go away.  You know people 
always think, Oh it won’t work you know - I’ve heard the computer systems don’t 
work, so this will be another one of them and so it will go away before I need to learn 
it” 
 
18. Failure to emphasis reporting 
While reporting was identified as an important part of the ERP system, there was no effort 
made to generate reports at all throughout the project as report generation was not identified 
as a priority  
“… there was a couple of areas where we just printed a report and faxed it for the 
first few weeks, because it wasn’t a priority… there were other priorities to get fixed.” 
 
The reason this was not a priority was because of the software and architecture used in the 
creation the system.  The system structure made it easy to create custom reports  
“… So we knew that we could get anything we wanted [out of the software], you could 
generate your own reports…” 
 
and this effectively eliminated this risk from affecting the outcome of the project. 
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4.1.2 Case 5 (ITM4) 
Company Name - Building Supplies International (BSI)* 
Interviewee - Mr John Clarke* 
 
Risks 
This company was in the first stages of the implementation when the interviews were done 
and covers the risks they were experiencing at the time.  Even though the structures bought 
into their ERP projects are highly formalised, address multiple critical factors and constantly 
monitor risks throughout the project, it was acknowledged that risks will still get missed 
during any implementation 
“…they always slip through…” 
 
Part of this acceptance was based on the knowledge that it would not be a short term project 
and would need constant monitoring to ensure that it would result in a successful outcome  
“…I’d say we’d probably be looking at three years before we’re actually stable ….” 
 
Additionally, although this implementation is a priority, the advancement of technology and 
the longevity of the project mean that outside influences will always be a factor.  It is because 
of these outside influences that this implementation is constantly being tested with issues 
relating to scope and creeping requirements 
“…So these are some of the risks that we’ve got to decide; do we bring them into the 
project or do we shelve them off to one side and accept the fact that it’s going to cost 
us a fair bit of money later?” 
 
At this stage of the project the focus is on establishing the scope, setting up procedures to 
determine how things are to be done and determining what factors are to be used when 
determining the success of the project at its completion 
“… we’ll probably be targeting the major risk and the major risks are personnel – 
sort of requirement explosion … people just demanding more and more things.  So we 
have to make sure that once we make a definition of the statement of requirements 
and we really define what the end goal is going to be, then there has to be a really big 
change control over the top of that … saying, “If you want to deviate from that it has 
to … be signed off by the steering committee … “ 
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Indeed it is their preference to do it this way as the systems and templates they have in place 
have been developed with their own business processes in mind so any customisation done to 
adapt the modules to the business has already been done.   
“… this is how we configure SAP… “ 
 
1. Failure to redesign business processes 
The new acquisition was originally part of another company and although they also used 
SAP, the resources associated with support and systems were tied to their previous company.  
This has resulted in the need to  
“…recreate the environment from what’s in people’s heads and what’s on their notes 
to match what it needs to be now…” 
 
Due to the nature of the business problem they were trying to fix, redesigning the business 
processes was an important part of the new configuration.  While they were able to progress 
with two of the properties under review, the lack of senior management commitment from the 
third property was causing uncertainties in their ability to plan and predict resources needed 
for the remaining components of the project. 
“…they are saying, “No, we don’t want to be in the project…”” 
 
4. Insufficient ‘internal’ expertise 
While one of the goals is to retain the knowledge internally  
“…what we are trying to do is do it more with internals ... to keep the knowledge…” 
 
The possibility that specific internal resources will not be available may result in the need to 
find additional resources to complete the project 
“…if they are not in the picture we have to resource a whole lot of SAP 
consultants…and the market … is really, really tight and they have will have no 
expertise about the [BSI] standards …” 
 
6. Failure to mix internal and external expertise effectively 
While initially not an issue with the original scope work, changes been brought about after 
the original scope was completed by the introduction of Unicode as a compulsory element of 
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SAP configurations in the near future mean that they may not have sufficient internal 
resources to complete the project. 
“… new functionality that’s in … SAP …called Unicode …that they are going to make 
compulsory … “ 
 
As a decision has yet to be made to determine whether this will be done now or as a separate 
project at a later stage, as much information as is possible has been gathered and presented to 
the project champion to push through.  The two alternatives are to incorporate the new 
standard into the project which will have implications on time frames and cost or to leave the 
implementation as it currently stands and change over after the project is complete.  The latter 
option will also result in additional expenditure as it will require significant additions to the 
budget has already been processed and approved.  While it is possible to push these changes 
out the increase in costs becomes significantly larger if this were to be done at a later stage 
and those in-charge of the financial aspects of the project are trying to draw a line in the sand. 
“…because they keep saying, Right, that’s the budget you’ve agreed to and that’s 
what you have to stick with.  We’re saying, Okay, That’s the budget that we agreed to 
on these assumptions.  Now these assumptions are changing…” 
 
Of significance to this risk is that if they decide to proceed with expanding the project to 
include the changes, they may not have sufficient internal resources to handle the project 
from this point forward and may need to rely on an external consultant company. 
 
7. Lack of ability to recruit and retain qualified ERP systems developers 
The initial planning and critical success processes included the need to actively retain 
identified super users associated with the project.   
“…the whole aim of it is to have these people working on projects so when the 
projects have finished they know all the knowledge and they move into the operational 
one…” 
 
While this focus has not changed, external forces have changed the current situation beyond 
the ability of the project team to be able to control.  The company yet to join were to be used 
as the resource for SAP personnel but natural attrition and the organisations lack of 
willingness to replace the personnel due to project uncertainty have put this plan in doubt.   
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“…because time has dragged on so much, a lot of the resources from the other 
company …  are all leaving …they haven’t been replacing … so it’s created 
problems… So once again the budget goes up because you have to replace it with 
external consultants.” 
 
Until the final organisation decides to join or not, replacements for natural attrition will not 
be made so this has been identified as a risk that will need to be controlled irrespective of the 
outcome. 
 
8. Lack of senior management support 
Top management support and commitment was a difficult proposition in this project because 
of the complicated nature of the ERP implementation proposed.  This project involved the 
integration of three different properties, each with their own set of processes and differing 
commitment levels. 
“… it’s our biggest risk at the moment… “ 
 
The third company do not have unanimous support for this project and as the Board of 
Directors need unanimous support for this to go ahead they could potentially stall the project. 
“…they have to have a unanimous agreement in order to sign these sorts of 
propositions … “ 
 
9. Lack of proper management control structure 
Due to the intricate nature of the implementation (as it involves the amalgamation of three 
properties) management control structures were an unknown complication and how 
information was to be disseminated was an evolving system tailored to how the project 
presented itself. 
“ … looked after it from a central strategic and message thing … so you define it all 
and … one from each company … delivers the individual message … “ 
 
Because of the uncertainty a number of rumours had surfaced speculating on whether the 
project would be proceeding or not, milestones and how the project would be structured 
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“…there’s some rumours coming out that have said, “Oh this is our go live date”, 
and we’ve said, “Well, no one should be saying that…” 
 
11. Ineffective management communication 
A major problem with a project of this size is establishing effective communication channels  
“…that’s the problem with a project this size…they all work on separate components 
and then they all talk amongst each other within the applications and infrastructure 
and then I’ve got to make sure that they are talking to each other at the next level 
up …” 
 
12. Failure to adhere to standardised specifications which the software supports 
While this was not initially an issue with the implementation, changes to the software with 
regards to the introduction of Unicode compatibility as compulsory within SAP 
configurations now means that the original templates are no longer usable as a long term 
solution.   
“… new functionality that’s in … SAP …called Unicode …that they are going to make 
compulsory in the next year or two, so if we don’t do it now we’re going to have to 
upgrade to it later which is going to cost us ...”  
 
Changes also to the hardware specifications within the organisation have resulted in a 
companywide preference for one hardware platform with the system having been originally 
installed on another.  It was originally decided to stay with the installed platform to reduce 
testing requirements as it was shown to have worked. 
“…Forget the standard, let’s just get what we have got - use that and keep the system 
as it is and then we don’t have to go back and test to see if some of the bugs were 
getting in…” 
 
As the project has progressed it has now becoming apparent that they will not be able to 
retain their current implementation so they are currently deciding whether to stay with the 
current hardware preference or move to the company standard which would remove a layer of 
difference with corporate support.   
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“…Well, if we’re going for a brand new system we may as well then get into the 
standard…” 
 
The decision to move from one to the other however is not a fait accompli but will be 
evaluated on its merits to the project.  The reason they can truly objective is because the 
project champion has the authority to override the standard  
“…the guys are more comfortable with the ones they’re using and [our project 
champion] says “Oh it’s not a really hard and fast standard…” 
 
15. Ineffective end-user communication 
The problems associated with establishing who is going to be in the project is also affecting 
communication -  
“…HR here won’t communicate, because they don’t know the full details of the plan 
because nothing has been finally decided…” 
 
Although this approach is accurate it fails to address the issues relating to user involvement  
“…I said, “You need to communicate if you want people to be involved… you have to 
communicate what it is you are trying to do and why and then you will get their buy-
in and then you’ll get their … acceptance…” 
 
Communication has been identified as a major component in the minimisation of risks 
“…communication really is your biggest thing of minimising risk because in anything 
– everything you look at the one key word is communication and that’s all going to 
fail if you don’t talk to each other …” 
 
The main reason this is a major risk is not as a consequence of what is said, but rather what is 
not.  If gaps are left in communication then informal information will be passed to fill those 
voids in the form of speculation and rumour.   
 “This is happening and these are the reasons why it’s happening”, otherwise they’ll 
start talking … and they’ll fill in the void.  They’ll hear rumours and they’ll start 
filling it up with incorrect information and that’s the bigger risk, so you’re better to 
tell them...”  
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Due to this communication lines have been set up to pass on information in a timely and 
accurate manner to the staff involved 
 “The model may be better if [it is] looked after … from a central strategic and 
message unit.  So you define it … and set it all up, but have one from each company 
who actually delivers the individual message … “ 
 
16. Lack of full time commitment of customers to project management and project 
activities 
There are high compliance requirements requested by both internal and external bodies  
“… in the States they’ve got Sarbanes Oxley, in Europe they have got something 
else… we’ve got audit type ones... we’ve got health and safety.  I mean that takes a lot 
of staff away…” 
 
This is compounded by the requirements of the day to day requirements of the business 
“…I’ve … got a problem … at the moment, he says, “We need to get as many people 
as we can put in the project”.  And I said, “Right, we are starting to need these 
people.  Oh, we’ve got month end coming soon and then we’ve got financial planning 
and then we’ve got budgeting”.  And he says, “Oh, we’ve got to make sure we don’t 
interfere with those”.  I said, “You can’t have it both ways”…” 
 
And the result is staff members who are unable to fully commit to the project, with 
implications further on. 
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4.1.3 Case 6 (ITM5) 
Company Name - R&D Manufactures* 
Interviewee - Mr David Johnson* 
 
Risks 
Risks were handled using a formal and systematic approach.  A risk registry was created with 
risks being ranked numerically based on the probability of a risk happening and its potential 
impact.  The senior management team would then meet regularly  
“We had a steering group that would review this risk register … and would only 
review changes in risks…each week…if it increased and then every month.  Otherwise 
we would manage and review all other risks … and make sure the mitigations were 
still accurate.” 
 
8. Lack of Senior Management Support 
Although this was never a risk, there was a concerted effort to keep the senior management 
team engaged by ensuring that they remained informed and involved in the ongoing risks 
surrounding the implementation.  This support was carried over to weekly meetings where all 
members of the steering group would meet to review how the project was going and deal with 
issues as they arose 
 “We had a steering group that would review this risk register every week that we met 
and we would only review change in risk.  Like anything increasing in risk we would 
review that normally – that was a mandatory thing each week for risk if it increased 
and then every month.  Otherwise we would manage, review all other open scores 
above six and make sure the mitigations were still accurate…” 
 
4. Insufficient ‘internal’ expertise 
Insufficient internal expertise was identified early as a potential major risk due to the external 
requirements relating to certification  
“…we needed to be completely Sarbanes Oxley compliant before we went live and a 
lot of the Sarbanes Oxley stuff is around your controls and your processes and your 
IT infrastructure and your security model…” 
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After analysing the internal resources it was found that the external requirements could not be 
met with internal resources.  To remedy this external assistance was sought to provide 
guidance and structure initially and as a consequence latter implementations were able to rely 
on internal staff to a large degree 
“[for our] first two implementations…we had to rely on a whole lot of people and 
external help to get that done, but by the time we got to Australia we knew … a lot 
more about how to roll out and manage implementations.” 
 
6. Failure to mix internal and external expertise effectively 
With the engagement of external expertise, the risks associated with mixing external with 
internal resources became paramount.  While the assistance was needed on this project, future 
projects dictated that there was a business need to empower those working on the project to 
up-skill, allowing future projects to succeed with lower levels of external assistance. 
“[for our] first two implementations…we had to rely on a whole lot of people and 
external help to get that done, but by the time we got to Australia we knew and my 
team and our business knew a lot more about how to roll out and manage 
implementations.” 
 
7. Lack of ability to recruit and retain qualified ERP systems developers 
As a consequence of the high levels of external expertise it was anticipated that this would 
pose a problem with staff allocated to the project both during and after the project.  During 
the project a risk identified was the potential to lose project knowledge if staff members were 
to leave.   
 
14. Insufficient training of end users 
While issues relating to user training were alleviated in subsequent implementations by the 
organisations ability to use other successful implementations as reference points  
“They don’t actually have to wait until they go live before they can do training they 
just go to another office.” 
 
the initial installation posed problems due to the high level of business and technological 
changes required within the business 
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“… replace…our old legacy…ERP.  It wasn’t really an ERP, it was more of an MRP 
system – a very…early stage transactional processing system built on a cobalt 
database.” 
 
16. Lack of full time commitment of customers to project management and project 
activities 
Although the project was of paramount importance to the business and was illustrated by the 
levels of senior management commitment, the day to day running of the business still 
required attention and enabling staff the ability to dedicate their time to the project was a 
juggling game 
 “… a lot of what the steering group was doing was dealing with the Project 
Manager’s complaints about not getting enough resource for doing certain aspects of 
the [project] – so its shuffling, “Who can do this task to allow this person to get on 
and do this task”  
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4.1.4 Case 7 (ITM6) 
Company Name - Wholesale Traders (WT)* 
Interviewee - Mr Tony Smith* 
 
Risks 
The risk registry was used as a tool to assist with the project.  The primary goal was to 
remove assumptions because they were dealing with so many people with a lot of 
institutional knowledge and they knew they would need a control repository.  From this 
repository managers would go back to their own groups to find out more, and to determine if 
it was a risk to them and its affects.  Each manager would then go out of their way to ensure 
they were not the “weak links”. 
 
While a risk registry was used extensively within the executive team, another key method of 
keeping on top of risks was the use of “Management by Walking Around”.  This management 
style was used extensively to monitor how things were going on the front line by talking to 
influential users and using their perspectives to determine if things appeared to be working.  
While their perspectives were not used to drive the project they were used to determine how 
the changes were being perceived and to implement changes as needed.   
 
1. Failure to redesign business processes 
This was treated as a major risk throughout the project because of the silo mentality that had 
existed within the business.  This was further complicated by the “ERP terrorists” who saw 
the project as a waste of time and were able to influence others to their way of thinking.  This 
led to lower levels of co-operation in some areas which manifested itself as insufficient 
information on how things were currently done.   
 
Although this knowledge gap had the potential to cripple the project, measures were taken to 
eliminate this from affecting the project in a critical way.  “ERP terrorists” were identified 
and attempts were made to win them over to the project.  Any areas that contained these 
personnel were identified and additional analysis was performed to ensure information was 
correct.   
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4. Insufficient ‘internal’ expertise 
This was identified early in the project with external contractors bought in to drive the project 
towards completion.  As well an immediate issue, insufficient internal expertise was 
identified as an ongoing issue as the level of IT competence within the business was 
acknowledged as being weak.  The business was aware of the levels of ongoing maintenance 
and improvements that would need to be done in the following months and possibly years.   
 
Due to the lack of in-house expertise, there was a high reliance on external consultants to 
support and direct the project.  This direction included the implementation model to be used, 
and tools (including the risk registry) used during the project to ensure things ran smoothly. 
 
Lack of senior management support 
Top management support was never an issue with this project.  From the outset the attitude 
was almost that of a loss-averse mind-set where each manager would keep abreast of the risk 
registry to avoid risks in their area of management.  If a risk in their area became medium to 
high then they would actively pursue the cause of the risk and attempt to resolve it before the 
next meeting.  If no resolution was found, the risk would be bought up in the next 
management meeting and different control strategies would be discussed with agreed 
strategies implemented.   
 
Lack of champion 
This was not an issue in this implementation even though a project champion was never 
formally chosen.  The sense of ownership fostered at the executive level was carried though 
the project, reinforced by the weekly meetings and peer expectations. 
 
Lack of full time commitment of customers to project management and project 
activities 
This was identified early in the project and steps were taken to ensure that this would not 
become a factor.  It was decided that members of the project team would be available 
exclusively for the project for a minimum of three days per week for the life of the project.  
Any other duties outside of the project had to fit into the two remaining days per week as the 
ERP implementation was the top priority. 
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4.1.5 Case 8 (ITM7) 
Company Name - Textile Manufactures International (TMI)* 
Interviewee - Mr Kevin Turner* 
 
Risks 
Many of the risks identified in the implementation were viewed initially as critical success 
factors and monitored throughout the implementation process.  A risk registry was not 
created until 3 months prior to go-live (when they started doing training) and was used to 
identify areas that needed to be monitored after go-live 
“…we did a risk register… to say, “Hey at go live we think these are the areas that 
are going to need review”...” 
 
Almost all of the risks in the register were identified as human resource and training issues so 
an attempt was made to move the responsibility of auctioning the risk register to the Human 
Resources (HR) Department.  This was consequently ignored and without executive pressure 
to action was not referred to again.   
“…the risk register which we sent to the Steering Committee and HR in particular, 
“Here’s a risk register, you go and look after it,” and we even weighed it … in terms 
of what the risk meant to the business and then handed it over and nothing really got 
done with it either, so you know it was a bit disappointing.” 
 
One interesting facet of the implementation was the way in which risks and issues were 
handled throughout the life of the implementation.  During the initial chartering and project 
stage they were handled by the Steering team.  After the project went live and they entered 
the shakedown stage, the implementation team proactively went into the workforce and 
supported the users to ensure problems got fixed quickly  
“…so initially at the start they walked the floor and they were out there and they were 
supporting …” 
 
After this shakedown stage ended the implementation team took a step back and they moved 
into more of a structured response using a help desk format 
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“…when it was getting into operational proper then it was, “That’s your mechanism 
go through the help desk.  Escalate it there and we’ll resolve it...”   
 
Failure to redesign business processes 
This was addressed at the beginning of the process as part of the extensive planning or project 
chartering that was done. 
 
Failure to follow an Enterprise-wide design which supports data integration 
While the design was not an issue, they were aware from the start that data integration was 
going to be an issue because of the disparate systems in-place.  This did not influence their 
approach to the implementation as it was always intended to be a system implementation 
which would require the business needing to change process as opposed to the new system 
being required to match the current business process configuration. 
 
Data cleaning was a big problem and although a lot of time and resources were allocated, it 
turned out to be larger than had been anticipated. 
“…that’s where we started to realise just what was going on in the system…so many 
areas…that could go wrong...so yeah, data cleansing was massive.” 
 
One aspect which proved troublesome was the matching of data codes, names and data types 
between different business units.  Prior to the ERP each business unit operated independently  
“…a big part of that was we actually changed our numbering conventions through 
that… because of the silo business approach they would have a part that was this 
naming convention.  This one would have another part – different naming convention 
and you would sit there and look at them and go, “What is that you know it just 
doesn’t make sense?” - the units and the measure are all over the place.”   
 
Insufficient ‘internal’ expertise 
This was addressed with a combination of active recruiting and the use of external 
consultants to fill the gaps identified.  Recruitment was identified early as a requirement as 
there was only one IT person in an administrative role and the requirements of the new 
system dictated the need for more personnel with a variety of skill sets. 
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Lack of business analysts with business and technical knowledge 
This again was addressed by the active recruitment process undertaken at the beginning of the 
implementation. 
 
Failure to mix internal and external expertise effectively 
This was part of the plan which involved recruitment and implementation partner selection.  
It was always intended that members of staff selected to be part of the implementation team 
would be up skilled by external partners so that super-users would be created. 
 
Lack of ability to recruit and retain qualified ERP systems developers 
Not only was this not an issue with this implementation, it was identified and monitored 
throughout the life of the implementation which resulted in this becoming a highly successful 
component of the entire implementation.   
“…a good thing that happened was once we disbanded the implementation team they 
went into operational roles… So we went through the implementation delivery and 
then moved into that operational role and we did that with everyone on the project 
team… One of the guys on my team, who was in charge of the supply chain …SAP 
background, is now in the Supply Chain Manager’s role in the business. ..”  
 
Lack of senior management support 
As an international company the initial idea had been to use this implementation as a test 
rollout.  This proved troublesome however and was the motivation behind the move away 
from a corporate rollout to more of a localised implementation.  The reason for this was that 
at the international level there was reluctance to move to a common platform because there 
was an existing platform in place at one of the other main sites (although it was a lower tier 
alternative) and other parties were not prepared to spend the additional funds required to 
achieve this 
“…so they were there challenging the huge price wide approach right away.” 
 
The nature of the organisation It quickly escalated so was scaled back to being a local 
installation only.  From a local perspective a project management team was created to push 
the implementation through.  
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“…it was the … Project Management Team … who would sit down and escalate and 
expedite any issues, but the main sponsors were the CFO and CO.  So the CO was 
from an operational side of the business - making sure that everyone was on track 
with what we were trying to achieve here and the CFO obviously around the business 
plus the financials. …” 
 
This was done not because of reluctance on behalf of the senior management team but rather 
because of their collective lack of experience  
“… they were senior managers but they hadn’t been exposed to ERP implementation 
of this size, so it was a real education …” 
 
Lack of proper management control structure 
Change management was handled by the project steering team.  There was an effort to move 
the responsibility to HR as many of the issues arising were personal related but that did not 
happen 
“ I tried to push it out to HR and of course they didn’t have a bar of it, so I ended up 
wearing that one” 
 
The project may have suffered from lower levels of pain had HR been involved as the areas 
identified as being of concern were based around people and processes 
“…there was … pain and that come post go live.  So the change management stuff… 
was people and process.  But again it still gets lumped into it – ERP implementation.” 
 
Insufficient training of end users 
While training was viewed as a major component of the integration, it was at the lower end of 
the priority list and moved to suit business needs 
“…training just gets pushed back and back…” 
 
 When it did happen however it was co-ordinated throughout the business to ensure 
maximum coverage 
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“…we got buy-in from operations to do it.  They mixed it in with their day to day 
requirements.  We did get good feedback in terms of - you know so we took them out 
of the environment put them in a classroom environment, it was a train a trainer type 
approach.  Did really good surveys and got really positive feedback to the point 
where that was seen as a real success.” 
 
Even with this success however there were still problems at go live with using the new 
system.  This was put down to a necessity for the users to just use the new system and get 
used to it. 
“…it’s just time on the system because they go through all the user acceptance 
testing, the training and stuff … Our training was really, really good, yet some of 
them just couldn’t understand, it was still too conceptual.” 
 
Lack of full time commitment of customers to project management and project 
activities 
It was felt that this was done especially well, in fact to the point where they though they may 
have spent too much time on this aspect.  The reason for this was that the business bought in 
employees who would be using the system to assist in the evaluation of the products when the 
respective companies did their presentations 
“…when the guys come down to their offsite vendor presentations we pulled out 
warehouse staff, sales clerks, purchasing people and said, “This is the system that 
you could be using, tell us your feedback.” “  
 
It was felt however that this time had additional benefits in regards to end user buy-in.   
“So you know you’ve got that buy-in right from the get go.  They felt like they were 
part of the process.” 
 
Lack of sensitivity to user resistance 
There were efforts made to try to be sensitive to possible resistance and this was done in two 
ways.  The first of which was to involve the users in all aspects of the project starting with the 
product selection.  The second was to identify key users whose influence could propagate a 
negative attitude towards the new implementation.  A term given to these users was 
“Implementation Terrorist” 
101 
“…we identified key people in the business …who… had an influence…if we’ve got 
issues we’ll just go straight to [them] and work with [them] on the issues, because if 
we resolve that then that’s 75 percent of the problem fixed…” 
 
One aspect of user resistance they addressed head on was the perception that the new system 
was not performing.  It was being blamed for constraining the business and was a very 
difficult problem to diagnose.  As a consequence of the noise being generated this became a 
high priority problem.  The way this was resolved was to bring in external auditors to 
evaluate the system to find out what the problems were and to get them fixed as soon as 
possible.  What was found was that the problem was not system related but rather people and 
processes.  After this was presented to the board the problem disappeared overnight. 
“…That was a common theme … we were hearing back, “The system is constraining 
the business”.  So we said, “Fine, we are going to go out and we are going to get 
independents to come in and run an audit.”  … we got two guys … and their findings 
were that the issues that were being experienced were 80 percent people and process.  
So … we went back to the Board with that …and from that moment on the noise 
almost disappeared overnight.  So … we did have technical issues which you would 
expect but not to the scale that people hang their hats on and say, “It’s the system’s 
fault.”  
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4.1.6 Case 9 (ITM8)  
Company Name - This and That Manufacturing (T&TM)* 
Interviewee - Mr John Broadman * 
 
Risks 
John’s working background and formal qualifications steered him towards formalised 
structure which included the use of a risk registry.   
“…it’s something that I think is pretty important and some of it also just comes down 
to the templates that you use for your project documentation I guess.” 
 
The problem encountered was that John was the only one to use the registry so its usefulness 
as a tool used to keep all senior members of the organisation informed was negligible. 
“A risk log is useless unless the business actually takes notice of it and that is a bit of 
an issue that I had in this project.” 
 
Interestingly this implementation was deemed a success even though many of the risks 
identified were not resolved during the implementation and continued to be a problem after 
completion. 
“… some of the risks … were at the top of the risk log throughout the entire project 
and that has actually come back to haunt us a bit, because the effort from that 
department wasn’t put in; they are still actually behind…” 
 
Part of the success of the project was attributed to luck 
“Most of the risks were not dealt with properly.  We were just lucky to a large 
degree…” 
 
Failure to redesign business processes 
The intention was to go with the recommended processes as the systems they had in place 
offered little competitive advantage and was almost universally disliked by staff 
“…we were coming from two separate systems anyway … no one liked them either, so 
it was quite easy to say, “Right we are just going to go to this system and we are just 
going to use whatever process they recommend for that situation.” 
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The reason this was not envisioned to be a problem was that the processes in place were 
mapped before the new implementation and very little complexity was found 
“…though our business has got some complexity most of the processes actually I 
think can be mapped relatively easily, so we were very confident that there weren’t 
going to be any issue…” 
 
Although the system was easy to map, one obstacle found was that although users knew the 
systems well they had not been exposed to other environments so were not aware of any 
better ways of doing things. 
“…it was a company where people had been working there for a majority of over 10 
years, well quite a few over 20 years, so they had never known any other systems.  So 
getting them to explain what they do and possibly even working out what would be 
better for the business is almost impossible because they don’t know anything else.” 
 
Insufficient ‘internal’ expertise 
This was always going to be an issue with staff turn-over as knowledge of the internal system 
was low 
“…we don’t have that knowledge in the business…”  
 
As a consequence of this they were unable to get a lot of input from staff so chose to dictate 
the process to staff 
“…so we pretty much … dictate the process - define a project team and then dictate 
from there how it’s going work …” 
 
One area where they struggled was in the creation of super-users.  They felt that this was due 
to the lack of expertise within the business as a consequence of high levels of staff turnover, 
redundancies which had removed much of the middle management and some of the more 
experienced members of staff and that IT competence was not a requirement for new 
members of staff.   
“…one of my big struggles is trying to … get super users in place with the system so 
all questions aren’t coming straight to me…” 
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Unfortunately because of this IT were inundated with problems.  As this was an issue for all 
three implementations it was thought that this attributed to the failure experienced in the third 
implementation – namely burnout. 
 
Failure to mix internal and external expertise effectively 
This was well done in this implementation primarily because of the solution they chose.  As it 
was industry specific they felt comfortable that any changes they required would not be 
misunderstood and would result in what was needed  
“…the consultants did understand [our industry], so when we were saying to them, 
“We want this,” they actually understood.   
 
 The reason this was emphasised was because this had not been the case in the past and it had 
caused long term problems which they did not wish to encounter again 
“… one of the big issues we’ve had in the past with solutions like this is where the 
implementers don’t understand your business.  I mean it’s so easy for a developer to 
completely misconstrue a requirement, go away and develop it and come back with 
something different.  We didn’t have that issue here…” 
 
Lack of senior management support 
Although there was an understanding that the senior management team needed to be behind 
the implementation 
“I think the management team understood that they needed to be behind it…” 
 
They still struggled to engage the senior management team.  This was in part attributed to the 
overall lack of IT knowledge as a majority of those in senior management had extensive 
backgrounds in sales with very little IT knowledge.   
“The Executive Team … they are salespeople, they are not really interested in 
projects like this, so we did struggle to get them engaged much at all. “ 
 
Lack of proper management control structure 
This was a very real problem and was attributed to the state of the business at the time.  Due 
to the economic downturn much of the middle management were made redundant which 
included the HR functionality  
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“…when they reduced staffing they pulled out pretty much all of the middle 
management, all the training function, the HR function went…” 
 
Insufficient training of end users 
Training was a real issue for the business and stemmed in part from the lack of senior 
management commitment.  Without that support staff did not feel the need to commit either 
and this resulted in widespread reluctance. 
“…getting them engaged in this project was almost impossible…” 
 
This reluctance extended to system usage after training.  Staff refused to use the system and 
without the push from above felt this was justified as there was a chance the project wasn’t 
going to work anyway. 
“…I had trained the same people three times because each time we trained them they 
just refused to use the system after that and just totally forgot it.  So it’s that kind of – 
trying to actually get one of the end users to actually go through the process and say, 
“Well actually I like that.  I don’t like that,” pretty much impossible.  We really, 
really struggled on that as a business…” 
 
 
Lack of feedback resulted in the organisation having to dictate what was going to happen 
with little regard for any user resistance. 
“…Right, I’m going to get some of the key corporate users in.  We are going to say 
this is how it’s going to work.  We are going to then train people.  If there are any big 
issues that come out of that training then we’ll address them…” 
 
Ineffective end-user communication 
End user communication was only seen as an issue because it was not two-way.  They had 
determined that with low levels of user feedback and low levels of senior management 
engagement that the process was going to be more dictatorial as a result 
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“…Ineffective end user communication – well that was an issue throughout …”  
 
Lack of full time commitment of customers to project management and project 
activities 
Lack of commitment was an issue not only with staff being allocated, but also with those 
running the implementation.   
“…we are pretty resource tight and I didn’t have the ability to assign a separate 
Project Manager or give up my day job while I was doing this project ...” 
 
Lack of sensitivity to user resistance 
Sensitivity to user resistance was dictated by lack of senior management support and the lack 
of technical ability within staff.  As there was little of either they resigned themselves to 
having to force the implementation through 
“…users do feel a bit that the system is imposed on them, but … you just can’t get 
feedback from them.  So that actually kind of mandated a bit that we pretty much had 
to put something in, then monitor it to a degree ….” 
 
They were aware that this could result in some serious issues but had to push through to 
ensure that the implementation went ahead 
“…we were totally insensitive to user resistance.  That was actually deliberate 
because we fully expected a lot of resistance and our strategy was just completely 
override it…” 
 
Failure to emphasis reporting 
While reporting was seen as an important feature, it was put aside because the software was 
industry specific and offered a lot of the reports needed as standard 
“…reporting was something that we kind of pushed off to one side … because it was a 
[ industry  ] specific solution it did have quite a lot of reporting built in that could do 
the majority of what users needed…” 
 
Even so problems were experienced because of the lack of feedback and buy-in from staff.  
This took the form of employees not giving the initial mock reports any seriously thought 
which resulted in the final reports not offering sufficient data  
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“…So it actually goes as far as to mock up the report for them …” Okay, here’s the 
sales report you’re going to get.”   When it was delivered it was still, “No, that’s not 
what I want,” what was delivered was exactly what was mocked up…” 
 
One reason given was the lack of understanding of the wider business  
“…we do have quite a divide between the people who would be looking at the reports 
and the people who are kind of entering the order and actually understand what’s 
going on behind the scenes a bit better…” 
 
This was not an issue in the following implementations because the work done resulted in 
higher levels of understanding  
 “…the implementation that went after this one, with that project I did have more of 
an idea…” 
 
Attempting to build bridges to legacy applications 
Due to the lack of senior management support and the problems experienced with the 
authority of the project champion the accounts department were able to override the IT 
department and announced that they would retain a legacy system which they were still 
using.   
“…Everyone else is quite happy that they be switched off, but its finance and it 
doesn’t matter how much you say, “Tell us what you need - we’ll get it all out and 
then you can switch the system off.”  It’s always, “But we might need something 
else,” and yeah, it’s very frustrating…” 
 
 
Although in previous implementations cost has been successfully used to justify the need to 
turn off legacy systems, this system is an internal resource which required no additional 
overhead costs to keep running. As such the accounts department have used this successfully 
to justify their decision as updating the system would be costly and time consuming and the 
disruption could be avoided if the status quo was retained.   
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There has been a couple of times when I’ve been able to … fully switch the system off, 
mainly where there’s a huge cost to maintaining it.  In this case, it’s kind of seen 
as…not really costing anything…” 
 
The problem is that the system is obsolete and could fail at any time which would require 
either a replacement system or the data to be moved and made available somewhere else (if 
possible) at short notice which could prove costlier and more of a business interruption than 
if the process were managed.   
“….but …it could still die at any point.  At the moment its still working, but I’m not 
going to guarantee that it will work tomorrow…“ 
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4.1.7 Case 10 (ITM9) 
Company Name - Industrial Manufactures* (IM) 
Interviewee - Mr Stephen Lee * 
 
Risks 
One of the control devices they used in the implementation was the risk registry. 
“…the risk register is just one of those devices which is no different to signing off one 
of the stages or signing off different things so it is just one of those controls.” 
 
While there were good reasons for using a registry, some of the administrative overheads 
made its use seem like more of a chore than as a useful implementation device 
“It’s almost used as a show piece for the steering committee.  
 
The reason for this observation was that those on the implementation team were completing 
an administrative task that added to their workload with very little gain as it just slowed a 
process that they were doing already 
“…So you evaluate your risks – either high medium or low or give them a rating of 1 
to 20 and then you monitor them as you are going through.  It’s good to keep track of 
it but (my view anyway) is that you instinctively do it anyway…” 
 
The ratings given to the impacts were done in two stages.  The first was to identify what the 
impact of a risk was going to be, and then it was assigned a numerical value based on the 
number and severity.   
“…people in the business understand the impact quite easily so they don’t tend to say 
what the impact is, they tend to say what the risk is, what the mitigation steps are 
going to be – they don’t really say what the actual impact is.  We didn’t record it in 
our risk register.”  
 
Failure to follow an Enterprise-wide design which supports data integration 
Due to the amount of modification and redesign of the system required by the business, it 
took approximately 4 months before they discovered a problem with some of their financial 
figures.  The figures were balancing at the executive level, but when finance drilled down 
some of the accounting figures were being lost. 
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“…at a high level it was balancing, but at the low level when you try to look at work 
in progress and transactions, it was just missing in the breeze…” 
 
This was attributed directly to the system modifications carried out  
“…This was directly because of the way we modded it…” 
 
Failure to mix internal and external expertise effectively 
The biggest problem they had was that IM knew what they wanted but didn’t know the 
software, and the consultants knew the software but didn’t know the business.  While this is 
not unusual it did take some time to get it right 
“…one of the biggest challengers we had here was that we knew what we wanted but 
didn’t know the software and they knew the software but didn’t know the business, so 
it took a while to get on the same page…” 
 
They found their mix worked very well which resulted in a smooth go-live, 
“…in general we had a good go live.  We went go live and from day one we could 
dispatch and ship out orders, had no real issues and everyone was smooth …” 
 
This was mainly because of the implementation consultants they had chosen.  It worked so 
well in fact that the consultants were able to move offsite three days after go-live because 
there were not any major issues, and most small issues had been resolved. 
“…the Consultants disappeared offsite 3 days after going live and we were by 
ourselves.” 
 
Lack of ability to recruit and retain qualified ERP systems developers 
The project manager was employed specifically for the ERP implementation.  To ensure the 
highest calibre of applicant, the business ensured there was a progression plan after the 
implementation, which was to take over the role of IT manager 
“…I was employed to be the project manager for the ERP, and now I’m the IT 
manager.  So the plan was to always take over from the IT Manager at the end of the 
project…” 
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The reason given was that the business had identified that they wanted continuity after the 
project to ensure the project manager was completely committed to the project and cared not 
only about the success of the project, but the ongoing health of the business.  
“…the business identified that they wanted some continuity after the project so they 
had a progression plan for me which formed part of the incentive for me.  If there had 
not been a progression plan after the project I wouldn’t have come…” 
 
As well as the project manager, the project team were assembled specifically for the project.  
One key difference was that the project team encompassed existing members of staff and it 
was not always a case of voluntary participation, especially as many had been doing their 
existing jobs for many years and had never done anything like this before.   
“…They have never done it before.  Some of these people are dragged out of the same 
role they have been doing for the last 20 years and we dragged them kicking and 
screaming (or it was pretty close) and told them that this is your baby so make it 
work.” 
 
After the project was completed, most project team members were absorbed back into the 
business 
“We took them back into the business...one or two went into different roles but the key 
people went back into their roles.  They are still seen as the super users …” 
 
The reason that some changed and some remained in their old jobs was primarily to do with 
how they handled and enjoyed change. 
“…..some people hate it...they went back to their comfort zone I guess.  Whereas 
other people go “I like this” and my career and my opportunities have opened up and 
a couple of people have obviously moved on, as you do. “ 
 
Natural attrition was the reason given for those that moved on.  They lost some key members 
of staff but were fairly philosophical and attributed it to natural attrition, which was always 
viewed as an ongoing factor 
“...We had the same sort of attrition from the project – you lose a couple of key 
people and there is nothing you can do about that.  It’s just life…””” 
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Lack of senior management support 
They identified this risk at the beginning of the project worked on it to ensure it never was a 
problem  
“…the [senior managers] bought into the project way back here and they knew what 
the risks was and we didn’t have it…if we needed something it just got done…the 
business knew it was the number 1 project…” 
 
Senior management commitment continued after the go-live stage, which included on-going 
steering committee meetings to monitor the implementation 
“…we kept steering committee meetings up and the project meetings for a good 2 or 3 
months afterwards to try and identify any issues we could have had…” 
 
Lack of champion 
The champion was identified before the start of the implementation 
“…We identified the champion before the project… and it was not his sole job but a 
key part of his role.  Any road blocks that came up …he could steam roll them 
through…” 
 
Although the champion stayed on throughout the project, a contingency plan was made in 
case another champion was needed 
“…There was a contingency plan there in case he left but he didn’t…” 
 
Failure to adhere to standardised specifications which the software supports 
This was a determining factor when it came to selection of ERP system, implementation team 
and implementation model.  For IM they considered their production methods to be a 
competitive advantage and needed a system that would enable them to keep that advantage.  
While it was acknowledged that there are risks to this approach, this was how they chose to 
continue and needed a product and team that could deliver 
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“We got the impression from them (and it would have been viewed as either a good 
thing or a bad thing) that it’s either our way or the highway which would have put us 
on a particular track.  As was said before, we are not vanilla.  Every business is 
different and you have to divert from that vanilla and we felt they were constantly 
trying to pull us back.  In some areas that was good, but in some that was bad.  
Especially where we think we have a competitive advantage…” 
 
While there was the intention of limiting the modifications as much as possible to avoid 
added complications and cost \ time over-runs, the business reasons to introduce 
modifications was there 
“At the steering committee we decided we were not going to do any mods.   So we 
pushed [back] on every mod but unfortunately there were genuine business cases why 
we had to mod the system. 
 
The modifications required now make it difficult with upgrades but that was an 
acknowledged consequence of the path they chose 
“…we have a lot of mods in key areas which now makes upgrading difficult.  It’s now 
a difficult process because we now have to retrofit the mods…“ 
 
Insufficient training of end users 
With so many of the business users being involved in the project, end-user training was not 
an issue.   
“We had train the trainer to mitigate risk, we had experts and we trained them and 
they went out and trained the uses.” 
 
Lack of full time commitment of customers to project management and project 
activities 
In the initial demonstration stage the business committed 25 people from all aspects of the 
business to be present 
“We had no less than 25 members of staff at the presentation…” 
 
The reason that this level of commitment was shown was because Steve made it very clear to 
all of the organisational units that this software would affect them and that it would happen 
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irrespective of what they did so if they wanted some input into how it worked they needed to 
be present. 
“I made it very clear at the beginning…to try to mitigate risk…it’s your decision so 
it’s your software, your company…” 
 
The commitment levels shown were indicative of the overall drive of the business to get it 
right first time 
“…Although it was a large commitment, at the end of the day it’s a small commitment 
if you get it wrong…” 
 
Lack of sensitivity to user resistance 
User resistance is not just restricted to end-users of the finished system.  In this project it was 
recognised that those members of staff selected to participate in the project would need 
incentives to be able to make it through the implementation process. 
“…You’re grabbing someone from production … and saying you’re going to be 
working over here for 6 months … in this project – they don’t know IT, they don’t 
know the processes involved, they’re outside their comfort zone and they all get 
stressed.  So you are asking a lot from a personal perspective and a lot of commitment 
and we put incentive bonuses around that….” 
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4.1.8 Case 11 (ERPC2) 
Company Name - Primary-Business (PB)* 
Interviewee - Mr Bob Scambury* 
 
Risks 
In general terms, risks within ERP implementations were viewed by Bob as being repetitive  
“I’ve been involved in a number of other projects … so I’ve seen it at various levels 
and they seem to make the same mistakes again and again…” 
 
And the value of having an experienced implementation team is that there is a higher chance 
that someone on that team has experienced one of the many things that can go wrong  
“… Experience is being able to recognise your mistakes when you make them 
again…” 
 
That is where project teams without experience can run into difficulties, even with external 
help.  While good intentions exist and a genuine desire to do the right thing can be present, 
without that internal experience to drive what needs to be done, identification of impending 
problems will not always result in action 
“The same mistakes are made again and again and if you can spot them, you can do 
something about them.  We put them on the table as risks but they don’t seem to do 
anything with them.  They put them on the table and recognise them as risks and say 
this and this and this but they never seem to let it influence their behaviours or give 
things the urgency they need at the right time.” 
 
Even implementation teams with experience can have mixed results.  This can be due to  
“…different results come out … because maybe one area was covered better and 
someone was experienced in that area or it wasn’t such a big concern such as data 
conversion or integration …”  
 
This is not helped by the view that tools such as risk registries, which are created to aid in this 
process, are seen as more of an administrative overhead  
116 
“I think the risks registry is seen as an administrative thing as they feel they have to 
dream up some risks to go in there.” 
 
 
A problem found with the generalisation of risks into categories however, is that each 
implementation will produce individual risks which need to be addressed and can be 
problematic if they are slotted into a category 
“I wonder if it is irrelevant … generic risks like “reporting not getting the attention it 
deserves” ….  Maybe we should be focusing more on specific risks for that particular 
project…” 
 
Even with the accurate identification of risks for a particular implementation you still run the 
risk of identifying symptoms as opposed to the root cause of risks.  An example of this is in 
the breakdown of the relationship between the project team and the vendor. 
“…the relationship between the project team and the vendor failing, those sorts of 
risks are often underreported or underestimated because they are not self-
reporting…” 
 
This situation can lead to the manifestation of other problems occurring and attempts made to 
address these risks being unsuccessful, leading to increased levels of confusion over 
appropriate controls for specific risks. 
 
A majority of the risks identified were categorised as people related 
 “… Because they are similar projects e.g. they are package implementations, and 
there is a fairly standard methodology for implementing them – human factors come 
into it more than technical factors.” 
 
This is because the actual setup of the software can be a relatively quick process 
“…configuring software doesn’t take long, I can configure most of the applications in 
a couple of days – even the complex ones…” 
 
Failure to redesign business processes 
This was a problem not because of a lack of intent, but rather because the internal users 
lacked the training and familiarity with the processes and tools available in the redesign 
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process.  What was to be redesigning and to what degree was something that was identified 
as needing to be done in the scoping stage.   
“…There are a lot of decisions you can and should make in the scoping document up 
front to make things so much easier when it comes to redesigning things…” 
 
And the scoping document was viewed as an important control mechanism 
“…We spent a lot of time checking out the scope and making sure it was adequate 
and covered everything that was required…” 
 
PB experienced this risk when the vendor wanted to do things differently to what PB wanted.  
Due to the engagement of experienced ERP implementation experts into their project team, 
PB knew the positive and negative implication of that change and decided to push it through.   
“… In the prototyping [stage] things [decided in the scoping stage] became a little too 
hard for them…so we just pushed them to do them…” 
 
Failure to follow an Enterprise-wide design which supports data integration 
Data integration was seen as a common problem in implementations, with integration of 
existing data always taking longer than expected 
“…data is always bad in the old system…and therefore integration always takes 
longer than expected and is always more complicated.”   
 
In the case of PB they had some unique data integration issues and as a consequence of their 
planning process and set go-live date, had to go live with a system that was not quite as ready 
as they would have wished. 
“…and it put the pressure on them to go live with things that weren’t quite ready…” 
 
Insufficient training and reskilling of IT workforce 
This was identified early as a potential problem so steps were taken to ensure the right skills 
were there from the beginning of the project 
“…we hired people with the right skills...”   
 
118 
Insufficient ‘internal’ expertise 
In this implementation the internal expertise was a driving force behind the methodology 
used.  Overall however there is no one method that they have to use, and the decision is based 
on the experience and composition of the project team.   
 “…so we work with the vendors on their approach…we do have our own 
methodology but in practice the real methodology we use will depend on the 
experience and skills of the team members in the implementation…” 
 
Lack of business analysts with business and technical knowledge 
This risk featured in the implementation and had a negative effect on business process 
redesign.  Without personnel skilled in the use and design of effective work processes they 
stood a great chance of getting the initial planning and scoping documents wrong 
“…the planners weren’t sufficiently trained or experienced…so that was a 
concern…” 
 
A control put in place was to assign a senior manager to oversee the process, but they were 
reassigned for business reasons and this had the effect of slowing down the planning process. 
“…This was identified and a senior manager was supposed to be working with them 
but got put onto other things…so that was another reason why they were so slow on 
the planning front…” 
 
Failure to mix internal and external expertise effectively 
While they did not experience any of these problems in this implementation, the relationship 
between the organisation and the vendor was regarded as critical and Bob described the 
breakdowns in this relationship as often being under-reported in the context of project 
problems or failures.   
“…the relationship between the project team and the vendor failing, those sorts of 
risks are often underreported or underestimated because they are not self-
reporting…” 
 
By self-reporting, Bob alluded to the point that no-on wants to admit that they were in the 
wrong, especially in projects of this size and complexity.  From his experience he had come 
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across situations where reasons for implementation problems or failures (which include 
technical issues) have originated from the breakdown of this relationship 
“…they can say that the software didn’t work or the vendor didn’t do enough, and if 
you dig down deeper you find that software works somewhere else and that vendor 
has worked somewhere else as well so there was something about that project that 
made it go wrong…”  
 
Lack of senior management support 
Senior management support and the effectiveness of a project champion were viewed as 
closely related and have the potential to impact each other significantly.   
 “…I think one of the biggest risks in organisations is themselves…management that 
gets frustrated…” 
 
Having a management team that are aligned with the implementation was identified by Bob 
as essential and was the case with PB.  The project champion had the full support of their 
CEO and was able to drive the project and the executive team towards their shared goal. 
While they were a new team together, they had a mix of experience and enthusiasm so were 
able to negotiate risks by being there to address them when they occurred 
“…we had quite an active steering team who included senior managers and we tried 
to use that team to get the business focused…” 
 
One problem that did occur was that managers were pulled away from the project during the 
project build which had the potential to derail the project.  This was quickly addressed and 
the project was able to continue on track 
“…this happened during the prototype when various people were not there…we had 
to put the facts on the table…” 
 
Lack of champion 
While the presence of a Project Champion is essential, they must also have the authority and 
backing from the very top of the organisation for it to be effective.  This was not a problem at 
PB. 
120 
“…there was good sponsorship and good support for the project team, there was also 
good encouragement and a bit of pressure from time to time to get things done…” 
 
Ineffective management communication 
While this was a relatively small implementation  
“…this was only a small implementation so that helps…” 
 
This risk did manifest itself in the implementation stage  
“…this came up during the implementation…people had different perceptions of what 
was happening and we had to facilitate some discussion to make sure everyone was 
on the same page…” 
 
While the initial scoping document was not a problem, the breakdown in communication 
appeared to occur as a natural consequence of the project due to its long nature and the 
natural variations in individuals ideas based on personal experiences and understandings.   
“…everybody is busy and frustrated and the system seems to be going slower and 
everything is taking longer it should and there are errors all over the place.  People 
start blaming each other and not doing things they should be doing and then people 
come to a view of what the system is doing…and who should be doing what and 
because everybody has different experiences and different understandings they are 
often never on the same page as to what the solution should be…” 
 
The method used to resolve this was through regular meetings to reinforce what was 
happening, explain what was needed and why. 
So we have an active steering team that meet each week and we have other meetings 
around that where we, for example, look at the planning system and look at the 
problems, what were the issues and how they should be solved and pull everybody 
together…”  
 
While this occurred in the PB implementation, Bob explained that in his experience, this 
naturally occurs in most ERP projects.   
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“…virtually every project there are tears, people upset, frustrated and wanting to 
throw the system and the consultants…this is where we calm them down and refocus 
them …” 
 
 
Failure to adhere to standardised specifications which the software supports 
This is a problem that can be traced back to the sales presentations of the vendors.   
“…if the system can do things in a particular way that’s not the best way of doing 
things, as a vendor you don’t say “yes you can do it that way but it is not the best 
way”, rather you say “yes you can do that”.  
 
One of the side effects of this can be the selection of an unsuitable system which can increase 
the chances of failure 
“…you are essentially setting yourself up for failure…” 
 
While Bob, as a consultant, is always concerned about this risk, it never transpired in the PB 
implementation.  As a control they would normally build in tests to check if this is going to 
affect the project 
“…that is something we are always concerned about.  That never transpired as a risk 
but we would normally build in tests to check the site…” 
 
Lack of integration 
This occurred as a consequence of third party interfaces which were not sufficiently tested 
and failed against internal testing. 
“.. this came up during the build and test, some of the integrated points weren’t 
delivered in the way they should have been and were delivered late…the supplier 
didn’t test it sufficiently enough ” 
 
Insufficient training of end users 
This risk manifested itself in the implementation, but was expected due to the tight time 
frames and problems with the availability of training for staff  
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“…we knew this was going to be a problem because of the tight time frames and the 
availability to actually get training…” 
 
Although insufficient training of end users is quite a common problem, there are a number of 
different aspects to this issue.  Organisations will underestimate the amount of time needed to 
complete this process 
“…It’s the learning curve.  Organisations always underestimate how long [the new 
system] will take to learn.  This includes the software and getting their heads around 
the new way of doing things...” 
 
This applies to the training needed during the project  
“…This is during the implementation project and is about getting up to speed on how 
the systems works.”  
 
it is not just an allocation, top down problem.  Users are required to participate and devote 
time to ensuring they know how to use the new system 
“People never dedicate enough of their time own time to being trained…” 
 
As a consequence, after go live users are unsure if what they are doing is correct, or if it will 
crash the system.  In these instances, they will fall back on how things were done in the past 
“When they go live people won’t follow the new procedures…you can prepare all the 
documentation you like but they won’t read it, rather they will try to do it the old 
way…” 
 
Ineffective end-user communication 
This occurred as a consequence of the problem experienced with management 
communication 
“…same sort of thing as with management communication, end user communication 
falls over as well… everyone is too busy and end users get too confused and 
frustrated … to hear the messages clearly…you just have to work through it” 
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Lack of full time commitment of customers to project management and project 
activities 
This occurred at multiple times during the implementation and was a consequence of normal 
business activity.  When a business installs a new system, the company still needs to operate 
so time demands from other areas are always there.  There were two way that they tried to 
control this.  The first was to emphasise the importance to priorities this activity due to the 
short time frames available for the installation 
“…are not always emphasising the priority of the tasks or the urgency in particular 
and …there are only so many weeks to complete this and … the time goes quickly…” 
 
The second was to acknowledge the situation, try to come up with some practical solutions 
and make compromises when no other options are available 
“…you also need to come up with some practical solutions to resourcing problems, 
and sometimes you have to be pragmatic and make some compromises  
 
Lack of sensitivity to user resistance 
User resistance is a normal consequence of this type of project due to its scope, size and 
organisational impact.   
“People don’t like to change how they do things so there is always user resistance…” 
 
This was a factor at the go-live stage of the PB installation and came about during the 
interactions between the project implementation team and the new system users.  When the 
project team fixed issues they expected users to change immediately 
 
“…we fixed this and now you should be doing it …” 
 
What the implementation team have to be mindful of is that the users levels of familiarity is 
quite a bit less than their own and that they are just trying to do their jobs while also trying 
not to break the new system 
“…you have to be a little bit more understanding of the users…” 
 
Failure to emphasis reporting 
This was an issue at the implementation stage.   
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“…We identified that they didn’t have enough reports and hadn’t made enough 
progress…” 
 
The person in charge of the reports did not believe them as they had already created a large 
number of reports ready to go 
“…I have a list of reports I will produce…” 
 
This was by no way unique to this project and typifies the problems with insufficient 
experience in that you don’t know what you don’t know.  While the reports manager may 
have completed the list of reports requested for go-live, the reports needed and those 
requested will not always match as users may not fully understand their needs.  
“That’s a mistake that everyone makes, there are never enough reports done for go –
live…” 
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4.1.9 Case 12 (ERPC3) 
Company Name – All About Construction (ABC)* 
Interviewee - Mr Vince Boyes* 
 
Risks 
Failure to mix internal and external expertise effectively 
One area where this mix can be difficult is with project managers.  Frequently two project 
managers are assigned to an implementation, one internal and a consultant.  The internal 
project manager has knowledge of the business but is reliant on the consultant project 
manager for information on implementation methods and models and specific technical 
details about the new software. 
“…Quite often the client project manager has had no exposure so it is a learning 
exercise for them…”   
 
Lack of senior management support 
This upgrade was a necessity and was  
 
Insufficient training of end users 
A client manager was responsible for training the end users and while the manager processed 
a clear understanding of the system, some of the finer details regarding reasons for specific 
configuration choices were not known to him.  As a consequence, there was the potential for 
users to become resistant to using the new system (as opposed to the old working system) as 
changes could appear unreasonable in isolation.   
“…I would have been able to explain it better with more reasons why.  This wasn’t 
too great an issue but it was there….” 
 
One method used by Vince to mitigate this was to be present in the group training sessions, 
and to offer information if the questions required any advanced understanding 
“…When I was in the room …I would say something like “this is the reason why we 
are doing it this way”, or “this is cause and effect”…” 
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Whether this was effective or not was debateable as the training was quite intense and the 
finer detail offered potentially did not make understanding the use of day to day functionality 
any easier 
“…At the same time, the person going through the training had so much going 
through their head at the time that it probably went over them…” 
 
Lack of full time commitment of customers to project management and project 
activities 
Not having the full complement and commitment of employees for an ERP implementation is 
unfortunately a reality for smaller businesses.  This can make things difficult as staff are 
forced to split their time between their day-to-day activities and the requirements of the 
project 
“…Because a lot of the places are small, they don’t have a large number of staff.  
People are still required to do their day to day jobs and if they don’t have enough 
time it becomes a problem….There are some projects where they have backfilled for 
staff and that does make life a lot easier…” 
 
Having enough people available for the project is not the only cause of problems when it 
comes to committing staff to a project.  Not having staff members with the necessary 
knowledge and skills available to participate in the project can also cause problems, 
especially when it comes to testing necessary functionality 
“…The quality of the people doing the testing can be mixed, and the quality of the 
results can be mixed … the best people you want are the probably the best people in 
the organisation but they are sometimes not the ones who can get released so you get 
someone … who doesn’t have that company knowledge which can have an impact 
further down the track, especially if the organisation doesn’t validate … data for the 
design [stage]…” 
 
This is especially true in the early design parts and applied to the last project 
“…I did all that [the configuration] because they didn’t any power users or super 
users with the ability to do it…” 
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The way found to mitigate this was to ensure qualified members of the organisation attend 
prototyping sessions to check and validate any work done 
“…you have to try to get that business buy-in.  They are coming along to the 
prototype sessions and validate the work a junior person has done…to ensure it is a 
valid process…” 
 
Failure to emphasis reporting 
While this was identified as usually occurring later in the project, the aim was to introduce 
report writing as early as possible to try to mitigate this risk. Additionally some of the system 
configuration was based on the reporting needs of the users so establishing this early would 
set the scene for the implementation. 
“…That was always one that would quite often feature later in the project but I 
always try to bring it …forward …because that will dictate what you need to put into 
the system…” 
 
Sometimes bringing it forward was not an option.  The reason for this was that for users to be 
able to accurately describe the reports they wanted, they had to have an understanding of how 
the system worked and the underlying processes involved.  This level of understanding is not 
there at the beginning of the implementation and sometimes it was necessary to leave it until 
later in the implementation. 
 “…The users just couldn’t grasp the … whole system … to be able to make any 
decisions around reports because they hadn’t got to grips with the underlying … 
processes.  So sometimes we didn’t have a choice but to leave it til later…” 
 
Attempting to build bridges to legacy equipment 
Interfaces to legacy equipment happens at a later stage when employing prototyping 
“… We will worry about the interface at a later stage …” 
 
This is because in a prototyping situation, the initial prototyping done is to model existing 
processes and connecting to other systems is secondary 
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“…If I look at prototypes, because you don’t have the interfaces considered even at 
the prototype stage…you knew that they were there but you are only prototyping the 
business processes, you worry about the interfaces at a later stage.  When you get 
down to the detail some of it can be difficult” 
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4.2 Risk Registry Findings 
The detailed risk registry (Appendix b) is a compilation of the risk registries received and the 
findings from the semi-structured interviews.  This was done to confirm the findings by 
matching what was recorded in risk registries with what was gathered in the interviews in an 
effort to achieve confirmation through triangulation.  Table 4.1 contains the headings and 
both the information they contain and if that information was derived from information 
received or analysis done. 
 
Table 4.1: Definition of risk registry headings 
Heading Information contained and how that information was derived 
Case & Risk No.  This identifies both the case and the source this information was drawn 
from.   
(R) = indicates this information came from the risk registry 
(I) = this information was gathered from the interview 
 
Risk: 
 
In both the Risk Registries and interviews, the risk definitions were those 
used by the organisations.   
Identified Risk Factor: 
 
Each risk was categories by the researcher using the definitions set out in 
Sumner (2000) and defined in the theoretical background.   
Description Further description of the risk if needed 
Stage risk was addressed: 
 
The identification of where the risks were addressed was completed by the 
researcher through analysis of the risk, impacts to the business and the 
controls used. This was done using the Markus and Tanis (2000) model as a 
framework for analysis. 
Business impacts: 
 
This information was supplied by the organisation and pulled directly from 
the risk registries or from the interview data. 
Controls used: 
 
As with the business impacts, this information was also pulled directly from 
the risk registries or from the interview data. 
Risk category As with identified risks, each risk was categories by the researcher using the 
definitions set out in Sumner (2000) and defined in the theoretical 
background.   
 
In appendix b, risks and controls have been listed by the project stage in which they occurred 
as described by Markus and Tanis (2000).  Further classification work has been done in 
appendix c, where the risks and controls have been sorted using the Risk Categories (as 
described by Sumner, 2000), and within the Risk Categories, by Project Stage (as described 
by Markus & Tanis, 2000). 
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Chapter Five: 
Discussion 
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5.1 Overview 
This discussion is broken into three sections.  The first section will examine the relationship 
between different risks in ERP implementations and looks to answer the first research 
question 
 
How does the relationship between different risks change during the different stages 
of an ERP implementation? 
 
Section two will include analysis of the relationship between risks and controls, and seeks to 
answer the second research question 
 
How can Project Managers (PMs) map risks to controls in ERP implementations at 
the project management level? 
 
The final section will encompass any further findings which emerged from the data.   
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5.2 Hierarchical (Risk to Risk) Relationships 
When performing axial coding on the data gathered, it was found that certain risks appear to 
be interrelated.  While the interrelated nature of risks has been hinted at over the years 
(Aloini et al., 2007; Parr & Shanks, 2000; Peng & Nunes, 2004; Sherer & Alter, 2004; 
Sumner, 2000) and more recently explored in a single case study by Aloini et al., (2012), the 
full extent of the relationship is still not known. 
 
While it would be of great value to statistically validate current findings, and was noted by 
Aloini et al., (2012) as a future extension of their work, they also stated that their research 
was a starting point from which further research should be done.  For this research it is hoped 
that further exploration using empirical data gathered through multiple case studies may 
assist in broadening and enhancing our knowledge of this relationship.   
 
In an effort to achieve the highest levels of corroboration, only risks that were identified as 
occurring in five or more of the nine interviews was explored.  The method used to rank the 
risk factors was to determine the number of different cases that the individual risks featured 
in the empirical findings.  Identified in table 5.1 are all of the risks from Sumner (2000) and 
their respective rankings based on the cases in which they were mentioned. 
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Table 5.1:  Summary of Risks per case study  
Risks Ranking  Case No 
1. Failure to redesign business processes B 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11,  
2. Failure to follow an Enterprise-wide design which supports data 
integration 
C 4, 8, 10, 11,  
3. Insufficient training and reskilling of IT workforce D 8, 11,  
4. Insufficient ‘internal’ IT expertise B 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11,  
5. Lack of business analysts with business and technical knowledge C 4, 8, 11,  
6. Failure to mix internal and external expertise effectively A 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11,12 
7. Lack of ability to recruit and retain qualified ERP systems developers D 5, 8, 10  
8. Lack of senior management support A 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 
,11  
9. Lack of proper management control structure C 5, 8, 9,  
10. Lack of champion D 10, 11  
11. Ineffective management communication D 5, 11,  
12. Failure to adhere to standardised specifications which the software 
supports 
D 5, 10 ,11,  
13. Lack of integration D 8, 11,  
14. Insufficient training of end users A 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 
12 
15. Ineffective end-user communication C 5, 9, 11,  
16. Lack of full time commitment of customers to project management 
and project activities 
A 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 
12 
17. Lack of sensitivity to user resistance C 8, 9, 10, 11 
18. Failure to emphasis reporting C 4, 9, 11, 12 
19. Inability to avoid technological bottlenecks - - 
20. Attempting to build bridges to legacy applications D 9, 12 
(A = 7 + | B = 5 – 6 | C = 3 – 4 | D = 1 - 2) 
 
From those findings, in total six risks were identified as having been discussed in five or 
more cases and have been ranked by frequency and included for further analysis (Table 5.2). 
 
Table 5.2: The top risks mentioned in the case studies (score of B and above) 
Risks Ranking Case No 
8. Lack of senior management support A 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 
11 
16. Lack of full time commitment of customers to project management and 
project activities 
A 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 
12 
6. Failure to mix internal and external expertise effectively A 5, 6, 8, 9, 10 ,11, 12 
14. Insufficient training of end users A 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12 
1. Failure to redesign business processes B 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11,  
4. Insufficient ‘internal’ IT expertise B 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11,  
(A = 7 + | B = 5 – 6 | C = 3 – 4 | D = 1 - 2) 
 
 
After determining which risks to examine, the same manner was employed to determine 
which stages to explore.  Table 5.3 drew data from the interview schedule (appendix a, page 
5) and displays both the cases and rankings by implementation stage that the specific risks 
were mentioned. 
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Table 5.3:  Summary of Risks discussed per Project Stage  
Risks Project Chartering Project Shakedown Onwards 
and 
upwards 
Ranking Case No Ranking Case No Ranking Case No 
1. Failure to redesign business processes B 4, 8, 10, 11, 12 B  5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 D 4, 8 - 
2. Failure to follow an Enterprise-wide design which supports 
data integration 
D 7, 11 B 4, 5, 8, 9, 11 D 7, 8 - 
3. Insufficient training and reskilling of IT workforce C 8, 9, 11, 12 B 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11 C 4, 7, 8, 10 - 
4. Insufficient ‘internal’ expertise C  4, 8, 9, 12 A 4, 5, 7, 8,  9, 10, 11 D 8 - 
5. Lack of business analysts with business and technical 
knowledge 
B 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 A 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 D 7, 8 - 
6. Failure to mix internal and external expertise effectively B 4, 7, 8, 9, 12 B 4, 5, 8,  9, 11 D 8 - 
7. Lack of ability to recruit and retain qualified ERP systems 
developers 
D 7, 9 B 4, 5, 10, 11, 12 C 4, 8, 10 - 
8. Lack of senior management support B 4, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12 B 4, 5, 8, 9, 11, 12 C 4, 8,  9 - 
9. Lack of proper management control structure B 4, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12 A 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11,  12 C 4, 8, 9, 10 - 
10. Lack of champion A 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12 B 4, 5, 8, 9, 11, 12 C 4, 8, 9 - 
11. Ineffective management communication B 7, 8, 9, 11, 12 A 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 C 4, 7, 8, 10 - 
12. Failure to adhere to standardised specifications which the 
software supports 
C 8, 9, 11, 12 A 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 D 4, 8 - 
13. Lack of integration C 8, 11, 12 A 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 C 4, 8, 9 - 
14. Insufficient training of end users D 8 A 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 B 4, 7, 8, 9, 10 - 
15. Ineffective end-user communication C 4, 8, 11 A 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 C 4, 7, 8, 9 - 
16. Lack of full time commitment of customers to project 
management and project activities 
C 4, 7, 11, 12 B 4, 5, 9, 11, 12 C 4, 9, 10 - 
17. Lack of sensitivity to user resistance C 4, 8, 12 A 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 B 4, 7, 8, 9, 10 - 
18. Failure to emphasis reporting B 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 A 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 B 4, 7, 8, 9, 10 - 
19. Inability to avoid technological bottlenecks D 4, 8 A 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 C 4, 7, 8, 9 - 
20. Attempting to build bridges to legacy applications C 8, 11, 12 B 4, 5, 8, 10, 11, 12 D 4, 8 - 
(A = 7 + | B = 5 – 6 | C = 3 – 4 | D = 1 - 2)
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Of note in Table 5.3 was that the project managers had not experienced any risks in the final 
stages of the Markus & Tanis (2000) model – Onwards and Upwards.  This was not 
necessarily because it did or did not happen, but rather that the project managers interviewed 
were not involved with the risk management activities in that specific stage of their 
organisations ERP initiative.   
 
The benefit of the Markus and Tanis (2000) model in this research is its control centric 
design, which has enabled the findings to be delineated by changes in control.  While this 
allows a greater strategic view of the entire process, the implementation models identified in 
the interviews as used by the project managers were operational and ended when the system 
was stable after go-live. As a consequence, none of the project managers spoke of further 
risks encountered after the systems was stable and operational.  This is an area that would 
benefit from future research.  From these tables, the risks and respective project stages to be 
analysed are as follows (Table 5.4)  
 
Table 5.4: The six most frequent ERP implementation risks, and the most frequent project stages they 
were observed. 
Risk Category Risks Project 
Chartering 
Project Shakedown Onwards 
and 
upwards 
Management structure 
and strategy 
8. Lack of senior management 
support 
B B  -  - 
User involvement and 
training 
16. Lack of full time 
commitment of customers to 
project management and 
project activities 
 - B  -  - 
Skill mix 6. Failure to mix internal and 
external expertise effectively 
B B  -  - 
User involvement and 
training 
14. Insufficient training of 
end users 
 - 
A B 
 - 
Organisational fit 1. Failure to redesign business 
processes 
B B  -  - 
Skill mix * 4. Insufficient ‘internal’ IT 
expertise (strategic level) 
 - 
A 
 -  - 
Skill mix * 4. Insufficient ‘internal’ IT 
expertise (operational and 
tactical levels) 
 - 
A 
 -  - 
 
* The Skill Mix risk “14. Insufficient ‘internal’ IT expertise” was analysed in a different 
manner than all other risks in table 5.4.  Two distinct findings surfaced in the interviews 
when discussing internal IT expertise, that being ‘strategic IT expertise’ and ‘operational and 
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tactical IT expertise’.  The findings were so different and distinct that to enhance clarity they 
were separated and analysed as two different categories. 
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5.2.1 The Project Chartering Stage 
8. Lack of senior management support – (Project Chartering) 
 
1. Failure to redesign business processes to fit the software 
For business process redesign to be successful, senior management must support the initiative 
by committing resources and their time to the project (Parr & Shanks, 2000).  Case 4 (ITM3) 
and Case 5 (ITM4) both experienced issues with redesigning their business processes due to 
lack of senior management support, in Case 4 this was because staff were not being released 
and Case 5 was due to uncertainty over the scope of the implementation. 
 
3. Insufficient training and reskilling of IT workforce 
For training and reskilling of the IT workforce, Case 5 (ITM4) needed senior managers to 
commit resources to the project to allow staff to be released and budget commitment for 
training to commence. 
 
4. Insufficient ‘internal’ IT expertise (strategic level) 
Insufficient internal IT expertise also extended to the expertise of the senior management 
group, and Cases 8 (ITM7) and 9 (ITM8) both experienced problems with low levels of IT 
knowledge in the senior management team.  The low levels of IT expertise have resulted in 
low levels of senior management input and reduced levels of commitment as senior managers 
were not able to help push the project forward. 
 
4. Insufficient ‘internal’ IT expertise (operational and tactical levels) 
With uncertainty surrounding what resources would be released, determining what internal IT 
resources would be available at the tactical and operational levels for the project was not 
possible in Case 5 (ITM4).   
 
5. Lack of business analysts with business and technical knowledge 
Senior managers need to be on board prior to the start of an ERP project to proactively start 
building internal skills in both business and technical analysis.  This extends past employing 
new technical personnel, to up-skilling those within an organisation with business skills or 
allowing new personnel enough time to become familiar with the business.  This was an issue 
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in Case 4 (ITM3) where coding systems used by the organisation had to be changed within 
the system three times to reflect the business needs.  
 
7. Lack of ability to recruit and retain qualified ERP systems developers 
The recruitment and retention of qualified ERP systems developers was a predefined goal in 
four of the different cases examined (Case 5 (ITM4), Case 6 (ITM5), Case 8 (ITM7) and 
Case 10 (ITM9)).  The creation and support by senior managers of incentives and other 
bonuses was imperative, with project members welcomed back into the organisation at 
completion.  Case 5 (ITM4) ran into problems because senior managers had yet to decide on 
the scope of the project so users were uncertain of their futures and this led to staff with ERP 
skills leaving.   
 
9. Lack of proper management control structure 
Due to the intricate nature of the implementation, the control structures in Case 5 (ITM4) 
were unable to be formalised and had to wait until agreement could be reached by the senior 
management group. 
 
10. Lack of champion 
 
While a champion was in place in Case 5 (ITM4), they had no authority over the separate 
senior management teams and this effectively stalled the project.  This lack of authority also 
caused issues in Case 4 (ITM3) where financial manger refused to supply the chart of 
accounts because the project was not a priority.  This is in contrast to Case 9 (ITM8) where 
the champion was identified early and had the authority to steam roll the project through 
when needed.  This positive backing also happened in Case 11 (ERPC2). Right from the 
beginning of the implementation, it was recognised that the project champion had to have the 
backing and support of senior managers to be effective.  In Case 5 (ITM4), a Project 
Champion was a requirement for any project, and if one was not found at the beginning of the 
project then the project was cancelled.  Therefore, all members of the senior management 
team were aware of the need for a project champion and there was an expectation that one of 
them would take the lead. 
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11. Lack of senior management communication 
In Case 5 (ITM4), the project was very large and included geographically diverse 
management teams.  Not only did communication avenues need to be set up but they also 
needed senior managers to support the initiative and use those channels for project 
communication. 
 
12. Failure to adhere to standardised specifications which the software supports 
Case 10 (ITM9) encountered issues with modifications and although they had a no change 
policy, business requests to add alterations to the system setup were approved.  Case 5 
(ITM4) also encountered this issue, but not quite in the same manner as Case 10 (ITM9).   
They had pre-existing templates for system configuration and had no desire to change the 
way SAP was implemented within the company.  A change in the way the software stored 
data (Unicode) was a requirement for the later versions of SAP, and resulted in the need to 
change the templates created.  They needed senior managers to commit to the changes and 
drive them through if they were to be successful and not exceed budget and time 
requirements.  The other alternative was to ignore the change, go with the company standard 
and push the change through at a later stage as a new project. They had presented the 
alternatives to the senior management team and were awaiting their decision.   
 
15. Ineffective end-user communication 
As a consequence of the lack of senior management support, communication to end-users in 
Case 5 (ITM4) giving details of the project and its effect on the organisation have not been 
finalised.  This has led to informal information in the shape of rumours being circulated and 
ultimately led to increases in user resistance. 
 
16. Lack of full time commitment of customers to project management and project 
activities 
High staffing requirements due to high levels of compliance (which include Sarbanes Oxley) 
lead the functional units to put pressure on the senior management team in Case 5 (ITM4) to 
release staff from the project to complete their daily duties.  This ultimately leads to staff who 
are unable to commit to the project.  This also occurred in Case 6 (ITM5) and Case 11 
(ERPC2).  Both projects had initial and ongoing commitment from senior managers but 
during the projects, in Case 6 (ITM5) users were pulled away from the implementation and in 
Case 11 (ERPC2), it was the managers who were being pulled away.  While there were some 
140 
real business reasons to do this, they both recognised the problems this could cause but 
referred to it as a juggling game. Cases 8 (ITM7) and 9 (ITM8) did not encounter problems, 
in fact they reported that internal commitment to their respective projects was very high.  In 
Case 8 (ITM7), staff were allocated to the project right from the initial presentations made by 
the ERP vendors, to be able to provide timely feedback to ensure the correct ERP system was 
selected.  Case 9 (ITM8) went further and ensured ongoing commitment to the project was 
outlined as a requirement of the management team and was successfully carried through from 
Project Chartering to The Project and beyond. 
 
17. Lack of sensitivity to user resistance 
In Case 9 (ITM8), a lack of support from the financial controller had a flow-on effect of 
increasing user resistance from within his department. This made it difficult for the project 
manager to gather all required information in the scoping stage. 
 
Analysis 
Risk Factor View (figure 5.1) 
In Figure 3, the structure appears uniformed and hierarchical.  Senior management support is 
influenced by strategic internal expertise which has a flow-on effect to 12 of the 19 remaining 
risk factors (Sumner, 2000) 
 
Risk Category View (figure 5.2) 
When stepping back one level and examining the risks by category (Figure 4) an even split 
between categories is present.  Of note is the influence on an implementation that the skill 
mix at the strategic level plays.  Other than that we see an even distribution of risk categories 
all being driven by Management structure and strategy. 
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Figure 5.1:  Relationship between ‘8. Lack of Senior Management Support’ and other risk factors at the Project Chartering stage 
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Figure 5.2: Relationship between ‘8. Lack of Senior Management Support’ and other risks categories at the Project Chartering stage
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6. Failure to mix internal and external expertise effectively- (Project Chartering) 
 
4. Insufficient ‘internal’ expertise 
Due to this silo mentality, if information was being processed incorrectly in Case 4 (ITM3), 
the only people able to tell were the users.  Unfortunately they were unable to explain why as 
they did not have an understanding of the wider business and it had an impact on the 
effectiveness of the external consultants to gather the required information. To avoid this, 
Case 9 (ITM8) proactively employed a project manager specifically for the ERP 
implementation. 
 
5. Lack of business analysts with business and technical knowledge 
This was one of the main contributing factors why Case 9 (ITM8) relied heavily on external 
expertise.  They knew what they wanted but didn’t know the software and were reliant on the 
consultants who knew the software but not their business. 
 
16. Lack of full time commitment of customers to project management and project 
activities 
Mr Boyes Case 12 (ERPC3) had experienced problems mixing sufficiently capable internal 
expertise with external experts, not because internal expertise was insufficient but because 
the business was unable to commit the super-user staff to the project.   
 
Analysis 
Risk Factor View (figure 5.3) 
In figure 5, ‘Failure to mix internal and external expertise effectively’ was noted as being at 
the bottom of this structure and was influenced by the existing abilities of internal resources, 
and the businesses commitment to resourcing the project.  Low levels of internal skill married 
with low levels of commitment resulted in difficulty .with mixing internal and external 
expertise. 
 
Risk Category View (figure 5.4) 
In the risk Category view (figure 6), we see only two categories present, skill mix and user 
involvement and training.  There appears to be a flow on effect between different skill 
categories that may be mediated with greater levels of user involvement and training. 
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Figure 5.3:  Relationship between ‘6. Failure to mix internal and external expertise effectively’ and other risk factors at the Project Chartering stage 
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Figure 5.4: Relationship between ‘6. Failure to mix internal and external expertise effectively’ and other risk categories at the Project Chartering stage 
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1. Failure to redesign business processes to fit software - Project Chartering 
 
4. Insufficient ‘internal’ expertise 
This was identified as a risk in Case 11 (ERPC2) because internal operational staff did not 
have the expertise or familiarity with the processes and tools available to the business to 
accurately engage in the redesign process and was mediated by the effects of consultants with 
external expertise.   
 
5. Lack of business analysts with business and technical knowledge 
This tied in closely with lack of internal IT expertise in Case 4 (ITM3) and stemmed from the 
silo nature of the organisation.  With very few staff having an understanding and overview of 
the organisation due to lack of exposure, process redesign was affected.  Case 11 (ERPC2) 
had a similar experience and described their business environment where low levels of IT 
skills tied with a lack of business knowledge were evident. 
  
6. Failure to mix internal and external expertise effectively 
In an attempt to combat the negative effects on business process redesign from insufficient 
internal expertise and lack of business analysts with business and technical knowledge, both 
Case 4 (ITM3) and Case 11 (ERPC2) engaged external consultants to provide the needed 
expertise required to redesign business processes successfully.  
 
12. Failure to adhere to standardised specifications which the software supports 
The business processes in place were identified as a competitive advantage for Case 10 
(ITM9) and although there was a no change policy in place to minimise changes, a high 
number of modifications were made after presenting the Management team with business 
decisions to incorporate the changes.   
 
17. Lack of sensitivity to user resistance 
Case 7 (ITM6) found that user resistance can lead to problems with business process redesign 
by the emergence of ‘ERP Terrorists’, who see the project as a waste of time and not only 
offered lower levels of co-operation, but also influence others to their way of thinking.  In 
Case 7 (ITM6), they proactively identified these people and found that if buy-in was achieved 
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with these ‘ERP Terrorists’, they would use their influence to promote the project and lower 
levels of user resistance occurred. 
 
Analysis 
Risk Factor View (figure 5.5) 
In figure 8, ‘Failure to redesign business processes to fit the software’, like ‘Failure to mix 
internal and external expertise effectively’ was noted as being at the bottom of this structure. 
It was influenced by the existing abilities of internal resources, and the businesses 
commitment to resourcing the project.  Low levels of internal skill married with low levels of 
commitment resulted in difficulties mixing internal and external expertise. 
 
Risk Category View (figure 5.6) 
In the Risk Category view we see a distinct separation of risk categories.  Skill mix features 
prominently in the risks yet skill mix does not have any effect on any other risks except skill 
mix or organisational fit.  
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Figure 5.5: Relationship between ‘Failure to redesign business processes to fit the software’ and other risk factors at the Project Chartering stage 
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Figure 5.6: Relationship between ‘Failure to redesign business processes to fit the software’ and other risk categories at the Project Chartering stage 
150 
Project Chartering 
The three risks examined during the Project Chartering stage were  
 Lack of senior management support 
 Failure to mix internal and external expertise effectively 
 Failure to redesign business processes 
 
All three of the finding have been combined in figures 5.7 and 5.8,  and we see the compiled 
results in a hierarchical structure. Of the 20 risks identified by Sumner (2000), 15 feature in 
the first stage of the risk management model.   
 
Risk Factor Analysis at the Project Chartering Stage (figure 5.7) 
Specific observations include the broad number of risk combinations that can affect other 
risks, most prominent being the influence senior management support has at the Project 
Chartering stage of an ERP implementation (Parr & Shanks, 2000).  As has been noted, Lack 
of senior management support is constantly identified as the top CSF or risk in ERP 
implementations (Aloini et al., 2012; Finney & Corbett, 2007; Nah et al., 2003; Somers & 
Nelson, 2001; Sumner, 2000), and certainly the most important activity in this stage (Nah & 
Delgado, 2006; Parr & Shanks, 2000).  Based on these findings, managers need to be on-
board from the beginning to increase the chances of a successful outcome.  While lack of 
senior management support has the potential to directly influence most risks in the Project 
Chartering stage, there are also a number of indirect flow-on effects that can be attributed to 
senior management support, most notable those that flow through to the redesign of business 
processes. These include 
 Lack of senior management support for the project can have a flow-on effect of 
increasing user resistance of those involved in the redesign process. 
 Senior managers allowing or stopping system modifications to be made. 
 Senior managers not addressing the lack of internal IT skills at the operational and 
tactical levels by employing new staff, and failing to ensure external expertise is used 
to address any internal skill shortfalls. 
 By senior managers not addressing the issues relating to lack of analysts with 
business and technical skills, and not addressing the shortfall with external expertise. 
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 Senior managers either committing the wrong people, or not committing enough 
people to the project, and either not addressing the shortfall with external expertise or 
not being sensitive to any resistance this may cause. 
  By senior managers ineffectively communicating to end users about the project and 
what it entails or requires, and then not being sensitive to the resistance this causes. 
Additionally, while five risks were identified as having a direct or secondary effect on 
business process redesign, when the three individual risks were combined that number 
jumped to nine with additional levels of complication as a flow-on effect of interactions with 
other risks.   
 
This figure also highlights the dangers of lower levels of engagement with members of the 
senior management team in the initial stages of an ERP implementation.  Lower levels of 
engagement occurred in a number of projects where low levels of internal IT skills were 
present at the strategic level, and those not directly involved with the project either did not 
engage or felt excluded because of their inability to influence or add to the project on a 
technical level. What comes through strongly in this research is that the majority of risks 
affecting ERP projects at the Project Chartering stage are people, as opposed to technical, 
issues.  One successful method used to ensure senior management engagement was the use of 
risk registries.  Although this was seen as an administrative overhead by project managers, 
their use as means of facilitating managerial communication was invaluable in projects where 
low levels of internal IT expertise existed at the strategic levels. 
 
What was unexpected was the lack of flow-on effect from the risk factor ‘Lack of Project 
Champion’.  A Project Champion, like senior management support, is described as one of 
the key factors in an ERP implementation (Aloini et al., 2007) but in these examples their 
influence at the Project Chartering stage was limited.  This may be an anomaly with the cases 
examined (as all were successful) or an actual facet of the project chartering stage.  
Irrespective of the reason, this finding would benefit from further research. 
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Risk Category Analysis at the Project Chartering Stage (figure 5.8) 
The following observations were noted in figure 5.8  
 
In the examples given, skill mix does not flow into any other risks except Organisational fit. 
Apart from the one exception, if there is a flow on effect from a skill mix category, it is into 
another skill mix category. 
 
In the four possible pathways involving user involvement and training between ‘8. 
Management structure and strategy’ and ‘1. Organisational fit’, in only one instance does it 
flow into something other than user involvement and training.   
 
Between 8. Management structure and strategy and 1. Organisational Fit, six of the 
seven possible pathways included Skill mix, User involvement and training or a 
combination of the two.   
 
Also of note is that at the project chartering stage, none of the risks identified were of a 
technical nature (Software systems design or Technology planning / Integration).  This may 
be as a result of dealing only with successful projects but it fits with the observation of one of 
the consultants interviewed.   Case 11 (ERPC2) observed that  
 
“…Because they are similar projects e.g. they are package implementations, and 
there is a fairly standard methodology for implementing them – human factors come 
into it more than technical factors.” 
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Figure 5.7: Relationship between different risk factors at the Project Chartering stage 
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Figure 5.8: Relationship between different risk categories at the Project Chartering stage 
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5.2.2 The Project Stage 
8. Lack of senior management support – The Project  
 
6. Failure to mix internal and external expertise effectively 
This was done well in the earlier projects at Case 6 (ITM5) as there had been little internal 
expertise.  High levels of senior management support were given in the engagement of 
consultants, and this proved to be successful and resulted in future projects requiring lower 
levels of assistance. 
 
11. Lack of senior management communication 
In Case 6 (ITM5), 7 (ITM6), 10 (ITM9) senior management communication had been 
identified as very important.  This communication channel was seen as essential when 
attempting to ensure senior management support and buy-in.  One problem encountered was 
that many of the senior management teams had very little technical knowledge so making the 
communication highly technical would have had the opposite effect of potentially disengaged 
managers.  One tool used in these implementations to encourage communication and allow 
non-technical managers to provide valuable input was through the use of the risk registries.  
Risk registries were used in these organisations to inform and encouraged a sense of 
ownership and buy-in from the senior management team.  Case 9 (ITM8) and Case 11 
(ERP2) both experienced issues with project related senior management communication and 
support, additionally both projects had risk registries in place but neither were used by the 
senior management team. 
 
16. Lack of full time commitment of customers to project management and project 
activities 
While support was there from senior managers in Case 6 (ITM5), it was still a juggling game 
to enable the right staff to be available for the project.  In Case 8 (ITM7), as with the Project 
Chartering stage, staff were allocated to the implementation throughout the project stage and 
this resulted in a positive buy-in and lower levels of end-user resistance from staff.  An 
ongoing commitment in Case 9 (ITM8) was outlined as a requirement of the management 
team and was successfully carried through from Project Chartering to the project and beyond. 
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17. Lack of sensitivity to user resistance 
In Case 4 (ITM3), due to problems with the training environment, staff were reluctant to do 
any training because it frequently would not work.  In the end they had to force them to 
participate as they had no other choice.  In Case 9 (ITM8), a lack of support from the 
financial controller had the flow-on effect of increasing user resistance from within his 
department. That lack of overall buy-in was a problem during the implementation, and 
continues as user resistance has transformed into lack of use and subsequent lack of 
integration. This also affected report writing as users did not analyse their needs sufficiently 
to enable the project manager to produce the needed reports during the project stage. 
 
18. Failure to emphasis reporting 
This was a secondary effect of lack of senior management support leading to increased user 
resistance which affected the project managers ability to produce the required reports during 
the project stage in Case 9 (ITM8).  
 
Analysis 
Risk Factor View (figure 5.9) 
In figure 12, the flow on effect from ‘Lack of senior management support’ in the Project 
stage was not as extensive as it was in the Project Chartering stage.  One possible conclusion 
is that when observed in isolation, less risks appear to be affected by senior manager’s 
decisions in the project stage as most of the decisions on what to do have already been made 
in the Project Chartering stage.   
 
Risk Category View (figure 5.10) 
In the risk category view (figure 13) only two type of risks appear to be influenced by senior 
management support, skill mix and User involvement and training. Both are present but in the 
interview results, neither influenced the other.  As with findings at the Project Chartering 
stage, the support needed in an ERP project from the senior managers appears to be people 
related, not technical. 
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Figure 5.9: Relationship between ‘Lack of senior management support and other risk factors at The Project stage 
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Figure 5.10: Relationship between ‘Lack of senior management support and other risk categories at The Project stage 
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16. Lack of full time commitment of customers to project management and 
project activities - The Project 
 
4. Insufficient ‘internal’ expertise 
While they had sufficient internal expertise in Case 12 (ERPC3), they were unable to commit 
super-users to the project which had the potential to cause problems with implementation of 
the project. 
 
7. Lack of ability to recruit and retain qualified ERP systems developers 
Although training and reskilling of those on the project team exposed them to new skills and 
opportunities, most people on the project team in Case 9 (ITM8) went back to their old roles.  
While they became highly valued super-users, some of those on the project team did not 
enjoy the experience and were happy to return.  
 
8. Lack of senior management support 
The need for a high level of commitment from staff to the project was identified and 
provisions were made in Case 7 (ITM6).  Senior managers committed all project staff for 
three days per week for the life of the project.  Senior management support was also high in 
Case 8 (ITM7).  It was so high in fact that it was almost regarded retrospectively as too high 
as large numbers of staff were committed for long periods of time to project activities. Senior 
management support in Case 10 (ITM9) was also extensive and allowed the project to get all 
the human resources it needed to get the implementation completed successfully.  At the 
other end of the scale, Case 9 (ITM8) suffered from a lack of full time commitment in not 
only staff allocations, but also at the project management level as the project manager was 
required to fulfil his daily activities as well as those of the project manager for the ERP 
implementation.   
 
17. Lack of sensitivity to user resistance 
With staff being allocated to the project from its inception, user resistance in Case 8 (ITM7) 
was reduced as staff members bought in to the project, and felt that they were part of the 
process.  In Case 10 (ITM9), not all users selected for the project did so voluntarily.  Many 
had not been involved in a project like this before and felt out of their depth but were told that 
they were on the team as they were the most knowledgeable and were therefore needed for 
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this project.  One method used to mitigate user resistance was to offer incentives to project 
staff as it was acknowledged that it would be difficult for them. 
 
18. Failure to emphasis reporting 
Report writing was a put off in Case 9 (ITM8) because the solution they chose was industry 
specific and many of the required reports were included in the chosen ERP solution.  Even so 
they still experienced problems trying to engage staff to advise what information they 
required.  The only project to identify report writing as a strength was Case 34 (ITM3).  The 
solution they chose allowed users the ability to easily construct reports as needed, so a formal 
process was never needed.  
 
Analysis 
Risk Factor View 
In figure 14, commitment to an ERP project has the ability to influence internal IT expertise 
and retention of qualified ERP systems developers.   
 
Risk Category View 
In the risk Category view (figure 15) we see the flow-on effect of user involvement and 
training to both risks within the same category, and to skill mix risks. We also see again the 
direct influence managerial support has on the people related aspects of an ERP 
implementation.   
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Figure 5.11: Relationship between ‘Lack of full time commitment of customers to project management and project activities’ and other risk factors at The 
Project stage 
 
162 
 
  
Figure 5.12: Relationship between ‘Lack of full time commitment of customers to project management and project activities’ and other risk categories at The 
Project stage 
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6. Failure to mix internal and external expertise effectively – (The Project) 
 
3. Insufficient training and reskilling of the IT workforce 
In Case 6 (ITM5), training and reskilling the IT workforce was of paramount importance.  
This was because the company had committed to additional rollouts and it was their intention 
to use the staff from the first implementation in a higher capacity in subsequent 
implementations.  External experts were bought in to fill the gap in the initial 
implementations, until internal resources could be up skilled. 
  
5. Lack of business analysts with business and technical knowledge. 
During the project stage in Case 6 (ITM5), the lack of business analysts had implications on 
the extent of external resources required to complete the implementation.  External experts 
were consequently charged with not only guiding the organisation through the 
implementation, but also training the project team to ensure the business were able to build 
internal resources with business and technical knowledge.  
 
7. Lack of ability to recruit and retain qualified ERP systems developers 
This tied in with the up skilling of existing IT staff in Case 6 (ITM5).  They needed to be able 
to retain the trained staff to ensure they had sufficient internal IT resources and analysts with 
both business and technical knowledge.  With higher retention rates, there was a reduced 
need for external resources.  
Analysis 
Risk Factor View 
In figure 16, we see a high correlation with the structure of the same risk in the project 
chartering stage.  The same structure exists where the risks identified as directly relating to 
‘Failure to mix internal and external expertise effectively’ are all influencing, as opposed to 
being influenced by, the examined risk. 
 
Risk Category View 
In the risk Category view (figure 17) we immediately see a very interesting situation where 
all risks identified are skill mix category risks.  This differs slightly with the same risk in the 
project chartering stage where although the structure and number of risks was the same, in the 
project chartering stage one of those risks was a user involvement and training risk.  With 
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such close similarities, this difference would benefit from a closer examination to confirm 
both the similarities, and the differences.  
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Figure 5.13: Relationship between ‘Failure to mix internal and external expertise effectively’ and other risk factors in The Project stage 
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Figure 5.14: Relationship between ‘Failure to mix internal and external expertise effectively’ and other risk categories in The Project stage 
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14. Insufficient training of end users – (The Project) 
 
8. Lack of senior management support 
Training end-users was very difficult in Case 9 (ITM8) and stemmed from the lack of support 
given to the project by the senior management team.  Without the drive from above, end- 
users felt empowered not to have to make themselves available for training as there was the 
possibility that the project would fail.  In addition to that, the senior account did not release 
staff for training. 
 
16. Lack of full time commitment of customers to project management and project 
activities 
With so many users committed to the project, training was never an issue in Case 10 (ITM9) 
and included a number of different approaches including train the trainer (where internal 
experts were trained and then went out to train the users).  Although there was commitment 
in Case 11 (ERPC2), insufficient end-user training was always going to be a risk in this 
project because of the short time frame available for this training to be completed.   
 
17. Lack of sensitivity to user resistance 
End user training was not successful in Case 9 (ITM8) as end-users lacked the push from 
above to engage in training, and felt empowered to resist training efforts.  In Case 11 
(ERPC3), user resistance become an issue because the training personnel were internal and 
didn’t have a full grasp of all of the components of the new system.  Therefore when end-
users asked pertinent questions about why changes were made, the trainer was not always 
able to answer them with the detail required and therefore some of the changes from the old 
working system appeared unreasonable when viewed in isolation (as opposed to the big 
picture). 
 
Analysis 
Risk Factor View 
In figure 18, the success of any training of end users is influenced by both the organisations 
commitment to allow people to be involved, and the commitment from end users to want to 
be involved.  Both of these are influenced by senior management support. 
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Risk Category View 
This situation is similar to the previous risk where the categories of risks between the 
examined risk and adjacent risks are all the same.  Apart from the secondary relationship to 
management structure and strategy, the major difference is that this risk involves user 
involvement and training risks, as opposed to skill mix risks.  When analysing the structure 
from the top down, again we see the pattern emerging of risks associated with management 
structure and strategy influencing people related aspects of the project. 
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Figure 5.15. Relationship between ‘Insufficient training of end users’ and other risk factors in The Project stage 
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Figure 5.16. Relationship between ‘Insufficient training of end users’ and other risk categories in The Project stage 
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1. Failure to redesign business processes to fit software – (The Project) 
 
12. Failure to adhere to standardised specifications which the software supports 
Due to the amount of modification and redesign required by Case 10 (ITM9), problems were 
encountered with subsequent upgrades and patches issued from their software supplier. As 
the software was no longer standard, the standard patches could not be used without changes 
being made to accommodate the redesigned structure. 
 
Analysis 
Risk Factor View 
Analysis of this risk differs considerably between the Project Chartering and the Project 
stages.  In the Project Chartering stage, ‘failure to redesign business processes to fit the 
software’ was influenced by five different risks and did not influence any others.  In the 
Project stage, ‘failure to redesign business processes to fit the software’ was not influenced 
by any of the other risks, rather the results of the design were recognised as influencing the 
risk ‘failure to adhere to standardised specifications that the software supports’.   
 
Risk Category View 
This is the first time any of the technical risks have appeared, and was as a consequence of 
prior decision making over issues relating to organisational fit.  It is possible that this was as 
a consequence of interviews with only project managers who had been involved with 
successful projects but nonetheless, is a significant observation. 
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Figure 5.17: Relationship between ‘Failure to redesign business processes to fit the software’ and other risk factors in The Project stage 
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Figure 5.18: Relationship between ‘Failure to redesign business processes to fit the software’ and other risk categories in The Project stage 
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4. Insufficient ‘internal’ IT expertise (strategic level) – The Project 
 
5. Lack of senior management support 
Lack of senior management support was always a potential issue for Case 9 (ITM8) because 
of the lack of IT expertise at the senior management level.  The sales focus and general lack 
of IT expertise resulted in issues with trying to engage the senior management team and a 
general lack of understanding with the entire process.  
 
Analysis 
Risk Factor View (figure 5.19) 
As was mentioned earlier, insufficient internal IT expertise appeared to affect the ERP 
implementation in different ways dependant on whether it was strategic or operational and 
tactical in nature.  For this reason these two categories were split with the following results. 
 
At the strategic level this affected senior management support.  With implementations where 
IT expertise at the strategic level was weak, without specific strategies in place senior 
management support and senior management engagement was low.  Where IT expertise was 
stronger or tools such as risk registries were effectively used, then engagement and support 
was stronger. 
 
Risk Category View (figure 5.20 
In the Risk Category view, while there is just the single relationship between skill mix and 
managerial structure and strategy, it is significant as skill mix is the only risk that flows into 
managerial structure and strategy at any stage of the implementation. 
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Figure 5.19: Relationship between ‘Insufficient ‘internal’ It expertise (strategic level)’ and other risk factors in The Project stage 
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Figure 5.20: Relationship between ‘Insufficient ‘internal’ IT expertise (strategic level)’ and other risk categories in The Project stage 
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4. Insufficient ‘internal’ IT expertise (operational and tactical levels) - The 
Project 
 
3. Insufficient training and reskilling of IT workforce 
This was an ongoing problem in Case 8 (ITM7) as there were very few IT personnel or super 
users present.  This had been an ongoing problem as they had experienced high levels of staff 
turnover and new staff members were not required to have high levels of IT and technical 
knowledge.  This resulted in a lack of knowledge of the business and IT systems and a lack of 
internal users capable or interested in advancing their IT skills.  This was in contrast to Case 
6 (ITM5) where active training in one implementation enabled them to have sufficient 
internal resources for subsequent implementations. 
 
6. Failure to mix internal and external expertise effectively 
The lack of internal expertise highlighted the need for external consultants to fill the gap in 
Case 7 (ITM6).  This included the need for direction, which included the implementation 
model to be used, as well as tools (including the risk registry) used during the project to 
ensure everything ran smoothly.  As a consequence of the lack of internal IT expertise, Case 
8 (ITM7) chose to go with an industry specific solution to ensure they were able to engage 
with external experts to complement their lack of internal expertise.  
 
7. Lack of ability to recruit and retain qualified ERP systems developers 
Case 6 (ITM5) felt they achieved this successfully as they initially had very low levels of 
internal expertise when implementing their first ERP system.  By actively retaining internal 
resources they were able to ensure sufficient internal resources were available for the next 
projects. Cases 8 (ITM7), 9 (ITM8) and 10 (ITM9) all recruited new project managers to 
cover insufficient internal skills at the operational and tactical levels.  
 
12. Failure to adhere to standardised specifications which the software supports 
This was important in Case 7 (ITM6) because insufficient internal expertise was identified as 
an ongoing issue and the business was aware of the levels of ongoing maintenance and 
improvements that would need to be done in the following months and possibly years.  With 
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this in mind, a system with minimum modifications was the only option to ensure system 
requirements did not exceed internal expertise. 
 
18. Failure to emphasis reporting 
This was an issue for Case 11 (ERPC2) as the person in charge of reports was under the 
impression that they had report generation under control. Under examination by the 
consultant project manager it became apparent that the internal project manager did not have 
the skills to know that it was not the case and typifies the problems with insufficient 
experience in that you don’t know what you don’t know. 
 
Analysis 
Risk Factor View 
At the operational and tactical levels, IT expertise influences and is influenced by more risks 
that at the strategic level.  IT expertise at the operational and tactical levels are influenced by 
IT training, and influence mixing of internal and external skills, retention of qualified ERP 
systems developers, systems modifications and report writing. 
 
Risk Category View 
Again we see the high number of skill mix risks that appear in the project stage of the ERP 
implementation.  From analysis of this risk category, the implications of not addressing one 
of the skill mix categories will result in another risk from the skill mix category manifesting 
itself.  This continues through all three levels until at the final level where it increases to not 
only influence more skill mix category risks, but also a software systems design and user 
involvement and training category risks.   
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Figure 5.21: Relationship between ‘Insufficient ‘internal’ It expertise (operational and tactical levels)’ and other risk factors in The Project stage  
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Figure 5.22: Relationship between ‘Insufficient ‘internal’ It expertise (operational and tactical levels)’ and other risk categories in The Project stage
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The Project stage Analysis 
All six risks were examined at The Project stage, with analysis done on both the risk factors 
and risk categories.  The risks examined were  
 8. Lack of senior management support 
 16. Lack of full time commitment of customers to project management and project 
activities 
 6. Failure to mix internal and external expertise effectively 
 14. Insufficient training of end users 
 1. Failure to redesign business processes 
 4. Insufficient ‘internal’ expertise (strategic level) 
 4. Insufficient ‘internal’ expertise (operational and tactical levels) 
 
All of the findings have been combined into hierarchical structures (figure 5.23 and figure 
5.24).  Of the 20 risks identified by Sumner (2000), 12 feature in the project stage of the risk 
management model.   
 
Due to the intricate nature of the relationships between the risks in this stage, it was necessary 
to add risks 3. Insufficient training and reskilling of workforce, and 4. Insufficient ‘internal’ 
IT expertise (operational and tactical levels) twice to allow all of the relationships to be 
mapped.  Multiple checks were made to ensure no additional relationships were accidentally 
created and that all pathways reflect the relationships established at the individual risk 
analysis levels.   
 
Risk Factor View 
The immediate difference between the hierarchical view of risks at the project chartering and 
the project stages is the complexity of the project hierarchical diagramme.  In the Project 
Chartering diagramme, there were five levels of risks with a majority of these risks (10 of 15) 
clustered in level three.  In the project diagramme, risk frequency per level ranged from one 
to four.  Similarities include insufficient internal expertise (strategic level) at level one and 
lack of senior management support at level two.  There are however a number of differences. 
 The Internal IT expertise of senior management no longer influences all other risks as it 
did in the Project Chartering stage.  It is however still the most influential risk in The 
Project stage as it has the potential to influence directly or indirectly seven of the 12 risks. 
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 Whereas no other risk at the Project Chartering stage was close to Lack of Senior 
Management Support when it came to influencing other risks, Insufficient Training and 
Reskilling of the IT Workforce comes close in the Project stage with the potential to 
directly or indirectly influence six of the 12 risks.  
 In the Project Chartering stage (figure 5.7), ‘Failure to Redesign Business Processes to fit 
the Software’ was the only risk not to influence any other risk.  The number of risks not 
to influence other risks increased to four different risks at The Project stage and included: 
o 6. Failure to mix internal and external expertise effectively 
o 12. Failure to adhere to standardised specifications which the software supports 
o 14. Insufficient training of end users 
o 18. Failure to emphasis reporting 
 
This implies higher levels of interconnectedness at The Project stage and higher chances of 
unpredictable behaviour as a consequence of second or third level influences. 
 
While they did not experience any of these problems in this implementation in case 11 
(ERPC2), from previous experience the relationship between the organisation and the vendor 
was regarded as critical by Bob, and he described the breakdowns in this relationship as often 
being under-reported in the context of project problems or failures.   
“…the relationship between the project team and the vendor failing, those sorts of 
risks are often underreported or underestimated because they are not self-
reporting…” 
 
By self-reporting, Bob alluded to the point that no-on wants to admit that they were in the 
wrong, especially in projects of this size and complexity.  From his experience he had come 
across situations where reasons for implementation problems or failures (which include 
technical issues) have originated from the breakdown of this relationship 
“…they can say that the software didn’t work or the vendor didn’t do enough, and if 
you dig down deeper you find that software works somewhere else and that vendor 
has worked somewhere else as well so there was something about that project that 
made it go wrong…”  
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Risk Category View 
When viewing The Project risks by category, what can be seen immediately is the high 
number of skill mix risks in this stage.  Additionally, Skill Mix risks are at the top level and 
flow not only into other Skill Mix risks, but all other risks except for the one Organisational 
Fit risk.   
 
While Managerial Structure and Strategy is the dominant risk category in the Project 
Chartering stage, this research would indicate that Skill Mix risks are the dominant risk 
category in The Project stage.  This hierarchical flow indicates that if the Skill Mix is not 
right, then they have the potential to affect almost all other risks in this stage.   
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Figure 5.23: Relationship between different risk factors in The Project stage 
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Figure 5.24: Relationship between different risk categories in The Project stage 
186 
5.2.3 The Shakedown Stage 
14. Insufficient training of end users (Shakedown) 
 
Lack of sensitivity to user resistance 
The end-user training preformed during the project stage in Case 8 (ITM7) was highly 
successful with positive end user feedback from their classroom style but issues still occurred 
at go-live.  User resistance did not come about because of a lack of ownership, but rather 
because the difference between the test system and the production environment was too 
conceptual for many of the employees to grasp.  Although they had been trained, they needed 
assurances that they would not break the system when they tried different functions. User 
resistance affected end user training in Case 4 (ITM3) as staff did not want to invest time 
learning how to use a system that they did not believe would work.  Case 9 (ITM8) 
encountered problems with training as a flow on effect of the Lack of Senior Management 
Support in The Project stage.  End users continued to avoid training and use other systems 
because they were able to do so.  The project manager’s only option was to force end users to 
participate but this was not highly successful as users would just go back to what they were 
doing.  In one case, even after three training sessions one person still refused to use the 
system and had forgotten what had been shown previously. 
 
Analysis 
Risk Factor View 
Only one risk in the shakedown stage was selected for analysis, and that was ‘Insufficient 
training of end users’.  The only risk to influence end user training from the research was 
‘Lack of sensitivity to end user resistance.  That this risk appeared in this stage is not 
surprising as that was one of the other risks that was identified by five or more project 
managers in the shakedown stage. 
 
Risk Category View 
While there is very little to analyse, similar to earlier User involvement and training risks, 
there is a flow-on effect between risks in this category.  If we check the earlier table (Table 
5.3: Summary of Risks discussed per Project Stage) and identify all other risks that were 
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mentioned five times or more in the shakedown stage, we see that all of these risks observed 
were User involvement and training risks.   
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Figure 5.25: Relationship between ‘Insufficient training of end users’ and other risk factors in the shakedown stage  
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Figure 5.26: Relationship between ‘Insufficient training of end users’ and other risk categories in the Shakedown stage
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5.3 Linear (Risk to Control) Relationship 
From the findings there appears to be no direct, observable relationship between risks and 
controls.  The following extract from the compiled risk registry (see Appendix c for the full 
risk registry) illustrates this point (Table 5.5).  While the risks gathered from the compiled 
risk registry were all identified as risks associated with end user resistance, the unique risk 
names, descriptions and controls used offer little common ground from which any form of 
relationship can be established.  This finding is in line with current research, and highlights 
the issues surrounding the different ways risks can be described and categorised in ERP 
implementations (Aloini et al., 2007; Markus & Tanis, 2000; Sherer & Alter, 2004).   
 
Table 5.5: Sample of ERP risks   
Risk 
number 
and 
case 
Risk Description Controls used 
4 
Case 7 
(ITM6) 
(I) 
ERP Terrorists' resisting 
the project and 
influencing others to 
resist 
Personnel within the business who resist the project and 
who are able to influence others to their way of thinking 
Sell \ promote post go-live project 
(stating both benefits and 
disadvantages to non-
participation). 
5 
Case 4 
(ITM3) 
(I) 
Unable to engage staff 
due to unstable training 
environment 
The training modules contain bugs and frequently 
break.  This coupled with resistance to change led to 
higher levels of user resistance. 
 
Train only on stable modules 
6 
Case 8 
(ITM7) 
(I) 
New system not 
performing  
It was being blamed for constraining the business and 
was a very difficult problem to diagnose.  As a 
consequence of the noise being generated this became a 
high priority problem.  
  
Engage independent auditors to 
audit the system to identify the 
source of the problems 
 
While no direct relationship was observed between risks and controls, what has emerged is 
the successful use of impact analysis as an intermediary construct to bridge this gap. While 
impacts as a consequence of risk have been noted (Aloini et al., 2012), the connection 
between impacts and controls has not. All PMs were questioned about their use of impact 
analysis, and all stated that it was conducted in some form. Of the 9 cases, three did not 
record any details and 4 used this analysis as a numerical tool only, a practise in line with the 
literature review findings (Patterson & Neailey, 2002). The remaining two cases detailed 
impact analysis and successful controls used, but this was only as an internal reference 
document for future internal implementations.  
 
The relationship between impacts and controls can be seen when examining the following 
excerpts from the compiled risk registries (Table 5.6). In this table we have three different 
risks, Risks one and two identify risks associated with ‘lack of full time commitment’, and 
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Risk three identifying ‘ineffective end-user communication’. While Risks one and two fall 
within the same risk factor, the impacts and subsequent applied controls are different. Risks 
two and three are different risk factors but are part of the same risk category, and have 
matching impacts, and subsequent matching applied controls.   
 
Table 5.6: Sample data_1 from compiled risk registries 
Case No Risk 
Category 
  Risk Factor Risk Impact Control Applied 
Risk 1: 
Case 6 
(ITM5) 
(R) 
User 
involvement 
and training 
 Lack of full-
time 
commitment of 
“customers” to 
PM and project 
activities 
Well-being of 
team members 
affected by 
workload  
Team members leave 
rather than hang around 
to suffer 
Stress levels lead to 
incorrect configuration. 
Realistic resource assessment 
performed prior to each phase to 
ensure that appropriate resource 
levels are put in place  
Have some fun 
Risk 2: 
Case 6 
(ITM5) 
(R) 
User 
involvement 
and training 
Lack of full-
time 
commitment of 
“customers” to 
PM and project 
activities 
Ongoing 
changes from 
within the 
business 
resulting in 
key team 
members 
being 
unavailable  
New ERP system fails 
to enable world class 
performance objectives 
Negative perception of 
the system  
 
Delays could occur 
 
Work closely to ensure effective 
communication between the 
business and the project. 
 Document “easy wins” and 
positive feedback back into the 
business 
Ensure the project is seen to be 
“in the business” 
Risk 3: 
Case 6 
(ITM5) 
(R) 
User 
involvement 
and training 
3. Ineffective 
end-user 
communication 
Ad hoc 
communicatio
n to customers 
whilst sorting 
the system out 
Negative perception of 
the system 
 
Delays could occur  
 
Misinformation leading 
to a perception that the 
ERP implementation is 
a failure.  
Document “easy wins” and 
positive feedback back into the 
business 
Ensure the project is seen to be 
“in the business” 
Project Champion, PM and 
Marketing Manager to discuss 
ongoing messages as events 
develop 
 
When applying these findings to the Lyytinen et al., Risk Management Approaches Model, a 
link can be seen between risks that fall into the user involvement and training risk category, 
risk impacts relating to negative perceptions and delays, and the imposition of controls 
requiring the project team to portray themselves as a positive part of the business. 
Heuristically, these controls could now be applied to an ERP implementation should the risk 
category be user involvement and training and the impact to the business comprise negative 
perceptions or delays.  
 
A second example from the compiled risk registry (encompassing a different risk category) 
was found, and is shown in table 5.7.  This example is very similar to table 5.6, where three 
risks were found from spanning two different risk factors.  The main difference in this 
example is that all risks share a business impact, and subsequent control.   
 
192 
All three cases identified the need to ‘Sell \ promote post go-live‘ to negate the business 
impact of loss of knowledge and when applied to the Lyytinen et al., Risk Management 
Approaches Model, it is anticipated that other skill mix risk categories that identify an impact 
of a risk as ‘loss of knowledge’ can seek to control this by selling and promoting the post go-
live project. 
 
Table 5.7: Sample data_2 from compiled risk registries 
Case 
no  
Risk 
Category 
Risk Factor Risk Business Impacts Controls used 
Case 5 
(ITM4) 
(I) 
Skill mix Insufficient 
"Internal" 
expertise 
Lack of internal 
SAP developers 
Loss of knowledge Sell \ promote post go-live project (stating both 
benefits and disadvantages to non-participation). 
Case 6 
(ITM5) 
( R ) 
Skill mix Lack of ability 
to recruit and 
retain qualified 
ERP systems 
developers 
Team members 
leave during the 
project 
· Loss of knowledge Sell \ promote post go live 
· Snowball effect Change management role impact process in place 
& procedure well communicated 
· Irreplaceable team 
members 
Focus groups and surveys of Project team 
members to monitor activities 
· Realisation of operational 
business 
Business support strategy agreed and made 
public 
Case 6 
(ITM5) 
( R ) 
Skill mix Lack of ability 
to recruit and 
retain qualified 
ERP systems 
developers 
Project team 
members not 
retained after the 
implementation 
· Loss of knowledge Sell \ promote post go-live project to carry over 
to team 
· Increased costs Succession planning to be done during the 
project 
· Reliance on external 
parties 
Executive team \ Project Managers to identify 
and assign IS support plan post go-live 
 
This direct connection between impacts and controls within the confines of the risk category 
appears to be an extension of the Aloini et al., (2012) research which found a connection 
between risks and common types of project failure.     
 
One of the problems experienced when attempting to examine the risk registry entries 
sourced solely from the documentation received was that impact analysis conducted appears 
to have been conducted to different levels of granularity dependant on the organisation and 
risk identified.  If we look at risks 1 and 3 in table 5.8, we see the risk identified in 3 being 
very similar to one of the business impacts identified in risk 1.  When we examine the 
controls used for the risks however, we see a similarity in the identified need to seek 
feedback from the project team. 
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Table 5.8: Sample1 of risk, business impact, and controls from compiled risk registries 
 
While that similarity can be seen, if we examine risks 3 and 4 we see that the business 
impacts have been analysed to a lower level of granularity than risk 1 and display similarities.  
In particular the identified need to “sell \ promote post go-live”.   
 
Table 5.9: Sample2 of risk, business impact, and controls from compiled risk registries 
Risk & 
Case 
No  
Risk Business 
impact 
Controls Control 
Type 
3 Team members 
leaving during 
the project 
 Loss of 
knowledge 
 
 Snowball effect 
 
 Irreplaceable 
team members 
 
 Realisation of 
operational 
business 
Sell \ promote post go live Behavioural 
Change management role impact 
process in place & procedure well 
communicated 
Behavioural 
Focus groups and surveys of Project 
team members to monitor activities 
Output 
Business support strategy agreed and 
made public 
Behavioural 
4 Project team 
members not 
retained after 
the 
implementation 
 Loss of 
knowledge 
 
 Increased costs 
 
 Reliance on 
external parties 
Sell \ promote post go-live project to 
carry over to team 
Behavioural 
Succession planning to be done during 
the project 
Behavioural 
Executive team \ Project Managers to 
identify and assign IS support plan post 
go-live 
Output 
 
 
From this analysis, an initial exploratory list of impacts and their respective controls has been 
compiled.  Table 5.10 contains a list of impacts and the controls used in the examined risk 
registries.   The impacts have been grouped into the same categories as used by Sumner 
(2000) in her breakdown of ERP risk factors.   
Risk & 
Case No  
Risk Business impact Controls Control 
Type 
1 
ITM 
(R) 
 Team members 
decide to leave the 
business (and 
project) assuming 
that there will be 
no future role 
 
Proactively seek feedback from team 
leaders if any project team members 
are affected (change manager to attend 
weekly team leader meetings) 
Behavioural 
3 Team members 
leaving during 
the project 
 Focus groups and surveys of Project 
team members to monitor activities 
Behavioural 
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Table 5.10: Skill mix impact / controls 
Impacts Controls Control Type 
 Team members decide to leave 
the business (and project) 
assuming that there will be no 
future role 
 Lack of motivation in the project 
due to uncertainty with the 
future direction 
 Final configuration and 
processes not optimised 
 Project team members may not 
“fit in” resulting in them leaving 
the business 
 Most knowledgeable staff in the 
new system may leave 
 Proactively seek feedback from 
team leaders if any project team 
members are affected (change 
manager to attend weekly team 
leader meetings) 
 One on one discussions with the 
project team member affected or 
perceived to be affected by the 
project 
 Feedback discussions and action 
plans developed in conjunction 
with Human Resources, 
Functional Reporting Manager 
and Project Change Manager 
 Retention plans need to be draw 
up by the Project Manager in 
conjunction with the Project 
Champion and Executive team  
 Succession planning to be 
addressed by the project 
Manager 
 Regular communication from the 
project to the business and vice 
versa 
 
 
 Behavioural 
 
 
 
 Output 
 
 
 
 Output 
 
 
 
 Output 
 
 
 Output 
 
 
 Behavioural 
 
 Loss of knowledge 
 Snowball effect 
 Irreplaceable team members 
 Realisation of operational 
business 
 Sell \ promote post go live 
 Change management role impact 
process in place & procedure 
well communicated 
 Focus groups and surveys of 
Project team members to monitor 
activities 
 Business support strategy agreed 
and made public 
 
 
 Behavioural 
 Behavioural 
 
 
 Output 
 
 Output 
 Loss of knowledge 
 Increased costs 
 Reliance on external parties 
 Sell \ promote post go-live 
project to carry over to team 
 Succession planning to be done 
during the project 
 Executive team \ Project 
Managers to identify and assign 
IS support plan post go-live 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Behavioural 
 
 Output 
 Output 
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Impacts Controls Control Type 
 Incorrect benefits, configuration, 
quality, performance 
 Incorrect configuration 
 Potential failure of the system in 
“go live” 
 Incorrect Assess phase output, 
with knock-on effects 
throughout 
 Confusion on “go live” as to 
which process should be used 
 Communicate “no changes” 
approach to business 
 Cohesive approach, 
communication of change, link 
between project champion and 
CEO, ensure correct backfill and 
strong links between project 
team members and senior 
management with clear 
processes defined 
 Steering team to ensure (at least) 
monthly confirmation from 
Project and Senior Management 
that the correct interface and 
protocols are in place 
 Dual review of all 
documentation by all team 
members and overall review by 
entire team throughout project 
 Control the integration process 
 Middle managers to be made 
aware that they need to think 
about the ERP when making 
decisions 
 Output 
 
 Behavioural 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Output 
 
 
 
 Output 
 
 
 Output 
 Clan 
 
 
 Risk of mistakes occurring 
 Burn out of key members 
Ensure a work balance is achieved 
Up-skill business people where 
appropriate 
 Clan 
 Behavioural 
 
 
When analysing skill mix impacts and controls, one impact \ control pairing which comes 
through strongly is loss of knowledge and the need to sell \ promote the post go-live project 
(Table 5.11).   
Table 5.11: Reoccurring Skill Mix impact / control pairings 
Impacts Controls Control Type 
 Loss of knowledge  Sell \ promote post go-live 
project to carry over to team 
 Behavioural 
 
It is hoped that in future research, this can be further developed by the identification of 
additional impact to control pairings. 
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Therefore, in response to the research question 
How can Project Managers (PMs) map risks to controls across different stages of ERP 
implementations? 
 
Project managers may be able to map risks to controls by performing in-depth business 
impact analysis, and mapping controls directly to the impacts.  Current risk management 
practices suggest converting business impact into a numerical value, and multiplying that 
value with a probability value to get the overall risk score (Patterson & Neailey, 2002).  This 
research would suggest that more value would be gained from identifying potential business 
impacts and using that as a decision tool rather than merely estimating their impact as a 
value. 
 
One additional observation from both of these examples is the use of multiple controls or 
portfolios of control for each of the identified risks.  While this relationship has highlighted 
certain controls applicable to certain business risks, the need to construct portfolios of control 
to manage risks in ERP projects is essential to project success (Choudhury & Sabherwal, 
2003, Kanellou & Charalambos, 2011; Kirsch, 1997).  
 
5.4 Other points of discussion 
5.4.1 Hierarchy of controls 
In part one of the discussion section, the hierarchy of risks finding identified a flow-on effect 
between different risks at different stages of an ERP implementation.  The hierarchical 
structure suggests that if a risk is not controlled, additional risks can occur as a consequence 
of that uncontrolled risk (be it by choice or omission as per the research model).  This flow-
on effect appears predictable and confirms previous literature linking the manifestation of 
negative effects in an ERP implementation if specific risks are not controlled (Aloini et al., 
2012; Markus, 2000, Sumner, 2000).   
 
Part two of the discussion section identified a link between risks and controls if the link is 
based on impacts caused by risks, as opposed to the risks themselves.  While further research 
is required, these findings suggest that the selection of appropriate controls may be possible 
using this method.  Literature on risk control in ESs and ERPs suggest however that 
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individual modes of control are insufficient and that multiple simultaneous controls or 
portfolios of control are needed and should be utilised (Kanellou & Charalambos, 2011).  A 
portfolio of control is a collection of different controls that can be applied to a risk and has 
been empirically found to be highly successful (Kirsh, 1997).  While literature suggests that 
portfolios should be customised for specific risks based on task characteristic, role 
expectations, and project-related knowledge and skills (Kirsch, 1997), practical methods of 
constructing these mechanisms, or even understanding why certain combinations of control 
choices are chosen, is still limited (Remus & Weiner, 2012).   
 
When conducting further analysis on both the hierarchical and linear relationships using the 
lens of the second research question, 
How can Project Managers (PMs) map risks to controls across different stages of ERP 
implementations? 
 
the following finding (and subsequent method), emerged. 
 
The proposed method to increase our understanding of portfolios of control is to augment the 
previously discussed Hierarchy of Risks models depicting risk flow to simulate control flow.  
It was found that while the flow-on effect of risks is downwards, the flow-on effect of 
controls moves in the opposite direction and appears to hierarchically flow upwards.  What is 
meant by this is that all individual risks have the potential to be mitigated by the application 
of controls.  What has been explored here is the possibility that a lower level risk can be 
controlled by applying a control for that risk at a higher level.   
 
An example of this can be seen when examining the hierarchical risk relationship for ‘8. Lack 
of Senior Management Support’ during The Project stage of an ERP implementation (figure 
5.27).  This diagramme features the hierarchical components examined in the previous 
section and includes control choices from Case 9 (ITM8).  What was found was that for a risk 
to successfully negate the flow-on effect of successive risks, it needed to encompass not only 
the primary control specifically implemented for that risk, but any primary controls 
applicable to risks that connect hierarchically at lower levels.  In this way controls can be 
visualised as flowing in an upward direction. 
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Figure 5.27: Hierarchical flow of risks vs. Hierarchical flow of controls 
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If we consider the hierarchical flow of risks from ’17. Lack of sensitivity to user resistance’ 
to ’18. Failure to emphasise reporting’, we see the primary and secondary control flows in 
action (Figure 5.28).   
 
 
Figure 5.28: Focused view of the Hierarchical flow of risks vs. Hierarchical flow of controls 
 
In this example, increases in user resistance were identified as a potential contributing factor 
to problems experienced with report writing.  User resistance in this example was caused by 
the flow on effect of the financial controller not supporting the project and the end users in 
his department feeling empowered to neither commit nor participate in project activities.  One 
of the side effects was that they did not commit time to analysing their reporting needs and 
this impacted negatively on the Project Manager being able to produce the correct reports. 
 
If we apply the controls outlined in this example (Figure 5.28) to ensure that the reports were 
completed the users had to become involved with report writing at an earlier stage of the 
implementation process. (18. Failure to emphasise reporting). 
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To reduce user resistance, the benefits of the project needed to be sold to the end users to get 
buy-in and if report writing was introduced at an early stage then ‘Failure to emphasise 
reporting’ would no longer be a risk.  (17. Lack of sensitivity to user resistance). 
 
This logic can be carried through to senior management support, and by successfully selling 
and promoting the post go-live project, that could have increased senior management support.  
By successfully selling and promoting the post go-live project to end-users, there was the 
potential to increase end user support.  If report writing was also introduced early by the 
senior management team then the manifestation of risks associated with report writing may 
also be controlled.  In this example we see the flow on effects of controls moving in an 
upward direction and enabling the meaningful creation of a portfolio of controls for managers 
in The Project stage of an ERP implementation.   
 
If we analyse the following ‘User involvement and training’ impact / control, we can see that 
the business has applied a hierarchical control structure in the assembly of a portfolio of 
controls for this risk (Table 5.12).  They have linked ‘Failure to emphasise reporting’ with 
Failure to mix internal and external expertise effectively’ and produced a set of controls to 
address multiple risks in a flow-on effect. 
 
Table 5.12: Example of Hierarchy of controls from risk registry 
 Unable to meet business 
requirements 
 
 Introduce report writing early in 
the implementation process 
 Allocate report writing expertise 
 Behavioural 
 
 Output 
 
Although a relationship has been established from the empirical data gathered, the 
hierarchical model and its application in the building of portfolios of control for project 
managers is still exploratory, and further research is recommended to confirm and build on 
these findings.  
 
5.5 Limitations  
 
There were a number of limitations in this research due to the timeframe, the number of 
companies available for this study and the scope of the project which focused on the 
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interconnected nature of a number of different constructs.  The exploratory nature of the 
research also had an impact on the limitations and the following list examines a number of 
limitations and outlines methods used to mitigate these where possible.  
 
All project managers interviewed were involved with successful projects as their last projects 
so these findings may not be generalizable to projects prone to failure.  Six of the 10 had 
however been involved with unsuccessful projects, or past projects which had suffered from 
serious problems during the project implementation and were explored during the interviews, 
but not to the depth of the successful projects. 
 
Only project managers were interviewed, reducing the scope of the research as it does not 
include any other perspectives.  Care was taken to validate the findings through multiple 
cases, internal documentation (e.g. risk registries), both semi-structure and structured 
interview components and publicly available information.  Nonetheless, further cases 
involving different stakeholder groups will enable these findings to be strengthened. 
 
When the PM’s spoke of controls to identified risks, they usually only identified individual 
controls.  These controls were frequently based on the controls they has been directly 
involved with (be it identification or implementation), yet literature and the supplied risk 
registries indicate that risks were and are effectively controlled by a number of different 
controls.  While this was explored, frequently the reason given was that the controls 
identified were the major controls that mitigated the risk.  This was identified as a subjective 
viewpoint and was not able to be confirmed by other stakeholders.  The use of risk registries 
(where available) was used in an attempt to mitigate this by providing additional 
perspectives, but was deemed to be of limited success as in a majority of cases, the risk 
registries were maintained by the Project Manager. 
 
The quality of the risk registries differed significantly between companies, with not only 
different usage and risks registered, but also differences on how the registries were 
structured, maintained and the information included.  This made it very difficult to detect 
similarities in control measures used between different projects based on the information 
recorded, and consequently only basic analysis could be performed.   
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Although the risks and stages were identified as the most commonly occurring across the 
interviews, there were very few risks that manifested themselves in similar ways in different 
organisations.  Determining causality is still some way off as further exploration is needed to 
both confirm current findings and to expand our understanding of how risks affect or are 
affected by other risks at different stages of ERP implementations.   
 
While most of the projects finished pre-Christchurch earthquakes, all of the interviews took 
place within one year post-earthquakes, which may have influenced the way risks and 
controls were perceived to have been administered during the project.  The method used to 
control this potential bias was to amalgamate the verbal responses with the risk registries in 
an attempt to identify inconsistencies using triangulating. 
While this research explored a number of different implementations, the list of risks and 
controls used is limited and would need extensive  
  
203 
 
 
Chapter Six: 
Conclusion 
  
204 
6.1 Conclusion 
ERP systems are complex and risky to implement.  If implemented successfully, ERP 
systems can provide real benefits for an organisation, including financial and business 
efficiencies.  Successful implementations are not guaranteed with more implementations   
expected to fail than succeed.  The aim of this research was to investigate factors identified in 
the theoretical discussion as contributing to these failure rates, which include the 
interconnected nature of ERP risks, and the control of risks at the tactical and operational 
levels.  From this, the following research questions emerged. 
1. How does the relationship between different risks change during the different stages of an 
ERP implementation? 
2. How can Project Managers (PMs) map risks to controls across different stages of ERP 
implementations? 
 
When addressing the first research question, it was found that certain risks appear to be 
interrelated, and formed different risk hierarchies at different project stages.  Some risks had 
been identified as being more prone to failure at specific stages, and this research confirms 
those findings.  It was also found that risks can influence, or be influenced by other risks 
dependent on the implementation stage.  This relationship was found in all nine cases and 
consistently identified a flow-on effect of risks affecting other risks at different stages of the 
implementation.  An example of this was ‘Lack of Senior Management Support’, as although 
senior management support had been identified as important within IS research, no specific 
identifiable patterns were found in risk literature should senior management support be 
lacking.  From this research, it was found that senior management support influenced every 
other risk in the Project Chartering Stage.  This relationship changed when the projects 
transitioned into The Project Stage, and senior management support was no longer as 
hierarchically inter-connected.  This was consistently found across all risks discussed, and 
leads strongly towards the finding that the relationship between different risks changes during 
the different stages of an ERP implementation. 
 
The second research question was addressed in two ways to ensure complete coverage.  The 
first was through analysis of risk registries.  In the analysis, no clear and direct relationship 
was found between ERP risks and controls.  Rather it was the impacts to the business as a 
consequence of these risks, as opposed to the risks themselves, which were identified as a 
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means to bridge this gap. This finding suggests that controls can be linked back to risks 
heuristically when the selection is based on business impacts, rather than the specific risk 
factors themselves.  While this addressed the second research question by identifying a 
method suitable for mapping risks to controls, its application as a means of identifying 
controls for risks across different stages of an ERP implementation was not as successful.  An 
additional method was therefore used to examine this component of the research question and 
included augmenting one of the hierarchical risk models created with a selection of 
appropriate controls and analysing the results.  What was found was an explanation and 
means of creating and reverse engineering portfolios of control.  This finding was tested and 
confirmed with case data and goes some way towards explaining how Project Managers can 
map risks to controls across different stages of ERP implementations.  Although this is new 
exploratory research, the use of multiple factors as interceding construct between risks and 
controls appears to be a novel approach to an ongoing problem and could produce real 
benefits for ERP implementation practitioners.   
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6.2 Further Research 
The extent of the inter-relationship between impacts and risks and hierarchically between 
risks themselves is not yet fully known. Although this research is ERP-specific, the risks 
identified are not (Sumner, 2000). While the intention is to conduct further research using 
ERPs as the focus, it is hoped that these findings can be applied to a wider range of IS 
implementations in an effort to better understand the constructs and to strengthen the 
empirical basis for developing robust ‘real-world’ theory.  
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Appendix a: Interview Schedule 
Although time indicators were established when the interview schedule was first created, during the interviews 
it became apparent that these were unrealistic as what was initially created as a 1 hour interview on average took 
1.5-2 hours to cover.  In all cases the interviewer was conscious of the time and commented when the time was 
reached.  The interviewees were asked and were happy to continue.  
 
Name of firm:  
 
Telephone number:  
 
Address:  
 
Date of interview:  
 
Contact:  
 
Phases of the interview 
 
Section 1: Introduction (Scheduled for 10 min – Averaged – 10 min) 
Part 1: Setting the scene – introductions and matters of confidentiality and right to review 
Part 2: The Firm – establish type and size of organisation 
Part 3: The individual – establish current position, project responsibilities and any previous experience  
 
Section 2: The interview (Scheduled for 20 min – Averaged – 60 min) 
This section will be semi-structured to examine how the projects were broken up and risks and controls 
measures identified and utilised during these stages. 
 
Section 3: The questionnaire (Scheduled for 20 min – Averaged – 45 min) 
This section contains a structured interview featuring different ERP models, risk identification, risk evaluation 
and examples of controls available for different identified risks. 
While there are set questions, the purpose of these questions is to prompt the interviewee to further elaborate on 
the specific risks identified in the literature and the control measures taken to counter these.  This will allow 
further exploration of any points raised earlier and encourage new discussion. 
 
Section 4: The conclusion (Scheduled for 10 min – Averaged – 5 min) 
Part 1: Final comments - Final comments or additional information arising from the questionnaire 
Part 2: Future interviews - Ask if can call for additional information, also if there is anyone else within the 
organisation that it would be advisable and available to talk to.  
Part 3: Restate confidentiality and right to review - Reconfirm that when the transcripts are completed they 
will be given to the interviewee for confirmation before being used for research. 
Part 3: Conclude – Thank you 
 
Section 1 – Introduction (10 min) 
 
Part 1:  Setting the scene (2 min) 
 
1. Introduce interviewer (name, previous experience) 
2. Research objectives (topic) 
3. Explain  
a. confidentiality agreement 
b. right to opt out at any time 
c. repeat request to record the interview  
d. explain that any transcripts (when completed) of this interview will be provided to the interviewee 
for evaluation before use in the research,  and any comments or information provided can be either 
removed or further clarified if required  
 
 
Pg-1 
Part 2:  The firm (3 mins) 
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The aim of this section is to find out about the firm – what it does, how large and how long they have been in 
business.  The optimum is for a large firm with multiple operating units. 
 
Name of contact:  
Job Title:  
 
Number of Full time staff:  
 
Firm type (e.g. manufacturing, service, retail etc):  
 
Product and industry (e.g. software, accountancy):  
 
How long has the firm been operating? 
 
Years of operation 0-1 2-5 5-10 10 - 15 15-20 20-30 30-50 50+ 
 
 
Part 3: The individual (5 min) 
 
The aim of this section is to establish what experience (if any) the respondent has had in the area of ERP 
implementations, risk analysis or risk control 
 
Just a little about yourself – your roles and responsibilities 
 
Please describe your role within the organisation.  For example what are your major responsibilities? 
Please describe your role within the ERP implementation.  For example what are your major responsibilities? 
Are you involved with the entire ERP installation or one of the modules in particular? 
Has this organisation used ERP systems before? 
Is this the first ERP installation you have been involved with? 
What experience have you had with ERPs? 
 
Section 2 - The interview (20 mins) 
This section encompasses questions relating to all 3 constructs of this research paper - ERP systems, identifying 
risks and controls.  Analysis of control measures is to take a majority of this time. 
 
Part 1: ERP system (5 mins) 
 
This section is to establish what ERP system has been selected and the stage of the implementation the firm is 
perceived to be at by the participant. 
 
Which ERP system have you selected? 
 
Is that a company initiative? 
 
Do you know which modules you are using? 
 
The following questions are to establish if there is a preferred method of viewing the stages of implementation in 
successful ERP projects. 
 
How is your firm breaking the implementation up?   
 
(Determine if the stages are based on tasks, technology or control) 
 
Is this a personal preference or a business requirement (or both)? 
 
Had you used this method prior to the project of this discussion? 
Part 2: Determine Risks and Controls per implementation stage 
Pg-2 
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May require an explanation of what is encompassed within control measures and will be determined by the 
answers given.  If the interviewee enquires directly about a definition of control then a full explanation may be 
given or partial as a prompt (see end of section for full explanation).  In the questions asked, the term 
“managing risks” is being used interchangeably for “control of risks”.  
 
In the first phase \ stage, can you describe a risk you identified? 
 
After you identified this, how did you go about managing the risk? 
 
Were the measures chosen (un)successful? 
 
Who was it that implemented those controls? 
May need to define the association between formal and informal controls and that formal controls are typically 
initiated at the management level and informal at the operational. 
 
 
Definition 
All methods and attempts to ensure individuals in organisations act in a manner that is consistent with 
meeting organisational goals and objectives 
Methods 
Controls: 
Formal 
 Behavioural – how things are done (e.g. procedures) 
 Output – what things are achieved (e.g. bonuses on output) 
Informal 
Clan – peer expectations (can align expectations through socialisation and team building) 
 
 
Section 3: Questionnaire 
Allow interviewee to complete the questionnaire 
 
 
Section 4: Conclusion 
Ask for feedback from the questionnaire 
Any additional points it may have raised 
That concludes the interview 
To ask: 
If clarification needed can ask (email or call) 
If there is anyone else within the organisation (stakeholder in charge of controls with a different project stage) 
that would be available to talk to 
Reconfirm that when the transcripts are completed they will be given to the interviewee for confirmation before 
being used for research 
Thank you and good bye 
 
Pg3  
221 
Questionnaire 
 
ERP implementation models 
Which of the following models describe or closely resemble the implementation model/s you have used or are currently using? If none apply, please fill in the line at the 
bottom 
 
Tick to 
indicate 
use 
Model name (if 
known) 
Stages      
 Implementation and 
Performance 
Initiation Adoption Adaption Acceptance Routinization Infusion 
 Bancroft Model Focus (Planning) As is (analysis of 
current situation)  
To be (system 
design – both high 
level and detailed) 
Construction and Testing 
(development and testing) 
Actual 
Implementation 
(implementing up 
to “go live”) 
 
 Ross Design  Implementation Stabilisation (after 
“go live” when 
system problems are 
fixed) 
Continuous improvement 
(steady improvement with 
added functionality) 
Transformation  
 PPM Planning (Selection of 
resources and personnel, 
scope and approach) 
Project (module 
identification, 
installation and 
cut-over) 
Enhancements 
(repair, extension 
and transformation 
of system) 
   
 Enterprise System 
Experience Cycle 
Project Chartering 
(Inception to executive 
commitment) 
The Project 
(Technical 
implementation to 
go live) 
Shakedown  
(Testing and bug 
fixing) 
Onwards and upwards 
(Accepted system, used to its 
maximum) 
  
 Spiral Model Determine objectives Identify and 
resolve risks 
Development and 
test 
Plan the next iteration   
  
 
 
      
Pg-4
222 
From the following list of identified risks, can you please indicate in which stage you think the risk can appear 
(pleas tick multiple stages if you think it is appropriate)? 
 
 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5 Stage 6 
       
Failure to redesign business 
processes 
      
Failure to follow an enterprise-
wide design which supports data 
integration 
      
Insufficient training and re-
skilling of IT workforce 
      
Insufficient internal expertise       
Lack of business analysts with 
business and technology 
knowledge 
      
Failure to mix internal and 
external expertise effectively 
      
Lack of ability to recruit and 
retain qualified ERP systems 
developers 
      
Lack of senior management 
support 
      
Lack of proper management 
control structure 
      
Lack of a champion       
Ineffective management 
communication 
      
Failure to adhere to standardised 
specifications which the software 
supports 
      
Lack of integration       
Insufficient training of end users       
Ineffective end user 
communication 
      
Lack of full time commitment of 
customers to project management 
and project activities 
      
Lack of sensitivity to user 
resistance 
      
Failure to emphasis reporting       
Inability to avoid technical 
bottlenecks 
      
Attempting to build bridges to 
legacy equipment  
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Did you see any of these risks appear in your last project, and if so, which stage (please tick multiple stages if 
appropriate)? 
 
 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5 Stage 6 
       
Failure to redesign business 
processes 
      
Failure to follow an enterprise-
wide design which supports data 
integration 
      
Insufficient training and re-
skilling of IT workforce 
      
Insufficient internal expertise       
Lack of business analysts with 
business and technology 
knowledge 
      
Failure to mix internal and 
external expertise effectively 
      
Lack of ability to recruit and 
retain qualified ERP systems 
developers 
      
Lack of senior management 
support 
      
Lack of proper management 
control structure 
      
Lack of a champion       
Ineffective management 
communication 
      
Failure to adhere to standardised 
specifications which the software 
supports 
      
Lack of integration       
Insufficient training of end users       
Ineffective end user 
communication 
      
Lack of full time commitment of 
customers to project management 
and project activities 
      
Lack of sensitivity to user 
resistance 
      
Failure to emphasis reporting       
Inability to avoid technical 
bottlenecks 
      
Attempting to build bridges to 
legacy equipment  
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Dependent on which of the staged models you choose, can you please tick the main stakeholders responsible for controlling identified risks within each of those stages? 
 
 
Stage Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5 
Stage Name      
Stakeholders      CEO 
 
     CIO 
 
     Exec. Team 
 
__Steering Committee 
 
     Project Manager 
 
__Operations Manager 
 
__Vendors 
 
__Consultants 
 
__IT Specialists (external) 
 
__Project team member 
 
__IT Specialists (internal) 
 
__Technical support 
 
__End users 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     CEO 
 
     CIO 
 
     Exec. Team 
 
__Steering Committee 
 
     Project Manager 
 
__Operations Manager 
 
__Vendors 
 
__Consultants 
 
__IT Specialists (external) 
 
__Project team member 
 
__IT Specialists (internal) 
 
__Technical support 
 
__End users 
 
     CEO 
 
     CIO 
 
     Exec. Team 
 
__Steering Committee 
 
     Project Manager 
 
__Operations Manager 
 
__Vendors 
 
__Consultants 
 
__IT Specialists (external) 
 
__Project team member 
 
__IT Specialists (internal) 
 
__Technical support 
 
__End users 
 
     CEO 
 
     CIO 
 
     Exec. Team 
 
__Steering Committee 
 
     Project Manager 
 
__Operations Manager 
 
__Vendors 
 
__Consultants 
 
__IT Specialists (external) 
 
__Project team member 
 
__IT Specialists (internal) 
 
__Technical support 
 
__End users 
 
     CEO 
 
     CIO 
 
     Exec. Team 
 
__Steering Committee 
 
     Project Manager 
 
__Operations Manager 
 
__Vendors 
 
__Consultants 
 
__IT Specialists (external) 
 
__Project team member 
 
__IT Specialists (internal) 
 
__Technical support 
 
__End users 
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Which of the following methods of control would be appropriate to manage each of the 
identified risks? 
(You may tick more than 1 if appropriate) 
 
 
Definition of Control 
All methods and attempts to ensure individuals in organisations act in a manner that is consistent with 
meeting organisational goals and objectives 
 
Methods 
Controls: 
Formal 
 Behavioural – measures to control how things are done (e.g. formal procedures, training) 
 Output – measures to control what things are achieved (e.g.  bonuses on output, sales targets, 
numbers and levels of training achieved) 
 
Informal 
 Clan – expected behaviour and outputs at the informal level - peer expectations (can align 
expectations through socialisation and team building) 
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 Formal  Informal 
 Behavioural Output Clan 
Failure to redesign business 
processes 
   
Failure to follow an enterprise-
wide design which supports data 
integration 
   
Insufficient training and re-
skilling of IT workforce 
   
Insufficient internal expertise    
Lack of business analysts with 
business and technology 
knowledge 
   
Failure to mix internal and 
external expertise effectively 
   
Lack of ability to recruit and 
retain qualified ERP systems 
developers 
   
Lack of senior management 
support 
   
Lack of proper management 
control structure 
   
Lack of a champion    
Ineffective management 
communication 
   
Failure to adhere to standardised 
specifications which the software 
supports 
   
Lack of integration    
Insufficient training of end users    
Ineffective end user 
communication 
   
Lack of full time commitment of 
customers to project management 
and project activities 
   
Lack of sensitivity to user 
resistance 
   
Failure to emphasis reporting    
Inability to avoid technical 
bottlenecks 
   
Attempting to build bridges to 
legacy equipment  
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Appendix b: Summary of Risks ranked by Project Stage  
Risks Project Chartering Project Shakedown Onwards and 
upwards Frequency Case No Frequency Case No Frequency Case No 
21. Failure to redesign business processes B 4, 8, 10, 11, 12 B  5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 D 4, 8 - 
22. Failure to follow an Enterprise-wide design which supports 
data integration 
D 7, 11 B 4, 5, 8, 9, 11 D 7, 8 - 
23. Insufficient training and reskilling of IT workforce C 8, 9, 11, 12 B 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11 C 4, 7, 8, 10 - 
24. Insufficient ‘internal’ expertise C 4, 8, 9, 12 A 4, 5, 7, 8,  9, 10, 11 D 8 - 
25. Lack of business analysts with business and technical 
knowledge 
B 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 A 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 D 7, 8 - 
26. Failure to mix internal and external expertise effectively 3  4, 7, 8, 9, 12 3  4, 5, 8,  9, 11 1  8 - 
27. Lack of ability to recruit and retain qualified ERP systems 
developers 
1 7, 9 3 4, 5, 10, 11, 12 2 4, 8, 10 - 
28. Lack of senior management support 3 4, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12 3 4, 5, 8, 9, 11, 12 2  4, 8,  9 - 
29. Lack of proper management control structure 3 4, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12 4 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11,  12 2  4, 8, 9, 10 - 
30. Lack of champion 4 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12 3   4, 5, 8, 9, 11, 12 2    4, 8, 9 - 
31. Ineffective management communication 3  7, 8, 9, 11, 12 4 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 2 4, 7, 8, 10 - 
32. Failure to adhere to standardised specifications which the 
software supports 
2 8, 9, 11, 12 4 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 1  4, 8 - 
33. Lack of integration 2 8, 11, 12 4  4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 2  4, 8, 9 - 
34. Insufficient training of end users 1  8 4 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 3 4, 7, 8, 9, 10 - 
35. Ineffective end-user communication 2  4, 8, 11 4 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 2   4, 7, 8, 9 - 
36. Lack of full time commitment of customers to project 
management and project activities 
2 4, 7, 11, 12 3 4, 5, 9, 11, 12 2  4, 9, 10 - 
37. Lack of sensitivity to user resistance 2 4, 8, 12 4 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 3  4, 7, 8, 9, 10 - 
38. Failure to emphasis reporting 3   8, 9, 10, 11, 12 4 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 3 4, 7, 8, 9, 10 - 
39. Inability to avoid technological bottlenecks 1   4, 8 4 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 2   4, 7, 8, 9 - 
40. Attempting to build bridges to legacy applications 2 8, 11, 12 3 4, 5, 8, 10, 11, 12 1  4, 8 - 
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Appendix c: Risks sorted by Risk Factor 
1. Failure to redesign business processes 
Case 
No  
Identified Risk 
Factor 
Risk Description Business Impacts Controls used 
Case 4 
(ITM3) 
(I) 
1. Failure to redesign 
business processes 
Unable to work out which 
processes are needed by the 
business 
  
  
Incorrect configuration of 
system 
Work one-on-one with the users to get 
required information 
Case 7 
(ITM6) 
(I) 
1. Failure to redesign 
business processes 
Unable to work out which 
processes are needed by the 
business 
Silo mentality within the organisational units 
means that staff do not have the necessary 
business knowledge to be able to accurately 
gage what processes are necessary and their 
impact on other business units.  This can be 
further impacted by users resistant to change 
(ERP Terrorists) 
Incorrect configuration of the 
system 
Engage external contractors 
Case 4 
(ITM3) 
(I) 
1. Failure to redesign 
business processes 
Unable to work out which 
processes are needed by the 
business 
 Incorrect configuration of 
system 
Work one-on-one with the users to get all 
required information 
Case 5 
(ITM4) 
(I) 
1. Failure to redesign 
business processes 
Unable to recreate current 
environment 
The resources for their current environment are 
soon to be removed and they need to recreate 
the old environment.  This has to be done using 
reverse engineering techniques as they will lose 
access to all of the previous company's support 
and systems. 
Incorrect configuration of 
system 
Work one-on-one with the users to get 
accurate information 
 
3. Insufficient training and re-skilling of IT workforce 
  Identified Risk 
Factor 
Risk Description Business Impacts Controls used 
Case 6 
(ITM5) 
( R ) 
3. Insufficient 
training and re-
skilling of IT 
workforce 
IS team working extended 
hours over a long duration 
  
  
· Risk of mistakes occurring Ensure a work balance is achieved 
· Burn out of key members Up-skill business people where appropriate 
 
 
 
4. Insufficient "Internal" expertise 
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  Identified Risk 
Factor 
Risk Description Business Impacts Controls used 
Case 5 
(ITM4) 
(I) 
4. Insufficient 
"Internal" expertise 
Lack of internal SAP 
developers 
If the third property do not join then they may 
have insufficient internal SAP resources for the 
project 
Loss of knowledge Sell \ promote post go-live project (stating 
both benefits and disadvantages to non-
participation). 
Case 8 
(ITM7) 
(I) 
4. Insufficient 
"Internal" expertise 
IT competence within the 
business is weak 
There was only one IT person in an 
administrative role and the requirements of the 
new system dictated the need for more 
personnel with a variety of skill sets. 
Incorrect configuration of the 
system 
Engage external contractors 
Case 9 
(ITM8) 
(I) 
4. Insufficient 
"Internal" expertise 
External requirements cannot 
be met by internal resources 
High levels of staff turnover had created a 
vacuum with new members of staff not 
required to have high levels of IT competency 
Incorrect configuration of the 
system 
Engage external contractors 
Case 6 
(ITM5) 
(I) 
4. Insufficient 
"Internal" expertise 
External requirements cannot 
be met by internal resources 
The need to be Sarbanes Oxley compliant 
requires greater technical knowledge than is 
currently available within the organisation. 
Incorrect configuration of the 
system 
Engage external contractors 
Case 7 
(ITM6) 
(I) 
4. Insufficient 
"Internal" expertise 
External requirements cannot 
be met by internal resources 
This was a identified as a not only a project 
problem, but also as a potential ongoing issue 
as internal IT resources are low and on-going 
system maintenance requirements are high  
Incorrect configuration of the 
system 
Engage external contractors 
 
 
 
6. Failure to mix internal and external expertise effectively 
  Identified 
Risk Factor 
Risk Description Business Impacts Controls used 
Case 6 
(ITM5) 
( R ) 
6. Failure to 
mix internal 
and external 
expertise 
effectively 
The team 
members 
business roles 
change whilst 
on the project  
The team members 
business roles 
change whilst on 
the project causing 
possible integration 
issues when team 
members are 
transferred back to 
the business after 
the ERP project is 
complete 
· Team members decide to leave the business (and 
project) assuming that there will be no future role 
Proactively seek feedback from team leaders if any project team 
members are affected (change manager to attend weekly team leader 
meetings) 
· Lack of motivation in the project due to uncertainty 
with the future direction 
One on one discussions with the project team member affected or 
perceived to be affected by the project 
· Final configuration and processes not optimised Feedback discussions and action plans developed in conjunction with 
Human Resources, Functional Reporting Manager and Project 
Change Manager 
· Project team members may not “fit in” resulting in 
them leaving the business 
Retention plans need to be draw up by the Project Manager in 
conjunction with the Project Champion and Executive team  
· Most knowledgeable staff in the new system may 
leave 
Succession planning to be addressed by the project Manager 
  Regular communication from the project to the business and vice 
versa 
230 
  Identified 
Risk Factor 
Risk Description Business Impacts Controls used 
Case 6 
(ITM5) 
( R ) 
6. Failure to 
mix internal 
and external 
expertise 
effectively 
Disconnect 
between BPR 
and ERP 
project  
Disconnect between 
BPR and ERP 
project stemming 
from an inadequate 
knowledge transfer 
between consultants 
and the business \ 
project team 
members leading to 
incorrect 
configuration (The 
“as is” processes are 
not a realistic 
representation of the 
actual “as is 
“situation 
· Incorrect benefits, configuration, quality, performance 
· Incorrect configuration 
Communicate “no changes” approach to business 
· Potential failure of the system in “go live” Cohesive approach, communication of change, link between project 
champion and CEO, ensure correct backfill and strong links between 
project team members and senior management with clear processes 
defined 
· Incorrect Assess stage output, with knock-on effects 
throughout 
Steering team to ensure (at least) monthly confirmation from Project 
and Senior Management that the correct interface and protocols are 
in place 
· Confusion on “go live” as to which process should be 
used 
  
  
Dual review of all documentation by all team members and overall 
review by entire team throughout project 
Control the integration process 
Middle managers to be made aware that they need to think about the 
ERP when making decisions 
Case 5 
(ITM4) 
(I) 
6. Failure to 
mix internal 
and external 
expertise 
effectively 
Unknown if 
more external 
SAP resources 
will be 
needed. 
 
 
Without 
confirmation of 
what resources are 
available, they do 
not know what 
external resources 
they will need 
Unable to get sufficient resources for project Sell \ promote post go-live project (stating both benefits and 
disadvantages to non-participation). 
Wait until all decisions about project participation have been made 
Case 9 
(ITM8) 
(I) 
6. Failure to 
mix internal 
and external 
expertise 
effectively 
Consultants 
not 
understanding 
the industry 
The reason this was 
emphasised was 
because this had not 
been the case in the 
past and it had 
caused long term 
problems which 
they did not wish to 
encounter again 
 
Incorrect configuration of the system Engage external contractors who understand the business 
ITM7 
(Case 
6) ( R ) 
6. Failure to 
mix internal 
and external 
expertise 
effectively 
Loss of 
consultant 
impacts 
quality of 
project 
 
  
  
Quality reduces and errors more likely as 
undocumented knowledge isn't present to aid decision 
making 
Super users have to do more explaining than expected due to lacking 
background knowledge 
Avoid losing more 
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  Identified 
Risk Factor 
Risk Description Business Impacts Controls used 
ITM7 
(Case 
6) ( R ) 
6. Failure to 
mix internal 
and external 
expertise 
effectively 
New SAP 
project 
Manager 
dismisses 
consultants 
and 
destabilises 
project 
  
  
Replacing consultants with knowledge of our business 
increases risk of "unforeseen circumstances" happening 
with new consultants that could have been avoided 
Don't replace consultants. Sort the issues another way 
Improve super users awareness that nothing can be taken for granted 
Case 6 
(ITM5) 
(I) 
6. Failure to 
mix internal 
and external 
expertise 
effectively 
Need to up 
skill current 
staff  
While internal 
resources currently 
do not have the skill 
to implement an 
ERP system, future 
implementations 
would benefit from 
higher levels of 
internal ERP 
knowledge 
External consultants perform all project functions 
without up skilling internal project team. 
Ensure external consultants are aware that their role is to both guide 
and teach internal resources 
 
7. Lack of ability to recruit and retain qualified ERP systems developers 
  Identified Risk Factor Risk Description Business Impacts Controls used 
Case 6 
(ITM5) 
( R ) 
7. Lack of ability to 
recruit and retain 
qualified ERP systems 
developers 
Team members 
leave during the 
project 
 · Loss of knowledge Sell \ promote post go live 
· Snowball effect Change management role impact process in place & procedure well 
communicated 
· Irreplaceable team members Focus groups and surveys of Project team members to monitor activities 
· Realisation of operational business Business support strategy agreed and made public 
Case 6 
(ITM5) 
( R ) 
7. Lack of ability to 
recruit and retain 
qualified ERP systems 
developers 
Project team 
members not 
retained after the 
implementation 
Project team members not retained 
after the implementation 
· Loss of knowledge Sell \ promote post go-live project to carry over to team 
· Increased costs Succession planning to be done during the project 
· Reliance on external parties Executive team \ Project Managers to identify and assign IS support plan 
post go-live 
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  Identified Risk Factor Risk Description Business Impacts Controls used 
Case 5 
(ITM4) 
(I) 
7. Lack of ability to 
recruit and retain 
qualified ERP systems 
developers 
Unknown if 
internal SAP 
resources will 
be retained and 
available for the 
project 
Without confirmation of who will 
participate in the project, they do not 
know what internal resources they 
will have 
Unable to retain sufficient resources for 
project 
Sell \ promote post go-live project (stating both benefits and disadvantages 
to non-participation). 
ITM7 
(Case6) 
( R ) 
7. Lack of ability to 
recruit and retain 
qualified ERP systems 
developers 
Super user 
leaves the 
project 
For whatever reason a super-user 
leaves the project at a late stage 
possibly without knowledge transfer 
If we lose any significant area expertise 
near go live date then we may not be 
able to go-live 
Ensure all super-users have backup 
Create plan "B" and assess effectiveness 
 
8 Lack of senior management support 
  Identified Risk Factor Risk Description Business Impacts Controls used 
Case 5 
(ITM4) 
(I) 
8 Lack of senior 
management support  
Without full 
support the 
entire project 
cannot go ahead 
Without full support from all participating 
board of directors, the project scope will 
have to be changed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Project scope needs to be 
rewritten 
Sell \ promote post go-live project (stating both benefits and disadvantages to non-
participation). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case 9 
(ITM8) 
(I) 
8 Lack of senior 
management support  
Lack of buy-in 
by the senior 
management 
team 
We are struggling to engage the senior 
management team.  This is in part 
attributed to the overall lack of IT 
knowledge as a majority of those in senior 
management had extensive backgrounds in 
sales with very little IT knowledge.   
Increase in user resistance as 
a consequence of the lack of 
visible support by the senior 
management team 
Sell \ promote post go-live project. 
Case 4 
(ITM3) 
(I) 
8 Lack of senior 
management support  
Chart of 
accounts not 
supplied before 
go-live 
The financial controller is busy and will 
not supply the chart of accounts necessary 
for configuration 
Incorrect chart of accounts 
created which causes an 
incompatibility between  the 
existing system and the new 
Ensure chart of accounts is supplied 
Case 6 
(ITM5) 
(I) 
8 Lack of senior 
management support  
Senior 
management 
team lose 
contact with the 
ERP 
implementation 
 
Without regular updates and meetings 
there is a risk that the senior management 
team will lose contact with the 
implementation and it will stop being their 
number 1 priority 
Implementation no longer 
number 1 priority within the 
business 
The Steering group is to meet to review risks every week to ensure mitigation 
plans are still accurate 
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  Identified Risk Factor Risk Description Business Impacts Controls used 
Case 8 
(ITM7) 
(I) 
8 Lack of senior 
management support  
Lack of support 
from HR part of 
company 
Change management was handled by the 
project steering team.  There was an effort 
to move the responsibility to HR as many 
of the issues arising were personal related 
but that did not happen.  The project may 
have suffered from lower levels of pain 
had HR been involved as the areas 
identified as being of concern were based 
around people and processes 
ERP team does not have the 
HR skills to deal with 
personnel issues associated 
with change management 
Move personnel related implementation issues to HR department 
 
9. Lack of proper management control structure 
  Identified Risk Factor Risk Description Business Impacts Controls used 
ITM7 
(Case 
6) ( R ) 
9. Lack of proper 
management control 
structure 
  
Inexperienced 
internal change 
manager may 
compromise Change 
Management 
function 
A new member of the executive team has 
just started with Change Management.  A 
recent decision to take over the planning and 
execution - leaving SAP in a review Q/A 
role - does add a little risk that he could 
make mistakes or miss opportunities which 
could result in a poorer result 
Project acceptance falls and users 
resist more than they should 
Training.  Easy access to experienced help 
Experienced assistance 
 
11. Lack of proper management control structure 
  Identified Risk Factor Risk Description Business Impacts Controls used 
ITM7 
(Case6) 
( R ) 
9. Lack of senior 
management 
communication 
  
If communication  A new member of the executive team has 
just started with Change Management.  A 
recent decision to take over the planning and 
execution - leaving SAP in a review Q/A 
role - does add a little risk that he could 
make mistakes or miss opportunities which 
could result in a poorer result 
Project acceptance falls and users 
resist more than they should 
Training.  Easy access to experienced help 
Experienced assistance 
 
12. Failure to adhere to standardised specifications which the software supports 
  Identified Risk Factor Risk Description Business Impacts Controls used 
Case 5 
(ITM4) 
(I) 
12. Failure to adhere to 
standardised specifications 
which the software 
supports 
New standard introduced makes 
established templates obsolete 
The introduction of Unicode 
support has rendered the 
established company 
templates obsolete, so a 
decision needs to be made 
whether to include the new 
standard or to move to it after 
the implementation. 
Cost overrun as new templates need 
to be created 
Sell \ promote post go-live project (stating both benefits and 
disadvantages to non-participation). 
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14. Insufficient training of end-users 
  Identified Risk 
Factor 
Risk Description Business Impacts Controls used 
Case 4 
(ITM3) 
(I) 
14. Insufficient 
training of end-users 
Training environment not stable 
enough to facilitate end user training 
 
 
 
 
The training modules contain bugs 
and frequently break.  This coupled 
with resistance to change led to 
higher levels of user resistance. 
Increased levels of user resistance Train only on stable modules 
Case 9 
(ITM8) 
(I) 
14. Insufficient 
training of end-users 
End-users not engaged 
Training was a real issue for the 
business and stemmed in part from 
the lack of senior management 
commitment.  Without that support 
staff did not feel the need to commit 
either and this resulted in 
widespread reluctance. 
· Poor usage of ERP Project Manager to define guidelines and strategies 
ensuring the reduction of reliance on disparate systems by 
selling the benefits of the new ERP system 
Case 6 
(ITM5) 
( R ) 
14. Insufficient 
training of end-users 
Poor data quality impacts on system 
and processes 
  
  
  
  
· Incorrect production schedule Repair data issues 
· Delay in purchasing messages 
· Team members unable to complete work Perform stock-take to correct inventory 
· Misunderstanding of systems outputs Educate users as to the results of incorrect data entry 
Case 6 
(ITM5) 
( R ) 
14. Insufficient 
training of end-users 
Team members don’t understand 
new system 
  
  
· Negative perception of system 
· Blame system for everything 
 
 
 
Setup training sessions (dependent on which key units go 
live) 
Case 6 
(ITM5) 
( R ) 
14. Insufficient 
training of end-users 
Regression to legacy systems post 
implementation  
Regression to legacy systems post 
implementation  
· Poor usage of ERP A cohesive approach from the Business Integration unit 
· Disparate information  Project Manager to define guidelines and strategies 
ensuring the reduction of reliance on disparate systems by 
selling the benefits of the new ERP system 
· No reliance on data Post Go-Live support strategy 
Case 8 
(ITM7) 
(I) 
14. Insufficient 
training of end-users 
Staff not confident using the new 
system at go-live 
Although training was viewed as a 
success, Even with this success 
however there were still problems at 
go live with using the new system.   
Staff using workarounds as they do not 
feel comfortable with the new system 
Users just need to use the new system and get used to it 
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16. Lack of full time commitment of customers to project management and project activities 
  Identified Risk Factor Risk Description Business Impacts Controls used 
ITM7 
(Case6) 
( R ) 
16. Lack of full time 
commitment of customers 
to project management and 
project activities 
Absent blueprint auditor derails 
projects at late stage 
(A super user) not present at 
the blueprint may result in 
larger problems later in the 
project than if they were known 
and resolved during the 
blueprint 
  
Finding defects at a late stage will 
require greater re-work and 
increased costs compared to if 
found at the early stages of 
blueprint 
Getting any audit appear at the latter stages of blueprint and gets 
involved 
Get auditor asap. Engage external auditor.  Have SAP audit 
consultant review plans 
ITM7 
(Case6) 
( R ) 
16. Lack of full time 
commitment of customers 
to project management and 
project activities 
Gaps in configuration due to 
super user under representation 
Gaps in configuration due to 
super user under representation 
If a super user with unique 
knowledge is not present during a 
relevant realisation session then the 
realisation solution may be deficient 
in functionality relevant to the super 
user.  Costs to remedy later could 
be high 
Optimise communication 
Improve communication 
 
  
Case 5 
(ITM4) 
(I) 
16. Lack of full time 
commitment of customers 
to project management and 
project activities 
Unable to release staff from day 
to day activities to participate in 
the project  
High compliancy requirements 
result in high administrative 
overheads.  This means that 
managers are unwilling to 
release staff for the project with 
upcoming deadlines including 
month end, financial planning 
and budgeting. 
 
 
Incorrect configuration Managers to enforce that the ERP is No.1 
Case 6 
(ITM5) 
( R ) 
16. Lack of full time 
commitment of customers 
to project management and 
project activities 
Wellbeing of team members 
affected by workload 
(particularly those part-time at 
“peak-times” of the project) 
  
  
  
  
· Team members leave rather than 
hang around to suffer 
· Stress levels lead to incorrect 
configuration, or final solution not 
achieving optimized outcome 
  
  
Peer review and coaching sessions to be undertaken 
 
Business support for stress to be offered 
 
Realistic resource assessment performed by Project Management 
(and approved by Steering committee) prior to each stage to ensure 
that appropriate resource levels are put in place (backfill increase if 
necessary) 
 
Have some fun 
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  Identified Risk Factor Risk Description Business Impacts Controls used 
ITM7 
(Case 
6) ( R ) 
16. Lack of full time 
commitment of customers 
to project management and 
project activities 
Super-users have too much 
work (to be quantified as super-
users probably have more tasks 
than can be delivered within 
project deadlines) 
  
  
  
  
If the super user has too much work 
then any combination of 
Add resource 
Won't be completed on time Extend the project 
 
Quality will suffer Additional resources will help mitigate super-users leaving project 
Stress related issues will happen 
Case 6 
(ITM5) 
( R ) 
16. Lack of full time 
commitment of customers 
to project management and 
project activities 
Ongoing changes from within 
the business resulting in key 
team members being 
unavailable for the project 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
· Delays could occur Work closely to ensure there is an effective communication link 
between the business and the project. 
· Team members leaving Document “easy wins” and positive feedback back into the 
business 
 
· New ERP system fails to enable 
world class performance objectives 
Ensure the project is seen to be “in the business” 
· Temptation to develop subsidiary 
systems to meet strategic objectives 
Ensure management buy-in and share operational pressure via the 
Project Manager – Project Champion link 
· Incorrect configuration The business strategy is to be made available to all within the ERP 
team 
· Resistance to change Document business impacts, resolution processes and change 
management impact assessments 
· Timeline slippage and undermines 
implementation, increases costs and 
risk of failure 
Ensure there are clear and concise communications as soon as any 
changes within the plan occur, with daily updates if necessary 
· Unable to complete business or 
project activities 
Project Managers to “ring fence” the project team and push back 
on the business demands 
· Failure to achieve timeline Managers to enforce that the ERP is No.1 
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  Identified Risk Factor Risk Description Business Impacts Controls used 
ITM7 
(Case 
6) ( R ) 
16. Lack of full time 
commitment of customers 
to project management and 
project activities 
Key staff unavailable due to ill 
health  
  
  
Missing key staff could delay and / 
or reduce quality for the project 
Look after staff 
Plan cover 
ITM7 
(Case 
6) ( R ) 
16. Lack of full time 
commitment of customers 
to project management and 
project activities 
Super user performance not 
spending optimal % of time on 
the project.  Old jobs beckons.  
"Effort" required to 
communicate with consultants 
which means some things get 
left that may cause issues later 
  
  
More things get left to the last 
minute which causes last minute 
panic threatening quality and go-
live itself 
Relocate super users permanently in Project room 
  
Case 6 
(ITM5) 
(I) 
16. Lack of full time 
commitment of customers 
to project management and 
project activities 
Ongoing changes from within 
the business resulting in key 
team members being 
unavailable for the project 
  · Delays could occur Work closely to ensure there is an effective communication link 
between the business and the project. 
Case 7 
(ITM6) 
(I) 
16. Lack of full time 
commitment of customers 
to project management and 
project activities 
Project team members not 
available to work on the project 
  Unable to complete business or 
project activities 
Project Managers to “ring fence” the project team and push back 
on the business demands 
Case 9 
(ITM8) 
(I) 
16. Lack of full time 
commitment of customers 
to project management and 
project activities 
No resources allocated to the 
project  
This included not only staff 
allocations, but also those 
running the implementation. 
The project manager was 
required to complete the project 
as well as all normal daily 
duties 
Unable to get sufficient resources 
for project 
Sell \ promote post go-live project (stating both benefits and 
disadvantages to non-participation). 
 
17. Lack of sensitivity to user resistance 
  Identified Risk Factor Risk Description Business Impacts Controls used 
Case 7 
(ITM6) 
(I) 
17. Lack of sensitivity to 
user resistance 
ERP Terrorists' 
resisting the project 
and influencing others 
to resist 
Personnel within the business who resist the 
project and who are able to influence others to 
their way of thinking 
Increased levels of user 
resistance 
Sell \ promote post go-live project (stating both benefits and 
disadvantages to non-participation). 
Case 4 
(ITM3) 
(I) 
17. Lack of sensitivity to 
user resistance 
Unable to engage staff 
due to unstable 
training environment 
The training modules contain bugs and 
frequently break.  This coupled with resistance 
to change led to higher levels of user 
resistance. 
 
Users think training is a 
waste of time 
 
Users don’t think the new 
system will work 
Train only on stable modules 
Case 8 
(ITM7) 
(I) 
17. Lack of sensitivity to 
user resistance 
New system not 
performing  
It was being blamed for constraining the 
business and was a very difficult problem to 
diagnose.  As a consequence of the noise being 
generated this became a high priority problem.  
  
 
Blame system for everything 
Engage independent auditors to audit the system to identify the 
source of the problems 
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18. Failure to emphasise reporting 
  Identified Risk Factor Risk Description Business Impacts Controls used 
Case 6 
(ITM5) 
( R ) 
18. Failure to emphasize 
reporting 
Report writing strategy 
not defined adequately 
  · Unable to meet business requirements Define strategy more clearly 
Case 6 
(ITM5) 
( R ) 
18. Failure to emphasize 
reporting 
No allocation of 
training in the report 
writing strategy 
  
  
· Unable to meet business requirements Introduce report writing early in the implementation process 
Allocate report writing expertise 
 
20. Attempting to build bridges to legacy systems 
  Identified Risk Factor Risk Description Business Impacts Controls used 
ITM7 
(Case 
6) ( R ) 
20. Attempting to build 
bridges to legacy systems 
WT initiatives alter 
scope after blueprint 
WT has concurrent projects running 
with legacy systems to fulfil new 
business needs.  Changes to these 
will need to be reflected in the SAP 
project 
Large cost and possible time impact. Prevent scope changes to parallel projects after blueprint 
completes.  Plan ahead 
Ensure any blueprint changes are minor and SAP impact is signed 
off by the SAP team prior to agreeing to them 
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Appendix d: Risks sorted by Project Stage and Risk Category 
Project Chartering 
  Risk Category Identified Risk 
Factor 
Risk Description Stage risk 
was 
addressed 
Business Impacts Controls used Control 
mode 
Case 4 
(ITM3) 
(I) 
Organisational 
fit 
Failure to redesign 
business processes 
Unable to work out 
which processes are 
needed by the business 
  
  
Project 
Chartering  
Incorrect configuration of 
system 
Work one-on-one with the users to get 
required information 
 
Case 7 
(ITM6) 
(I) 
Organisational 
fit 
Failure to redesign 
business processes 
Unable to work out 
which processes are 
needed by the business 
Silo mentality within the 
organisational units means 
that staff do not have the 
necessary business 
knowledge to be able to 
accurately gage what 
processes are necessary and 
their impact on other 
business units.  This can be 
further impacted by users 
resistant to change (ERP 
Terrorists) 
Project 
Chartering 
Incorrect configuration of the 
system 
Engage external contractors  
Case 7 
(ITM6) 
(I) 
Organisational 
fit 
Lack of sensitivity to 
user resistance 
ERP Terrorists' 
resisting the project 
and influencing others 
to resist 
Personnel within the business 
who resist the project and 
who are able to influence 
others to their way of 
thinking 
Project 
Chartering 
Increased levels of user 
resistance 
Sell \ promote post go-live project (stating 
both benefits and disadvantages to non-
participation). 
 
Case 6 
(ITM5) 
( R ) 
Skill mix Lack of ability to 
recruit and retain 
qualified ERP systems 
developers 
Team members leave 
during the project 
 Project 
Chartering 
· Loss of knowledge Sell \ promote post go live Behavioural 
· Snowball effect Change management role impact process 
in place & procedure well communicated 
 
· Irreplaceable team members Focus groups and surveys of Project team 
members to monitor activities 
 
· Realisation of operational 
business 
Business support strategy agreed and 
made public 
 
Case 6 
(ITM5) 
( R ) 
Skill mix Lack of ability to 
recruit and retain 
qualified ERP systems 
developers 
Project team members 
not retained after the 
implementation 
Project team members not 
retained after the 
implementation 
Project 
Chartering 
· Loss of knowledge Sell \ promote post go-live project to carry 
over to team 
 
· Increased costs Succession planning to be done during the 
project 
 
· Reliance on external parties Executive team \ Project Managers to 
identify and assign IS support plan post 
go-live 
 
  Risk Category Identified Risk 
Factor 
Risk Description Stage risk 
was 
Business Impacts Controls used Control 
mode 
240 
addressed 
Case 6 
(ITM5) 
( R ) 
Skill mix Failure to mix internal 
and external expertise 
effectively 
The team members 
business roles change 
whilst on the project 
causing possible 
integration issues when 
team members are 
transferred back to the 
business after the ERP 
project is complete 
The team members business 
roles change whilst on the 
project causing possible 
integration issues when team 
members are transferred back 
to the business after the ERP 
project is complete 
Project 
Chartering 
· Team members decide to 
leave the business (and project) 
assuming that there will be no 
future role 
Proactively seek feedback from team 
leaders if any project team members are 
affected (change manager to attend 
weekly team leader meetings) 
 
· Lack of motivation in the 
project due to uncertainty with 
the future direction 
One on one discussions with the project 
team member affected or perceived to be 
affected by the project 
 
· Final configuration and 
processes not optimised 
Feedback discussions and action plans 
developed in conjunction with Human 
Resources, Functional Reporting Manager 
and Project Change Manager 
 
· Project team members may 
not “fit in” resulting in them 
leaving the business 
Retention plans need to be draw up by the 
Project Manager in conjunction with the 
Project Champion and Executive team  
 
· Most knowledgeable staff in 
the new system may leave 
  
Succession planning to be addressed by 
the project Manager 
 
Regular communication from the project 
to the business and vice versa 
 
Case 6 
(ITM5) 
( R ) 
Skill mix Failure to mix internal 
and external expertise 
effectively 
Disconnect between 
BPR and ERP project 
stemming from an 
inadequate knowledge 
transfer between 
consultants and the 
business \ project team 
members leading to 
incorrect configuration 
(The “as is” processes 
are not a realistic 
representation of the 
actual “as is “situation 
Disconnect between BPR and 
ERP project stemming from 
an inadequate knowledge 
transfer between consultants 
and the business \ project 
team members leading to 
incorrect configuration (The 
“as is” processes are not a 
realistic representation of the 
actual “as is “situation 
  
Project 
Chartering 
· Incorrect benefits, 
configuration, quality, 
performance 
· Incorrect configuration 
Communicate “no changes” approach to 
business 
 
· Potential failure of the system 
in “go live” 
Cohesive approach, communication of 
change, link between project champion 
and CEO, ensure correct backfill and 
strong links between project team 
members and senior management with 
clear processes defined 
 
· Incorrect Assess stage output, 
with knock-on effects 
throughout 
Steering team to ensure (at least) monthly 
confirmation from Project and Senior 
Management that the correct interface and 
protocols are in place 
 
· Confusion on “go live” as to 
which process should be used 
  
  
Dual review of all documentation by all 
team members and overall review by 
entire team throughout project 
 
Control the integration process  
Middle managers to be made aware that 
they need to think about the ERP when 
making decisions 
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  Risk Category Identified Risk 
Factor 
Risk Description Stage risk 
was 
addressed 
Business Impacts Controls used Control 
mode 
Case 5 
(ITM4) 
(I) 
Skill mix Insufficient "Internal" 
expertise 
Lack of internal SAP 
developers 
If the third property do not 
join then they may have 
insufficient internal SAP 
resources for the project 
Project 
Chartering 
Loss of knowledge Sell \ promote post go-live project (stating 
both benefits and disadvantages to non-
participation). 
 
Case 5 
(ITM4) 
(I) 
Skill mix Failure to mix internal 
and external expertise 
effectively 
Unknown if more 
external SAP resources 
will be needed. 
Without confirmation of 
what resources are available, 
they do not know what 
external resources they will 
need 
Project 
Chartering 
Unable to get sufficient 
resources for project 
Sell \ promote post go-live project (stating 
both benefits and disadvantages to non-
participation). 
 
Wait until all decisions about project 
participation have been made 
 
Case 5 
(ITM4) 
(I) 
Skill mix Lack of ability to 
recruit and retain 
qualified ERP systems 
developers 
Unknown if internal 
SAP resources will be 
retained and available 
for the project 
Without confirmation of who 
will participate in the project, 
they do not know what 
internal resources they will 
have 
Project 
Chartering 
Unable to retain sufficient 
resources for project 
Sell \ promote post go-live project (stating 
both benefits and disadvantages to non-
participation). 
 
Case 8 
(ITM7) 
(I) 
Skill mix Insufficient internal 
expertise 
IT competence within 
the business is weak 
There was only one IT person 
in an administrative role and 
the requirements of the new 
system dictated the need for 
more personnel with a variety 
of skill sets. 
Project 
Chartering 
Incorrect configuration of the 
system 
Engage external contractors  
Case 9 
(ITM8) 
(I) 
Skill Mix Insufficient internal IT 
expertise 
External requirements 
cannot be met by 
internal resources 
High levels of staff turnover 
had created a vacuum with 
new members of staff not 
required to have high levels 
of IT competency 
Project 
Chartering 
Incorrect configuration of the 
system 
Engage external contractors  
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  Risk Category Identified Risk 
Factor 
Risk Description Stage risk 
was 
addressed 
Business Impacts Controls used Control 
mode 
Case 9 
(ITM8) 
(I) 
Skill Mix Failure to mix internal 
and external expertise 
effectively 
Consultants not 
understanding the 
industry 
The reason this was 
emphasised was because this 
had not been the case in the 
past and it had caused long 
term problems which they 
did not wish to encounter 
again 
Project 
Chartering 
Incorrect configuration of the 
system 
Engage external contractors who 
understand the business 
 
Case 5 
(ITM4) 
(I) 
Management 
structure and 
strategy 
Lack of senior 
management support  
Without full support 
the entire project 
cannot go ahead 
Without full support from all 
participating board of 
directors, the project scope 
will have to be changed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Project 
Chartering 
Project scope needs to be 
rewritten 
Sell \ promote post go-live project (stating 
both benefits and disadvantages to non-
participation). 
 
Case 9 
(ITM8) 
(I) 
Management 
structure and 
strategy 
Lack of senior 
management support 
Lack of buy-in by the 
senior management 
team 
We are struggling to engage 
the senior management team.  
This is in part attributed to 
the overall lack of IT 
knowledge as a majority of 
those in senior management 
had extensive backgrounds in 
sales with very little IT 
knowledge.   
Project 
Chartering 
Increase in user resistance as a 
consequence of the lack of 
visible support by the senior 
management team 
Sell \ promote post go-live project.  
  Risk Category Identified Risk 
Factor 
Risk Description Stage risk 
was 
Business Impacts Controls used Control 
mode 
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addressed 
Case 5 
(ITM4) 
(I) 
Software 
systems and 
design 
Failure to adhere to 
standardised 
specifications which 
the software supports 
New standard 
introduced makes 
established templates 
obsolete 
The introduction of Unicode 
support has rendered the 
established company 
templates obsolete, so a 
decision needs to be made 
whether to include the new 
standard or to move to it after 
the implementation. 
Project 
Chartering 
Cost overrun as new templates 
need to be created 
Sell \ promote post go-live project (stating 
both benefits and disadvantages to non-
participation). 
 
Case 6  
(ITM7) 
( R ) 
User 
involvement 
and training 
Lack of full time 
commitment from of 
customers to project 
management activities 
  
Absent blueprint 
auditor derails projects 
at late stage 
(A super user) not present at 
the blueprint may result in 
larger problems later in the 
project than if they were 
known and resolved during 
the blueprint 
  
Project 
Chartering 
Finding defects at a late stage 
will require greater re-work and 
increased costs compared to if 
found at the early stages of 
blueprint 
Getting any audit appear at the latter 
stages of blueprint and gets involved 
 
Get auditor asap. Engage external auditor.  
Have SAP audit consultant review plans 
 
Case 6  
(ITM7) 
( R ) 
User 
involvement 
and training 
Lack of full time 
commitment from of 
customers to project 
management activities 
Gaps in configuration 
due to super user under 
representation 
Gaps in configuration due to 
super user under 
representation 
Project 
Chartering 
If a super user with unique 
knowledge is not present 
during a relevant realisation 
session then the realisation 
solution may be deficient in 
functionality relevant to the 
super user.  Costs to remedy 
later could be high 
Optimise communication  
Improve communication  
Case 5 
(ITM4) 
(I) 
User 
involvement 
and training 
Ineffective end-user 
communication 
Lack of 
communication leading 
to misinformation 
being spread 
Gaps left in communication 
are being filled with 
unsubstantiated rumour, 
which is promoting end user 
resistance as staff are unsure 
of the business direction or 
the security of their jobs. 
Project 
Chartering 
Lack of end user buy-in 
  
Set up central strategic and messaging unit 
  
 
 
  Risk Category Identified Risk 
Factor 
Risk Description Stage risk 
was 
addressed 
Business Impacts Controls used Control 
mode 
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Case 5 
(ITM4) 
(I) 
User 
involvement 
and training 
Lack of full time 
commitment of 
customers to project 
management activities 
Unable to release staff 
from day to day 
activities to participate 
in the project  
High compliancy 
requirements result in high 
administrative overheads.  
This means that managers are 
unwilling to release staff for 
the project with upcoming 
deadlines including month 
end, financial planning and 
budgeting. 
 
 
Project 
Chartering 
Incorrect configuration Managers to enforce that the ERP is No.1  
 
The Project 
  Risk Category Identified Risk 
Factor 
Risk Description Stage risk 
was 
addressed 
Business Impacts Controls used Control 
mode 
Case 6 
(ITM5) 
( R ) 
Organisational 
fit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Insufficient training 
and re-skilling 
IS team working 
extended hours over a 
long duration 
  
  
The Project · Risk of mistakes occurring Ensure a work balance is achieved  
· Burn out of key members Up-skill business people where 
appropriate 
 
Case 4 
(ITM3) 
(I) 
Organisational 
fit 
Failure to redesign 
business processes 
Unable to work out 
which processes are 
needed by the business 
  
The Project Incorrect configuration of 
system 
Work one-on-one with the users to get all 
required information 
 
       
  Risk Category Identified Risk 
Factor 
Risk Description Stage risk 
was 
addressed 
Business Impacts Controls used Control 
mode 
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Case 5 
(ITM4) 
(I) 
Organisational 
fit 
Failure to redesign 
business processes  
Unable to recreate 
current environment 
The resources for their 
current environment are soon 
to be removed and they need 
to recreate the old 
environment.  This has to be 
done using reverse 
engineering techniques as 
they will lose access to all of 
the previous company's 
support and systems. 
The Project Incorrect configuration of 
system 
Work one-on-one with the users to get 
accurate information 
 
Case 6  
(ITM5) 
( R ) 
Skill mix Lack of ability to 
recruit and retain 
qualified ERP systems 
developers 
Super user leaves the 
project 
For whatever reason a super-
user leaves the project at a 
late stage possibly without 
knowledge transfer 
The Project If we lose any significant area 
expertise near go live date then 
we may not be able to go-live 
Ensure all super-users have backup  
  Create plan "B" and assess effectiveness  
Case 6  
(ITM5) 
( R ) 
Skill mix Failure to mix internal 
and external expertise 
effectively 
Loss of consultant 
impacts quality of 
project 
  The Project Quality reduces and errors 
more likely as undocumented 
knowledge isn't present to aid 
decision making 
Super users have to do more explaining 
than expected due to lacking background 
knowledge 
 
  
  
Avoid losing more  
Case 6  
(ITM5) 
( R ) 
Skill mix Failure to mix internal 
and external expertise 
effectively 
New SAP project 
Manager dismisses 
consultants and 
destabilises project 
  The Project Replacing consultants with 
knowledge of our business 
increases risk of "unforeseen 
circumstances" happening with 
new consultants that could 
have been avoided 
Don't replace consultants. Sort the issues 
another way 
 
  Improve super users awareness that 
nothing can be taken for granted 
 
Case 6 
(ITM5) 
(I) 
Skill mix Insufficient internal 
expertise 
External requirements 
cannot be met by 
internal resources 
The need to be Sarbanes 
Oxley compliant requires 
greater technical knowledge 
than is currently available 
within the organisation. 
The Project Incorrect configuration of the 
system 
Engage external contractors  
  Risk Category Identified Risk 
Factor 
Risk Description Stage risk 
was 
addressed 
Business Impacts Controls used Control 
mode 
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Case 6 
(ITM5) 
(I) 
Skill mix Failure to mix internal 
and external expertise 
effectively  
Need to up skill 
current staff  
While internal resources 
currently do not have the 
skill to implement an ERP 
system, future 
implementations would 
benefit from higher levels of 
internal ERP knowledge 
The Project External consultants perform 
all project functions without up 
skilling internal project team. 
Ensure external consultants are aware that 
their role is to both guide and teach 
internal resources 
 
Case 7 
(ITM6) 
(I) 
Skill mix Insufficient internal 
"IT" expertise 
External requirements 
cannot be met by 
internal resources 
This was a identified as a not 
only a project problem, but 
also as a potential ongoing 
issue as internal IT resources 
are low and on-going system 
maintenance requirements 
are high  
The Project Incorrect configuration of the 
system 
Engage external contractors  
Case 6  
(ITM7) 
( R ) 
Management 
structure and 
strategy 
Lack of proper 
management control 
structure 
  
Inexperienced internal 
change manager may 
compromise Change 
Management function 
A new member of the 
executive team has just 
started with Change 
Management.  A recent 
decision to take over the 
planning and execution - 
leaving SAP in a review Q/A 
role - does add a little risk 
that he could make mistakes 
or miss opportunities which 
could result in a poorer result 
The Project Project acceptance falls and 
users resist more than they 
should 
Training.  Easy access to experienced help  
  Experienced assistance  
Case 4 
(ITM3) 
(I) 
Management 
structure and 
strategy 
Lack of senior 
management support 
Chart of accounts not 
supplied before go-live 
The financial controller is 
busy and will not supply the 
chart of accounts necessary 
for configuration 
The Project Incorrect chart of accounts 
created which causes an 
incompatibility between  the 
existing system and the new 
Ensure full management team buy-in 
 
Ensure chart of accounts is supplied 
 
Case 6 
(ITM5) 
(I) 
Management 
structure and 
strategy 
Lack of senior 
management support 
Senior management 
team lose contact with 
the ERP 
implementation 
Without regular updates and 
meetings there is a risk that 
the senior management team 
will lose contact with the 
implementation and it will 
stop being their number 1 
priority 
The Project Implementation no longer 
number 1 priority within the 
business 
The Steering group is to meet to review 
risks every week to ensure mitigation 
plans are still accurate 
 
  Risk Category Identified Risk 
Factor 
Risk Description Stage risk 
was 
addressed 
Business Impacts Controls used Control 
mode 
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Case 8 
(ITM7) 
(I) 
Management 
structure and 
strategy 
Lack of senior 
management support 
Lack of support from 
HR part of company 
Change management was 
handled by the project 
steering team.  There was an 
effort to move the 
responsibility to HR as many 
of the issues arising were 
personal related but that did 
not happen.  The project may 
have suffered from lower 
levels of pain had HR been 
involved as the areas 
identified as being of concern 
were based around people 
and processes 
The Project ERP team does not have the 
HR skills to deal with 
personnel issues associated 
with change management 
Ensure full management team buy-in  
 
Move personnel related implementation 
issues to HR department 
 
Case 5 
(ITM4) 
(I) 
Management 
structure and 
strategy 
11. Ineffective 
management 
communication 
Unable to establish 
effective 
communication 
channels 
With a project this size, 
everyone works on different 
things and it is just a matter 
of ensuing that 
communication channels stay 
open 
The Project Increases the risk of 
disengaged senior managers 
The steering group is to meet to review 
risks every week to ensure mitigation 
plans are still accurate 
 
Case 6 
(ITM5) 
( R ) 
User 
involvement 
and training 
Lack of full-time 
commitment of 
“customers” to project 
management and 
project activities 
Wellbeing of team 
members affected by 
workload (particularly 
those part-time at 
“peak-times” of the 
project) 
  
  
  
The Project · Team members leave rather 
than hang around to suffer 
Peer review and coaching sessions to be 
undertaken 
 
· Stress levels lead to incorrect 
configuration, or final solution 
not achieving optimized 
outcome 
  
Business support for stress to be offered  
Realistic resource assessment performed 
by Project Management (and approved by 
Steering committee) prior to each stage to 
ensure that appropriate resource levels are 
put in place (backfill increase if necessary) 
 
    Have some fun  
ITM7 
(Case6) 
( R ) 
User 
involvement 
and training 
Lack of full-time 
commitment of 
"customers" to project 
management and 
project activities 
Super-users have too 
much work (to be 
quantified as super-
users probably have 
more tasks than can be 
delivered within 
project deadlines) 
  The Project If the super user has too much 
work then any combination of 
Add resource  
  Won't be completed on time Extend the project  
  Quality will suffer Additional resources will help mitigate 
super-users leaving project 
 
  Stress related issues will 
happen 
 
  Risk Category Identified Risk 
Factor 
Risk Description Stage risk 
was 
addressed 
Business Impacts Controls used Control 
mode 
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Case 6 
(ITM5) 
( R ) 
User 
involvement 
and training 
Lack of full time 
commitment of 
customers to project 
management and 
project activities 
Ongoing changes from 
within the business 
resulting in key team 
members being 
unavailable for the 
project 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
The Project · Delays could occur Work closely to ensure there is an 
effective communication link between the 
business and the project. 
 
· Team members leaving Document “easy wins” and positive 
feedback back into the business 
 
· New ERP system fails to 
enable world class performance 
objectives 
Ensure the project is seen to be “in the 
business” 
 
· Temptation to develop 
subsidiary systems to meet 
strategic objectives 
Ensure management buy-in and share 
operational pressure via the Project 
Manager – Project Champion link 
 
· Incorrect configuration The business strategy is to be made 
available to all within the ERP team 
 
· Resistance to change Document business impacts, resolution 
processes and change management impact 
assessments 
 
· Timeline slippage and 
undermines implementation, 
increases costs and risk of 
failure 
Ensure there are clear and concise 
communications as soon as any changes 
within the plan occur, with daily updates if 
necessary 
 
· Unable to complete business 
or project activities 
Project Managers to “ring fence” the 
project team and push back on the 
business demands 
 
· Failure to achieve timeline Managers to enforce that the ERP is No.1  
ITM7 
(Case 
6) ( R ) 
User 
involvement 
and training 
Lack of full time 
commitment of 
customers to project 
management and 
project activities 
Key staff unavailable 
due to ill health  
  The Project  Missing key staff could delay 
and / or reduce quality for the 
project 
Look after staff  
    Plan cover  
ITM7 
(Case 
6) ( R ) 
User 
involvement 
and training 
Lack of full time 
commitment of 
customers to project 
management and 
project activities 
Super user 
performance not 
spending optimal % of 
time on the project.  
Old jobs beckons.  
"Effort" required to 
communicate with 
consultants which 
means some things get 
left that may cause 
issues later 
  The Project More things get left to the last 
minute which causes last 
minute panic threatening 
quality and go-live itself 
Relocate super users permanently in 
Project room 
 
       
  Risk Category Identified Risk 
Factor 
Risk Description Stage risk 
was 
addressed 
Business Impacts Controls used Control 
mode 
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Case 6 
(ITM5) 
( R ) 
User 
involvement 
and training 
Failure to emphasize 
reporting 
Report writing strategy 
not defined adequately 
  The Project · Unable to meet business 
requirements 
Define strategy more clearly  
   
Case 6 
(ITM5) 
( R ) 
User 
involvement 
and training 
Failure to emphasize 
reporting 
No allocation of 
training in the report 
writing strategy 
  
  
The Project · Unable to meet business 
requirements 
Introduce report writing early in the 
implementation process 
 
Allocate report writing expertise  
ITM7 
(Case 
6) ( R ) 
User 
involvement 
and training 
Ineffective end-user 
communication 
Inconsistent project 
communications 
throughout company 
Some departments have 
internal meetings involving 
their super users giving an 
update to the project and 
answering questions.  Other 
don't 
The Project Some staff less accepting of the 
project, spread negative 
comments and reduce 
acceptance and quality of the 
final result 
Standardise communications mediums and 
expect compliance  
 
Improve other forms of communication to 
compensate 
 
Case 4 
(ITM3) 
(I) 
User 
involvement 
and training 
Insufficient training of 
end-users 
Training environment 
not stable enough to 
facilitate end user 
training 
The training modules contain 
bugs and frequently break.  
This coupled with resistance 
to change led to higher levels 
of user resistance. 
The Project Increased levels of user 
resistance 
Train only on stable modules  
Case 4 
(ITM3) 
(I) 
User 
involvement 
and training 
Lack of sensitivity to 
user resistance 
Unable to engage staff 
due to unstable training 
environment 
The training modules contain 
bugs and frequently break.  
This coupled with resistance 
to change led to higher levels 
of user resistance. 
The Project Increased levels of user 
resistance 
Train only on stable modules  
  Risk Category Identified Risk 
Factor 
Risk Description Stage risk 
was 
addressed 
Business Impacts Controls used Control 
mode 
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Case 6 
(ITM5) 
(I) 
User 
involvement 
and training 
Lack of full time 
commitment of 
customers to project 
management and 
project activities 
Ongoing changes from 
within the business 
resulting in key team 
members being 
unavailable for the 
project 
  The Project · Delays could occur Work closely to ensure there is an 
effective communication link between the 
business and the project. 
 
Case 7 
(ITM6) 
(I) 
User 
involvement 
and training 
Lack of full time 
commitment of 
customers to the 
project 
Project team members 
not available to work 
on the project 
  The Project Unable to complete business or 
project activities 
Project Managers to “ring fence” the 
project team and push back on the 
business demands 
 
Case 9 
(ITM8) 
(I) 
User 
involvement 
and training 
Insufficient training of 
end users 
End-users not engaged Training was a real issue for 
the business and stemmed in 
part from the lack of senior 
management commitment.  
Without that support staff did 
not feel the need to commit 
either and this resulted in 
widespread reluctance. 
The Project · Poor usage of ERP Project Manager to define guidelines and 
strategies ensuring the reduction of 
reliance on disparate systems by selling 
the benefits of the new ERP system 
 
Case 9 
(ITM8) 
(I) 
User 
involvement 
and training 
Ineffective end-user 
communication 
No feedback received 
from users about the 
new system and any 
problems. 
Staff refused to use the 
system and without the push 
from above felt this was 
justified as there was a 
chance the project wasn’t 
going to work anyway. 
The Project · Poor usage of ERP Project Manager to define guidelines and 
strategies ensuring the reduction of 
reliance on disparate systems by selling 
the benefits of the new ERP system 
 
Case 9 
(ITM8) 
(I) 
 User 
involvement 
and training 
Lack of full time 
commitment of 
customers to project 
management and 
project activities 
No resources allocated 
to the project  
This included not only staff 
allocations, but also those 
running the implementation. 
The project manager was 
required to complete the 
project as well as all normal 
daily duties 
The Project Unable to get sufficient 
resources for project 
Sell \ promote post go-live project (stating 
both benefits and disadvantages to non-
participation). 
 
ITM7 
(Case 
6) ( R ) 
Technology 
planning and 
integration 
Attempting to build 
bridges to legacy 
systems 
WT initiatives alter 
scope after blueprint 
WT has concurrent projects 
running with legacy systems 
to fulfil new business needs.  
Changes to these will need to 
be reflected in the SAP 
project 
The Project Large cost and possible time 
impact. 
Prevent scope changes to parallel projects 
after blueprint completes.  Plan ahead 
 
Ensure any blueprint changes are minor 
and SAP impact is signed off by the SAP 
team prior to agreeing to them 
 
 
 
Shakedown 
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  Risk Category Identified Risk 
Factor 
Risk Description Stage risk 
was 
addressed 
Business Impacts Controls used Control 
mode 
Case 6 
(ITM5
) ( R ) 
  
  
  
  
  
User 
involvement 
and training 
Ineffective end user 
communication 
Ad hoc 
communication to 
customers whilst 
sorting the system 
out 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Shakedown · Misinformation leading to 
a perception that the ERP 
implementation is a failure.  
This would result in a lack 
of confidence, creating 
increased “reassurance” 
communication or potential 
loss of business 
Customer services to attend ERP 
daily brief  
 
Project Champion, Project Manager 
and Marketing Manager to discuss 
ongoing messages as events develop 
 
Project Champion, Project Manager 
and Marketing Manager to meet and 
agree on a communication strategy 
post go-live 
 
Strategy involving 2 levels of 
communication. 
 
1. To account managers keeping 
them fully informed of issues and 
actions \ likely impacts 
 
2. A Customer suitable 
communication that confirms that the 
ERP is working as expected and 
indications as to progress and 
increased levels of service 
experienced 
 
Case 6 
(ITM5
) ( R ) 
User 
involvement 
and training 
Insufficient training 
of end users 
Poor data quality 
impacts on system 
and processes 
  
  
  
  
Shakedown · Incorrect production 
schedule 
Repair data issues  
· Delay in purchasing 
messages 
 
· Team members unable to 
complete work 
Perform stock-take to correct 
inventory 
 
· Misunderstanding of 
systems outputs 
Educate users as to the results of 
incorrect data entry 
 
Case 6 
(ITM5
) ( R ) 
User 
involvement 
and training 
Insufficient training 
of end users 
Team members 
don’t understand 
new system 
  
  
Shakedown · Negative perception of 
system 
Setup training sessions (dependent on 
which key units go live) 
 
· Blame system for 
everything 
 
  Risk Category Identified Risk 
Factor 
Risk Description Stage risk 
was 
addressed 
Business Impacts Controls used Control 
mode 
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Case 6 
(ITM5
) ( R ) 
User 
involvement 
and training 
Insufficient training 
of end users 
Regression to legacy 
systems post 
implementation  
Regression to legacy 
systems post 
implementation  
Shakedown · Poor usage of ERP A cohesive approach from the 
Business Integration unit 
 
· Disparate information  Project Manager to define guidelines 
and strategies ensuring the reduction 
of reliance on disparate systems by 
selling the benefits of the new ERP 
system 
 
· No reliance on data Post Go-Live support strategy  
Case 8 
(ITM7
) (I) 
User 
involvement 
and training 
Insufficient training 
of end users 
Staff not confident 
using the new 
system at go-live 
Although training was 
viewed as a success, Even 
with this success however 
there were still problems 
at go live with using the 
new system.   
Shakedown Staff using workarounds as 
they do not feel comfortable 
with the new system 
Users just need to use the new system 
and get used to it 
 
Case 8 
(ITM7
) (I) 
User 
involvement 
and training 
Lack of sensitivity 
to user resistance 
New system not 
performing  
It was being blamed for 
constraining the business 
and was a very difficult 
problem to diagnose.  As 
a consequence of the 
noise being generated this 
became a high priority 
problem.   
Shakedown · Blame system for 
everything 
Engage independent auditors to audit 
the system to identify the source of 
the problems 
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Appendix e: Risk factors in ERP projects (Sumner, 2000) 
 
Risk category Risk factor  Unique to 
ERP  
Organizational fit  Failure to redesign business processes  
Failure to follow an enterprise-wide design which supports data 
integration  
Yes 
Yes 
Skill mix  Insufficient training and re-skilling  
Insufficient internal expertise  
Lack of business analysts with business and technology knowledge  
Failure to mix internal and external expertise effectively  
Lack of ability to recruit and retain qualified ERP systems developers 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Management 
structure and 
strategy  
Lack of senior management support  
Lack of proper management control structure  
Lack of a champion  
Ineffective communications 
 
Software systems 
design  
Failure to adhere to standardized specifications which the software 
supports  
Lack of integration  
Yes 
Yes 
User involvement 
and training  
Insufficient training of end-users  
Ineffective communications  
Lack of full-time commitment of customers to project management and 
project activities  
Lack of sensitivity to user resistance  
Failure to emphasize reporting 
 
Technology 
planning/integration  
Inability to avoid technological bottlenecks  
Attempting to build bridges to legacy applications  
Yes 
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Appendix f: Different Classifications used in CSF research (Dezdar & 
Sulaiman, 2009) 
Critical Success Factor Different Classifications within each CSF 
Top management support and 
commitment 
Top management/executive involvement 
Top management/ executive commitment 
Top management/executive awareness 
Top management/executive participation 
Company-wide support 
Company-wide commitment 
Dedicated resources 
Employee recognition and incentive 
Funds support 
Project management and 
evaluation 
 
Effective project management 
Project planning project schedule and plan 
Project scope 
Work time schedule 
Detailed schedule 
Project completion time 
Project cost; auditing and control 
Project management of consultants and suppliers 
Business process reengineering and 
minimum customization 
 
BPR 
Business process reengineering 
Business process change 
Business process improvement, optimization, and reengineering 
Alignment of the business with the new system 
Process adaptation level 
Process standards 
Business process skills 
Job redesign 
Worked with ERP functionality maintained scope 
Minimum customization 
ERP team composition, 
competence and compensation 
 
Composition of project team member 
Balanced implementation team 
Project team 
The best and brightest 
Project team empowerment 
Steering committee 
Project team competence 
The domain knowledge of the ERP project team 
Teamwork participation 
Attitude of the ERP project team 
Professional personnel 
Constitution of project team 
ERP team compensation 
Change management program Change management plan 
Managing changes 
Managing conflicts 
Argument for change 
Management of expectations 
Organizational resistance to change 
Change readiness 
Understanding changing requirements 
Change in business goals during the project 
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Conflicts between user departments 
Reasonable expectation with definite target 
User training and education Training employee 
Education on new business processes 
Adequate training and instruction 
Training of project team and end-user 
Effective training 
Hands-on training 
Business plan and vision Business plan-vision-goals-justification 
Vision statement and adequate business plan 
Feasibility-evaluation of ERP project 
Effective strategic thinking and planning strategic 
Competitive pressure 
Clear goals and objectives 
Clear desired outcomes 
Strategic IT planning 
Link to business strategy 
ERP strategy and implementation methodology 
Consensus on organizational objectives 
Clear ERP strategy-vision 
Enterprise-wide communication 
and cooperation 
 
Effective enterprise-wide communication 
Interdepartmental communication 
Interdepartmental collaboration 
Interdepartmental cooperation 
Open and honest communication among the stakeholders 
Cross-functional coordination 
Free flow of information in project team communicating ERP 
benefits 
Communication with ERP project team 
 Organizational culture Cultural and business change 
Cultural differences 
Cultural readiness 
Change culture 
Cultural fit 
Cultural issues 
Shared beliefs 
Centralization of decision making 
Commitment to learning 
National culture 
Trust 
Unfocused information seeking 
Deal with organizational diversity 
Human resources commitment 
Vendor support Vendor-customer cooperation 
Vendor-customer partnership 
Usage of vendor’s tools 
Technical competence of supplies 
Effective communications with users 
Domain knowledge of supplier 
Implementation team members 
Connectedness with user department 
Effective communications with users 
Service of the supplier of ERP 
Software analysis, testing and 
troubleshooting 
System development 
Stabilization of ERP 
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 Adequate testing 
Data accuracy 
Data analysis and conversion 
Data management 
Data fit 
Data migration 
Accurate and prompt data acquisition 
Trouble shooting 
Tests and problem solutions 
Country-related functional requirement 
Technical issues 
Project champion Project manager 
Project leader expertise 
Strong and committed leadership 
ERP project manager leadership 
Careful selection of ERP Software Adequate ERP selection 
System selection process 
Suitability of software 
Package standards 
Completeness of software 
Selection of ERP vendor 
ERP vendor quality 
ERP vendor reputation 
Related experience of supplier  
ERP supplier option and service 
Technical competence of supplier 
Domain knowledge of supplier 
Use of consultant Consultant-customer partnership 
Consultant involvement 
Consultant support 
Usage of consultant’s tools 
Consultant selection 
Consulting services 
Technical competence of consultants 
Domain knowledge of consultant 
Consultant competence 
Consultant implementation team 
Connectedness with user department 
Effective communications with users 
Appropriate business and IT 
legacy systems 
 
Legacy systems and IT infrastructure 
IT infrastructure skills 
Pre-existing data and systems 
Suitability of hardware and software 
Technological context 
Technology or infrastructure in place 
Integration and communication between legacy system and ERP 
System quality System reliability 
System integrity 
System stability 
Compatibility of software 
Timeliness 
ERP adaptation level 
ERP software features 
Competency and flexibility of the ERP 
Ease of use 
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Perceived complexity 
User fit 
Fit between ERP and business process 
User involvement User participation 
User support 
Feeling of user involvement 
Willingness to participate 
Employee cooperation 
Involving individuals and groups 
Key user involvement 
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Appendix g: Critical Success Factors (Somers & Nelson, 2001) 
 
1 Top management support 
2 Project team competence 
3 Interdepartmental cooperation 
4 Clear goals and objectives 
5 Project management 
6 Interdepartmental communication 
7 Management of expectations 
8 Project champion 
9 Vendor support 
10 Careful package selection 
11 Data analysis and conversion 
12  Dedicated resources 
13 Use of steering committee 
14  User training on software 
15 Education on new business processes 
16 Business process reengineering 
17 Minimal customisation 
18 Architecture choices 
19 Change management 
20 Partnership with vendor 
21 Use of vendor’s tools 
22 Use of consultants 
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Appendix h: CSF categories (Finney & Corbett, 2007) 
 
Top management commitment and support  
Change management 
BPR and software configuration  
Training and job redesign 
Project team: the best and brightest  
Implementation strategy and timeframe  
Consultant selection and relationship  
Visioning and planning  
Balanced team 
Project champion 
Communication plan  
IT infrastructure 
Managing cultural change 
Post-implementation evaluation  
Selection of ERP 
Team morale and motivation 
Vanilla ERP 
Project management 
Troubleshooting/crises management 
Legacy system consideration  
Data conversion and integrity  
System testing 
Client consultation 
Project cost planning and management  
Build a business case 
Empowered decision makers 
  
260 
Appendix i: Critical Success Factor analysis (Nah et al., 2003) 
While the CSF used in the article by Nah et al. 2003 were not listed in importance, the order 
has been changed to reflect the ranking given within the article itself. 
Ranking CSF 
1 Factor 11: Top management support  
  
1. Approval and support from top management 
  
2. Top management publicly and explicitly identified project as a top priority  
  
3. Allocate resources 
   2 Factor 8. Project champion  
  
1. Existence of project champion 
  
2. High level executive sponsor as champion  
  
3. Project sponsor commitment 
   3 Factor 6: ERP teamwork and composition  
  
1. Best people on team 
  
2. Balanced or cross-functional team  
  
3. Full-time team members 
  
4. Partnership, trust, risk-sharing, and incentives 
  
5. Empowered decision makers 
  
6. Business and technical knowledge of team members and consultants 
   4 Factor 9: Project management  
  
1. Assign responsibility 
  
2. Clearly establish project scope  
  
3. Control project scope 
  
4. Evaluate any proposed change 
  
5. Control and assess scope expansion requests 
  
6. Define project milestones 
  
7. Set realistic milestones and end dates  
  
8. Enforce project timeliness 
  
9. Coordinate project activities across all affected parties 
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5 Factor 4: Change management culture and program  
  
1. Recognizing the need for change 
  
2. Enterprise-wide culture and structure management 
  
3. User education and training 
  
4. User support organization and involvement 
  
5. IT workforce re-skilling 
  
6. Commitment to change—perseverance and determination 
   6 Factor 5: Communication  
  
1. Targeted and effective communication  
  
2. Communication among stakeholders  
  
3. Expectations communicated at all levels 
  
4. Project progress communication  
  
5. User input 
   7 Factor 2: Business plan and vision  
  
1. Business plan or vision 
  
2. Project mission or goals  
  
3. Justification for investment in ERP 
   8 Factor 3: Business process reengineering (BPR)  
  
1. BPR 
  
2. Minimum customization 
   9 Factor 10: Software development, testing, and troubleshooting  
  
1. Configuration of overall ERP architecture Wee, 2000  
  
2. Appropriate modelling methods/techniques 
  
3. Vigorous and sophisticated testing  
  
4. Troubleshooting  
  
5. Integration 
   10 Factor 7: Monitoring and evaluation of performance  
  
1. Track milestones and targets 
  
2. Performance tied to compensation  
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3. Analysis of user feedback 
   11 Factor 1: Appropriate business and information technology legacy systems  
  
1. Business setting 
  
2. Legacy system 
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Appendix j: Critical Success Factor analysis (Akkermans & van Helden, 
2002) 
 
Critical success factor 
(1) Top management support 
(2) Project team competence 
(3) Interdepartmental co-operation 
(4) Clear goals and objectives 
(5) Project management 
(6) Interdepartmental communication 
(7) Management of expectations 
(8) Project champion 
(9) Vendor support 
(10) Careful package selection 
(11) Data analysis and conversion 
(12) Dedicated resources 
(13) Steering committee 
(14) User training 
(15) Education on new business processes 
(16) BPR 
(17) Minimal customisation 
(18) Architecture choices 
(19) Change management 
(20) Vendor partnership 
(21) Vendor’s tools 
(22) Use of consultants  
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Appendix k: ACIS article (2010) 
Vanderklei, M., Remus, U., Nesbit, T., & Wiener, M. (2010). Controls for managing risks across different 
stages of ERP projects. 21st Australasian Conference on Information Systems, 1-3 Dec, Brisbane, Australia. 
 
 
Controls for managing risks across different stages of ERP projects  
Mark Vanderklei, Ulrich Remus, Trevor Nesbit  
University of Canterbury, New Zealand 
Email: ulrich.remus@canterbury.ac.nz  
  
Martin Wiener  
University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Germany  
Email: martin.wiener@wiso.uni-erlangen.de  
Abstract  
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) implementations can be highly risky, posing numerous 
challenges to companies that implement them. Prior research has mainly focussed on identifying and 
assessing risks in ERP projects. Still little is known on mitigating risks by means of managerial 
control. Thus, this ongoing research aims to address these gaps by exploring how organisations 
exercise control in regards to identified risks during different stages of an ERP project. By using a 
case study approach this study particularly seeks to answer if and why control choices for risks 
change across different project stages. The preliminary results indicate that there is support for both, 
the need to collate the learnt experiences of ERP participants for these risks and their relative 
controls to be evaluated at all stages of the ERP project as the importance of risks and controls differ 
for each phase of the implementation project.  
Keywords  
ERP implementation, control, risk  
INTRODUCTION  
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems represent the concept of an integrated system designed 
to increase efficiency by integrating business processes and sharing common resources across an 
organisation (Hanseth et al., 2001; Jones et al., 2006; Markus and Tanis 2000). As such, projects 
associated with the implementation of ERP systems are complex, time-consuming and costly (Klaus 
et al., 2000; Robey et al., 2002), posing numerous risks to companies that implement. Often this 
results in high levels of failure. Prior studies have examined many different factors noted as 
attributing to ERP implementation failure including the implications of inappropriate modifications 
(Brehm et al., 2001), negative end user reactions (Shepherd et al., 2009), wrong cost estimation 
(Daneva and Wieringa 2008), poor financial performance, and lack of risk identification (Hunton et 
al., 2004; Sumner 2000). Despite the large number of risks associated with ERPs, demand for these 
systems continues to increase. The revenue from ERP projects reportedly grew to $28.8 billion in 
2006 and is projected to be in excess of $47 billion by 2011 (Longinidis and Gotzamani 2009). While 
there has been a dramatic decrease in the percentage of failures (down to 33% in 2004), businesses are 
still losing billions of dollars annually in the implementation of software designed to reduce costs and 
increase profitability (Zhang et al., 2005).  
This paper is adopting the concept of IT-related risk to ERP implementations (Markus 2000). Here 
risk is defined as a problem that has not yet happened but is the likelihood that an organization will 
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experience a significant negative effect (e.g., technical, financial, human, operational, or business 
loss) in the course of the implementation of an ERP system either internally or externally. As such the 
concept of risk is closely related to the concept of critical success factors (CSF), which has already 
reached significant importance in the field of ERP research (e.g., Kuang 2001; Somers & Nelson 
2004; Sumner 1999). However, the use of CSF as a prescriptive means of avoiding risks is limited. 
Indeed, this fragmented view on risks has been noted as a missed opportunity and an area of pressing 
business need (Markus 2000). In addition, prior research addressing risks in ERP projects has been 
mainly focussing around risk identification and assessment and lacks prescriptive means on the actual 
mitigation of these risks.  
One powerful approach for mitigating risks is exercising control (Du et al., 2007); where control 
refers to any attempt to motivate individuals to behave in a manner consistent with organizational 
objectives (Ouchi 1978). With this in mind, risk and control have been likened to the two sides of a 
coin and analysis of one without the other fails to fully address risk mitigation within ERP projects. 
Indeed the purpose of controls is to mitigate and reduce risks so that they are within acceptable limits 
(Albadri & Jordan 2003; Gallivan 2001). So far, research addressing risks and controls has focussed 
on IS development teams (Henderson and Lee 1992) and individual software development projects 
(Choudhury & Sabherwal 2003; Ropponen & Lyytinen 2000). All of these studies identified a 
common link between risk assessment, control of those risks and the effects on organisational 
performance. However, there is little on risk and control within the context of ERP projects with its 
specific characteristics as outlined above. Investigating risk controls is further complicated by the fact 
that during IT projects risks do not remain static, but changes as a function of prior decisions and 
behaviour (Markus 2000). The dynamic nature of risks also doesn’t easily lead to a stable risk pattern, 
as in particular second-order consequences of human problem-solving behaviour might lead people to 
misdiagnose the causes of problems and apply attempted (control) solutions that actually make the 
situation worse (Markus and Tanis 2000).  
To summarize, while prior research addressing risks in ERP projects has gained significant 
importance, so far research has mainly focussed on risk identification and assessment, leaving large 
gaps in mitigation risks by means of control. Furthermore, there is still little known on control in 
response to risks identified during different stages of ERP implementation projects. Thus, this paper 
tries to address these gaps by exploring how control is exercised in ERP projects in regards to 
identified risks. By using a case study approach this study particularly seeks to answer if and why 
control choices for risks change across different project stages.  
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND  
Risks in ERP implementations  
Extending the definition of risk provided in the introduction, risk is seen from a behavioural 
perspective, where risk is not treated as rational choice and probability concept, but associated with 
the threat of a bad outcome. It suggests that decision makers tend to act in a loss-aversive manner 
instead of a rational one (Lyytinen et al., 1998). Risk is a necessity for continuous business 
improvement and the purpose of risk management is not to eliminate all risks but to help managers 
make sense of their situations, by identifying the risk, assess its impact, exclude bad choices and 
intervene to reduce, or avoid the risks (Bancroft et al., 1998; Lyytinen et al., 1998). Table 1: Risk 
factors in ERP projects according to Sumner (2000)  
 
Risk category  Risk factor   Unique to ERP   
Organizational fit   • Failure to redesign business processes   
• Failure to follow an enterprise-wide design which supports   
• data integration   
Yes  
Yes  
Skill mix   • Insufficient training and re-skilling   
• Insufficient internal expertise   
• Lack of business analysts with business and technology knowledge   
• Failure to mix internal and external expertise effectively Lack of ability to recruit and 
retain qualified ERP systems developers  
Yes  
Yes  
Yes  
Yes  
Management structure 
and strategy   
• Lack of senior management support   
• Lack of proper management control structure   
• Lack of a champion Ineffective communications  
  
Software systems design   • Failure to adhere to standardized specifications which the   
• software supports   
• Lack of integration   
Yes  
Yes  
User involvement and 
training   • Insufficient training of end-users   
• Ineffective communications   
• Lack of full-time commitment of customers to project   
• management and project activities   
• Lack of sensitivity to user resistance Failure to emphasize reporting  
  
Technology 
planning/integration   
• Inability to avoid technological bottlenecks   
• Attempting to build bridges to legacy applications   
Yes  
Risk management comprises an attention shaping component, including risk identification and 
analysis and an intervention planning component, including interventions and risk resolution 
techniques (Lyytinen et al., 1998). Identified risks are then linked to potential managerial 
interventions with the help of heuristics (see fig. 1). All of these components have been addressed at 
different levels and in a number of different ways within research pertaining to ERP implementation. 
Based on a comprehensive literature review and an empirical investigation of multiple case studies 
Sumner (2000) identified risk factors, associated to ERP projects (Table 1), thus refining the general 
concept of IT-related risks towards ERP-related risks. These include factors associated to 
organisational fit, skill mix, management structure and strategy, software systems design, user 
involvement and training, technology planning, project management and social commitment. These 
risk factors can also be broadly mapped to different core implementation stages (see below). As 
indicated in the introduction IT related risks are highly dynamic in the sense that they vary throughout 
a project as a function of prior decisions and behaviour, which might lead to unintended behaviour 
and consequences (Markus, 2000). In particular in ERP implementations residual risk might increase 
over time (contrary to conventional IT projects) as ERP systems tend to be continuously enhanced and 
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further integrated with other systems, increasing complexity, which in turn increases their failure-
proneness (Markus, 2000).  
 
Risks across the stages of ERP implementation  
The process view of ERP implementation sees implementation as a sequence of stages where the 
outcome of each stage can be examined, as well as the cumulative outcome across all of the stages 
(Markus and Tanis 2000) (Somers & Nelson 2004). Many different ERP implementation models have 
been created (see Parr & Shanks, 2000). This research is using the enterprise systems experience cycle 
by Markus and Tanis (2000), which includes a planning phase as well as a post-implementation phase 
(see Figure 1). The purpose of this framework was to explain ERP success, which would make it also 
very useful in trying to understand actions and effects related to ERP failure and associated risks in 
each stage.  
Project Chartering: This stage details the activities performed prior to project approval. Typical risk 
factors comprise the lack of top management support and championship and the lack of a proper 
management structure for the project (Sumner 2000). This is also confirmed by Nah and Delgado 
(2006) and Parr and Shanks (2000), who found that top management support and championship was 
the most important activity during this phase.  
The Project (Configure and Rollout): This stage is focused with getting the system and end users up 
and running (Markus and Tanis 2000). Parr and Shanks (2000) found that it was crucial to have a 
balanced project team and the best people available in this phase. This stage is marked by its focus on 
the hard, technical tasks of installing the system rather than softer social tasks such as change 
management. Typical risk factors to be addressed are failure to redesign business processes, failure to 
follow an enterprise-wide data design, lack of business analysts, failure to adhere to standardized 
specifications and the lack of data integration (Sumner 2000).  
Shakedown: The shakedown phase includes all those activities associated to the system going live in 
an organisation until all initial problems have been resolved. It ends when normal operations resume 
and control is passed from the project team to the respective operational managers (Markus & Tanis, 
2000). In this phase any control issues unresolved from earlier phases would appear, typically taking 
the form of performance issues and disruptions in productivity (Muscatello & Parente, 2006). Typical 
risk factors include insufficient training and re-skilling of the IT workforce in new technology, 
insufficient internal expertise and failure to mix internal and external expertise effectively (Sumner 
2000).  
Onwards and upwards: This has been identified as the phase in which the benefits of an ERP system 
implementation will be felt within an organisation. This phase takes the organisation from the 
commencement of normal operations to eventual replacement – be that with an upgrade or different 
product. Typical activities during this phase include continuous business improvement, additional user 
skill building and assessments of the post implementation benefits.  
 
Control in ERP projects  
Similar to risks a behavioural view of control is adopted. This view implies that when a controller 
exercises control over a controlee, the controller is taking some action in order to regulate or adjust 
the behaviour of the controlee (Kirsch 1996). The behavioural view further presumes that the 
controller uses certain control mechanisms to exercise four modes of control, which may broadly be 
divided into formal and informal controls (Kirsch 1997). Each control mode can itself be implemented 
through multiple control mechanisms and combined into a portfolio of control. Please note that the 
same general control mechanism can support more than one control mode (Table 2). Formal controls 
are comprised of two modes, output and behavioural based controls. Output controls are mechanisms 
in place that define appropriate output targets (e.g. sales targets) and are concerned with what has 
been done as opposed to how it is done. Behavioural controls are different in that the outcome is of 
secondary importance to the method in which it was achieved and details an approach or set of 
instructions which are designed to result in a standard set of outcomes (e.g. procedures and 
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instructions) (Choudhury & Sabherwal 2003; Eisenhardt 1985; Elofson 1994). Informal controls 
consist of clan and self-control. Clan control is likened to the cohesive practices of a group and is 
typified by the degree to which all members of a group are committed to achieving group goals. Self-
control is solely reliant on an individual’s ability to monitor and control their own behaviours, with 
appropriate rewards and sanctions as required (Albadri & Jordan 2003; Harris et al., 2009).  
The concept of control is an established area of research and has featured in a number of studies 
examining outsourcing and software development (e.g., Choudhury & Sabherwal 2003; Dibbern et al., 
2008; Eisenhardt 1985; Harris et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2008). However, methods of resolving identified 
risks in ERP projects by exercising control is still in the formative stages with studies having 
concentrated on either risk mitigation at the strategic level or risk identification and prioritisation thus 
far (Sumner 2000). Within risk management, control has been described as a stage following risk 
assessment (Du et al., 2007). In general, the types of control potentially useful in managing IT-related 
risk are as varied as the risks themselves (Markus 2000). This is further complicated by the fact that 
control attempts are not invariably successful as they vary greatly according to the context, what type 
and to what extent control has been used. Nevertheless, perceived control should be seen as a 
powerful factor influencing both risk perception and decision-making (Du et al., 2007).  
 
Table 2: Control mechanisms (adapted from Kirsch (1997) and Choudhury & Sabherwal (2003))  
Control 
mode  
Control mechanism  Examples of control mechanism  
Outcome  
control  
• Mechanisms to explicitly specify desired outcomes  that were 
assessed later  
• Mechanisms (including IS) to evaluate the quality and timing 
of outputs delivered by the vendor  
• Development methodology  
• Job description  
• Supervisor-subordinate hierarchy  
• Work assignment  
• Rules & procedures  
Behavior 
control  
• Mechanisms by which the controller explicitly specified rules, 
procedures, or processes for the controlee to follow  
• Mechanisms to facilitate direct observation of the controlees 
behaviour  
• IS designed to help the controller monitor behaviour of the 
controlee  
• Defined target implementation date and/or budget  
• Expected level of performance  
• Defined project milestones  
Clan 
control  
• To promote shared goals  
• To promote and assess adherence to shared beliefs and values  
• Coalitions of individuals with shared ideologies  
• Socialization  
• Hiring & training practices  
• Implemented rituals and ceremonies  
Self control  • To encourage or motivate the controlee to exercise greater self-
control  
• Individual empowerment  
• Self-management  
• Work autonomy (who / how)   
• Self-set goals, self monitoring, and self rewarding  
While there is a gap in identifying and selecting control modes for mitigating risks within ERP 
projects, prior literature on control in IS development, such as Choudhury & Sabherwal (2003) and 
Elofson (1994) can assist in selecting appropriate controls. While these individual control modes have 
specific characteristics with regards to the properties of the risks they address, the use of multiple 
controls or portfolio of controls has been identified as an important concept (Kirsch 1997). Control 
portfolios are the use of multiple controls at the same time to control risks, and can include the use of 
formal and informal control mechanisms simultaneously (Gopal & Gosain 2009). Furthermore, Kirsch 
(2004) explored the dynamics of control during large IS projects and found that control is exercised 
differently for each phase following certain patterns, such as “collective sense making”, “technical 
winnowing” and “collaborative coordinating”. More importantly, some factors trigger changes in 
control choices from one project phase to another and emerging issues in one phase trigger changes to 
controls in other phases. Even though this research was based on custom-developed applications, 
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these findings may have important implications for this research, in particular the scope of large IS 
projects and that some of these factors (e.g. performance problems) are often perceived as risks.  
 
Summary  
The literature review on risk, control and ERP implementation projects shows that in each single field 
there is already a significant amount of work, which could frame the underlying research question of 
this study and help explaining the findings. In particular, Markus and Tanis (2000) Enterprise System 
Experience Cycle could be used to frame the investigation of risk controls according to different 
phases and changes across phases, the conceptualization of risk management by Lyytinen (1998), the 
comprehensive list of risk factors compiled by Sumner (2000) together with the identified control 
modes (including the concept of portfolios of control) by Kirsch (1997) can be used to examine pre-
identified risk control constructs, and finally the theory of control dynamics (Kirsch 2004) could be 
used to further explain how risk control is exercised in each phase, and why control changes across 
phases.  
 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY  
From the literature review the following model has been developed to describe the constructs of ERP 
implementation stages, their associated risks and means of controlling/resolving that risk (Figure 1). 
This model combines stage transition and iteration when examining risks and controls in relation to 
the stages of an ERP implementation. The stage transitions are illustrated in the progressive steps 
going from phase 1 “project chartering” through to phase 4 “onwards and upwards” and include 
unidentified risks. Iteration is used to step through risk identification at each of the different ERP 
implementation stages and when a risk is discovered, either an appropriate control measure is found to 
counter this risk or in certain circumstances it is left uncontrolled and is addressed at a later stage. The 
inclusion of unidentified and uncontrolled risks in stage transition is based on Sumner (2000) where it 
was found that unidentified or unaddressed risks had a cumulative effect on successive stages in an 
ERP installation. 
 
 
Figure 1: Proposed research model 
A qualitative research design is applied by answering questions about how and why organisations 
exercise control in regards to identified risks during different stages of an ERP project. This approach 
is in line with previous research in this area (Kirsch 2004; Sumner 2000) and will draw upon the 
processes described in Eisenhardt (1989). In line with Kirsch (2004) this approach can be 
characterized as “soft positivism” described as a means of revealing both “pre-existing phenomena 
and relationships” as well as the ability to “surface other constructs..., in the manner of interpretivists 
or grounded theorists” (pp. 378). As this research is designed to investigate pre-existing phenomena 
drawing from risk and control theory whilst retaining the ability to explore additional constructs, this 
approach was deemed the most appropriate. The research was conducted in two stages. First, an 
exploratory pilot study comprising three interviews with senior IT personnel.  staff members of ERP 
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projects and the analysis of relevant project documentation aims at clarifying the set of research 
questions and refining the scope of our research. The second stage is building on these results and is 
conducting two single indepth case studies, guided by the principles proposed by Langley (1999) and 
Yin (1994). Currently, the pilot study has been completed and the first case study has started.  
CASE STUDY  
This case follows an ERP implementation and resource amalgamation of three satellite offices of a 
multinational company in the building industry, Building Supplies Ltd [not real name]. These 
companies are all currently using SAP and are configured and supported in the following manner: 
Company B is located in Brisbane Australia, are 100% owned by Building Suppliers Ltd and host 
their own SAP resources. Company A is located in New Zealand and is also 100% owned but have 
their SAP resources hosted by company C. Company C is the new acquisition and is only 75% owned. 
While they currently host the SAP resources of Company A, they in turn are being hosted by their 
previous owners in America – a situation that will change in the near future as the links with their 
previous owners are severed and they are required to host their own resources (Figure 2). Although 
there is a business need to consolidate resources between companies A and B, the impetus to proceed 
was created by the acquisition of Company C from a competitor. With the acquisition of Company C 
comes the loss of access to their current SAP resources and hence the need to find an alternative 
solution. While the core ERP implementation is set to be completed on Company C, the proposed 
solution is to integrate all three companies into a data centre located in Brisbane Australia as shown in 
figure 2 “Desired Outcome”. This will include finding an existing data centre to host their equipment, 
moving SAP resources for companies A and B into that Data centre and recreating a SAP 
environment for Company C (as they lose intellectual rights to their previous environment). SAP 
personnel will be sourced from Company C to administer the environment with business processes 
examined and redesigned over the 3 companies to enable systems integration.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The default implementation model used is the Bancroft Model (1996) and is the Building Supplies Ltd 
standard for ERP implementations. The project is currently in the transition between the planning 
(project chartering) and the As Is analysis (project) phase and has included input from the steering 
committee, CIO advisory team and the Board of Directors from all three companies involved. The 
project is scheduled to be completed by October, 2011 with the first stage encompassing the data 
centre setup and migration scheduled to cut over in April, 2011.  
 
Data collection  
Figure 2:  Current Situation and desire outcome of the analysed ERP implementation 
 
 .  
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The main sources of data collection are in-depth face-to-face interviews, brainstorming and a review 
of published and internal documentation, such as meeting protocols, process documentation and risk 
mitigation plans. Although the project manager may remain on the project over a number of stages, 
the four different stages involve separate groups of stakeholders as control is passed from one stage to 
the next (Markus & Tanis, 2000). The aim is to interview stakeholders from all ERP stages. This 
would also cover multiple perspectives (controller and controlee). Audio recordings will be made, 
which are then transcribed and uploaded into NVivo in preparation for coding. In parallel, memos are 
written to capture important thoughts and ideas, which evolve during the interviews. The first part of 
the interview is devoted to gaining an in-depth understanding of the implementation process. The next 
set of questions will focus on the key issues associated with risks and controls in each of the project 
phases. Specific attention is paid to conditions and interactions clarifying the relationship between 
risks and control in different project stages. Using the predefined constructs of control, ERP stages 
and identified risks topic and analytical coding is used to confirm already established constructs but 
also to identify new codes and concepts.  
PRELIMINARY CASE FINDINGS  
As this is ongoing research it is only possible to report from interviewing the ERP project manager of 
the first case study according to the project chartering and the project phase. Coding the first set of 
interviews has resulted in a number of identified risks and their proposed solutions, which had been 
mapped to the risk categories and risk factors identified by Sumner (2000).  
 
Lack of executive commitment of Company 3 to the project  
Company C is only one of the companies to be less that 100% owned (75% owned with the 
other 25% owned by a rival company). Originally company C were owned by three separate 
entities until a major share was bought out by Building Supplies Ltd. While this provides 
them with a controlling influence over how things are done, agreement to the expenditure 
required for an ERP consolidation requires more than a majority vote. Resistance to commit 
to the project has been noted as a major risk to the scope of the project. “...they have to have a 
unanimous agreement in order to sign these sorts of propositions...”As the implications of 
their decision will affect and potentially increase risks in other areas, agreement is being 
pursued aggressively in two ways. An incentive has been given in that the new 
implementation will involve the current SAP and hardware resources resulting in a 
centralised sharing of resource and minimal capital outlay with increased disaster protection.  
“...the big cherry is if they come in it’s not going to cost them anything operationally, 
because it’s all tied up in the budget of the project...”  
 
As an added incentive they have highlighted possible risks Company C will be exposed to if 
they don’t join and their potential ramifications.  
“...we are going to go with these guys [company B], ... you are going to lose that 
million dollars we pay you, ... so you... are going to have to sort out your budget and 
you’re going to...lose some of your staff because you won’t need as many anymore, so 
it’s a big risk for you and ... you really should come and join us.”.  
 
The risk of Company C deciding to delay their decision to join a later date has been explored and it 
has been eliminated by Building Supplies Ltd as a feasible option. To dissuade this they have 
explained that this decision would result in high levels of expenditure as hardware and skilled 
personal would have to be found resulting in double ups of resources. Any resources found would be 
retained and will result in skilled SAP personnel at Company C no longer being needed. “...it’s no 
good them coming along in a year or two’s time and saying, “Yeah, we’re in now” and we’re going, 
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“Well, guess what boys, we got all these SAP people now and you’re got all these SAP people.  If we 
bring you in play, guess what, there are a whole lot of redundancies and it ain’t going to be in here.” 
To mitigate this Building Supplies Ltd have a proposed deadline for agreement. If no agreement is 
reached then that part of the project will be excluded.  
Lack of Project Champion  
A lack of project champion at Company C has been identified as a major risk. This is addressed in 
their proposal process as a major risk and if no project champion is found then the project will be 
terminated. “If we can’t name who the person’s going to be who is the champion, we don’t go ahead... 
we need someone because they are the one who has to sign off to say that’s what they want”. 
Currently they are working through this issue and if not resolved then this may cause the project to be 
cancelled.“...we are having big arguments at the moment, ...[over]... a lack of a champion. The 
specified deadline will determine whether the project proceeds or is cancelled.  
Lack of access to intellectual property associated with system design  
Company C was bought from another company and as part of that agreement, Company C will lose 
their rights to the support and system infrastructure that is in place. An additional problem is that the 
SAP environment used to run the business cannot be recreated from backups or copies of the system 
in place as that is included in the intellectual property agreement of the original company. 
“...they are trying to recreate the environment from what’s in people’s heads and what’s on 
their notes to match what... needs to be [known]...”  
The risks associated with this are high as if the system is recreated incorrectly, this could result in the 
system becoming unusable. The mitigation plan is based on a combination of company standards with 
regards to ERP implementations, existing documentation and personal familiarity with the current 
system. The company stance with ERP implementations is to adhere to a number of best practices 
with ERP implementations, namely sufficient levels of business process redesign, minimal 
customisation.  
“... so now we have to integrate them and we’ve got to work out their business process and 
our business process and does it make sense and which ones are we going to use going 
forward.”.  
Measures have been put in place to facilitate this process. In particular addressing the issue by 
introducing business analysts at an early stage of the project to determine levels and where business 
process redesign needs to occur. 
“...because ... it could be a critical path... [and]... reporting always seems to take the longest 
... they are saying, “Let’s get it in early”...”  
 
Lack of technical expertise  
One of the potential problems identified if company C decides to go alone is that they currently house 
all available technical support for the products involved and this may result in the need to source 
additional skills.  
“...if they are not in the picture we have to resource a whole lot of SAP consultants... the 
market over there is really, really tight and they have will have no expertise about ... [our] 
standards ...”  
As this project has yet to be signed off, the current plan at the moment is to wait and see what 
happens.  
 
Incompatibility of hardware and operating systems  
While the company standard is IBM, the current configuration at the Australian environment 
that works is the use of HP-UX machines. The risk is that adhering to the standard could 
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introduce unknown errors into a working system so a decision to stay with the current 
configuration has been made to avoid trouble shooting issues relating to OS at a later stage.  
“Forget the standard, let’s just get what we have got - use that and keep the system as 
it is and then we don’t have to go back and test to see if some of the bugs were getting 
in.  , so that’s minimising risk and one of those things is you just cut out all of those 
things that we don’t need to do”.  
Table 3: Identified risks and associated control mechanisms in the case study  
Risk category  Risks   Corresponding control mechanisms  
Managerial 
structure  and 
strategy  
Lack of executive commitment 
of Company 3 to the project  
  
Lack of Project Champion  
Clan control – all members of the board are bought together or socialised to establish 
and ensure that there is no incongruence between individuals.  
Output control – if no commitment is registered by the cut-off date then company 3 
will be excluded from the project.  
Output control – if no project champion is found by the cut-off date then the project 
will be on hold until a champion is found.  
Clan control – All members of the steering committee are aware of the need for a 
project champion and there is an expectation that one of them will take the lead  
Software  
System Design  
Lack of access to intellectual 
property associated with system 
design  
Output control – business analysts have been introduced early into the project to map 
out the processes currently used, and from this to determine the required outputs.  
Output control – creation of a development site to test and ensure all SAP resources 
and required database structures are in place.  
Behavioural control – Internal project management procedures are being followed 
detailing the steps taken in an ERP installation to ensure that everything is covered.  
Technology 
planning  Possible  lack  of 
 technical expertise  
Incompatible  hardware 
 and operating systems  
Although this risk has been identified no control measures will been implemented until 
the next stage as this will involve sourcing and employing additional staff, an 
unnecessary step if company 3 agree to participate.  
Additionally these staff will not be required in the short term so timeframes allow for 
this to happen at a later stage if needed.  
Output control – although the company standard is to use IBM, HP-UX is currently 
being used and tests have confirmed its suitability so will be used instead.  
 
Summary  
When examining the types of controls used, previous literature is suggesting that clan control is a 
control type synonymous with operational level staff and administered by a controller as a means of 
achieving goal congruence though the identification and alignment of business goals (Harris et al., 
2009). Although a number of different methods exist, one of the identified methods of encouraging 
clan type behaviour exhibited in this case is through socialisation where individuals are bought 
together to eliminate “...goal incongruence between individuals” (Ouchi 1979). What has been 
observed in this organisation is that clan control is a typical form of control used at the executive level 
with the project team being bought together with an expectation that all members participate in both 
the formulation and observation of the project goals. The implications within this case are that the 
controller and controlee of clan controls can in fact be the same people, and indeed this process is 
deemed highly important as the timeframes involved with an ERP implementation mean that success 
is reliant on all members of the team observing and striving to achieve the defined goals.  
CONCLUSION AND NEXT STEPS  
So far, the preliminary results indicate that identified risks and exercised controls are tied 
together and may have an important impact on ERP implementation success and further 
analysis should identify how these risk controls further influence risk mitigation and the 
‘residual risk’ (Markus 2000) in the remaining project phases, in particular how these risk 
controls ‘flow’ across the different project phases, and how heuristics combine risk factors 
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and risk resolution techniques (Lyytinen et al., 1998). The preliminary results also 
demonstrate the usefulness of our theoretical framework, including Sumner’s risk factors and 
categories as well as Kirsch’s classification of controls. Further, the preliminary findings 
already indicated some interesting findings, for example that in the first case clan control 
might also plays an important role at the executive level. Further interviews with other 
stakeholders, in particular controlees will further investigate this proposition and other 
control mechanisms might emerge. The next steps for this research are to complete the 
remaining interviews of the first case study as the project moves along, proceeding in a 
similar way for data collection and analysis as presented above. In parallel, it is intended to 
conduct a second case study in order to strengthen the empirical basis for developing theory.  
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Abstract 
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems have been in existence for over 2 decades yet businesses 
are still losing billions of dollars annually due to the implementation of software designed to reduce 
costs and increase profitability. Risk Management is an area that contributes to these losses, 
specifically due to uncertain outcomes when dealing with an interconnected construct such as risk, 
and a research gap at the tactical and operational levels between risks and controls.  
A comparative case study approach, encompassing 13 different organisations, was adopted to explore 
emerging patterns at the project implementation level, and from this two contributions emerged. After 
observing risks behaving in a hierarchical fashion with predictable results, an exploratory Hierarchy 
of Risks model was constructed. Although this model is still in its formative stage, it may prove useful 
in furthering our understanding of the close inter-relationship of risks in ERP implementations and 
the implications of managerial choice when determining risk prioritisation. A second finding is that 
no direct linear relationship appears to exist between risks and controls. Rather, this counterintuitive 
finding suggests that it is impacts as a consequence of risk, rather than the risks which cause the 
impacts, which allows these constructs to be bridged. 
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1. Introduction 
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) implementations are some of the most complex and risky 
Information Systems (IS) projects available as they involve the entire organisation in a protracted 
process of business change. While the main reason for implementing these systems is “...to enhance 
control over processes within an organisation” (Hanseth et al., 2001, pp. 35), additional technical and 
business reasons include improvements in efficiency (Jones et al., 2006) and increases in 
rationalisation (Hanseth et al., 2001). Although these systems appear to offer compelling advantages, 
the results are often less desirable and include high cost, long installation time-frames and high levels 
of failure. In 2011, projections of $47 billion of annual revenue yielded disappointing results: 61.1% 
of projects took longer than expected, 74.1% went over budget and 48% failed to realise at least 50% 
of the original desired benefits (Panorama Consulting Group, 2011).  
The aim of this research is to examine the control of risks at the project implementation level, as this 
has been identified as an ongoing reason for ERP implementation failures (Aloini et al., 2007). This 
paper adopts the definition of risk as a problem that has not yet happened but may cause an 
organisation to experience significant negative impacts (e.g. technical, financial, human, operational, 
or business loss) in the course of implementing an ERP system (Aloini et al., 2007; Sumner, 2000). 
One powerful approach to risk mitigation is exercising control (Du et al., 2007); where ‘control’ refers 
to any attempt to motivate individuals to behave in a manner consistent with organisational objectives 
(Ouchi, 1978). Methods of controlling risks in ERP implementations are still in the formative stages 
with studies having concentrated on either risk mitigation at the strategic level (Finney & Corbett, 
2007) or risk identification and prioritisation at the tactical and operational levels (Aloini et al., 2012; 
Sumner, 2000).  Part of this can be attributed to the complex interconnected nature of ERP risk 
factors, where risks occurring early in an implementation have the potential to influence different 
risks later in that same implementation (Aloini et al., 2012). In addition, contrary findings about how 
risks can be controlled have contributed to the formative state of theory-based research examining the 
relationship between risks and controls at the project implementation level (Gopal & Gosain, 2009). 
The following research questions arise: 
 Is there a direct relationship between different risks in ERP implementations, and, if so, how? 
 How can Project Managers (PMs) map risks to controls in ERP implementations at the tactical and 
operational levels? 
In the next section we will define ERPs and review the literature examining risk, control and risk 
management models. This is followed by an explanation of the criteria used in the selection of 
organisations and personnel to interview, and the methods used in the collection and codification of 
data. The two research questions will then be examined, followed by conclusions drawn from these 
findings and the identification of areas requiring future research. 
2. Theoretical Background 
ERP systems are neither company nor technology-specific. Rather, ERP is a descriptor assigned to 
integrated computer software systems designed to connect multiple parts of a business together and 
enable data gathered in one area to be accessible to other business units, enabling finer degrees of 
analysis (Markus & Tanis, 2000). In essence, ERPs act as activity based control systems where input 
into the system will result in statistical outputs allowing control to be exercised. During the 
implementation of an ERP, this formal structure is not in place and therefore an activity view of 
control is neither appropriate nor possible at this time. Rather, a behavioural view of control is most 
appropriate (Soh et al., 2010). This implies that when a controller exercises control over a controllee, 
they are taking some action in order to regulate or adjust the behaviour of the controllee (Kirsch, 
1996). The behavioural view further presumes that the controller uses certain control mechanisms to 
exercise control within given situations (e.g. implementation dates, procedures) (Soh et al., 2010). 
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Although the concept of control is established and has been used to examine outsourcing (Gopal & 
Gosain, 2009) and software development (Harris et al., 2009), methods of controlling risks in ERP 
implementations are still in the formative stages (Aloini et al., 2012; Sumner 2000). While control 
modes can be categorised as Formal (Behavioural and Output) and Informal (Clan and Self) (Kirsch, 
2004), specific controls that are useful in managing IT-related risks are as varied as the risks 
themselves (Markus & Tanis, 2000).   
Aloini et al., (2012) and Lyytinen et al., (1998) examined a variety of risk management models and 
theories (e.g. PRINCE2, PMBOK, The Australian Standard, SAFE and Boehm’s Software Risk 
Approach, and others) and concluded that despite great variations and drastic differences, managerial 
risk strategies share a standardised format. These include “how to inquire and observe, how to 
organise and interpret observations, and how to subsequently launch managerial action” (Lyytinen et 
al., 1998, pp. 236). The Lyytinen et al., Risk Management Approaches Model (Figure 1) was 
constructed using this standardised format and is a control-centric model with the ability to foster 
decision-making in situations where complete information is not always available (1998). This model 
depicts one event or state (risk) and three ideas and principles (risk identification and analysis, 
heuristics and risk resolution and control) which collectively make up the risk control process:   
 
Figure 1: Risk Management Approaches Model (Lyytinen et al., 1998, pp. 236) 
The first principle of risk identification and analysis in the Risk Management Approaches Model has 
received extensive coverage (Aloini et al., 2012). ERP implementations represent an excellent context 
for examining the interplay between different risk factors, because they cross departmental boundaries 
(Vandaie, 2008), and are prone to risks (Aloini et al., 2012).  Sumner created a list of risk factors base 
on a combination of literature reviews and empirical findings, and is used to define risks factors in 
this research (Sumner, 2000). One alternative form of analysis draws on the interconnected nature of 
risks and proposes a hierarchy of risks, where a risk appearing early in an ERP implementation can 
have a direct effect on risks at later stages. The Hierarchy of Risks structure was tested against a 
single case and delivered promising results with further research proposed (Aloini et al., 2012).   
Heuristics is introduced as the intervening principle, and can roughly be defined as a ‘rule of thumb’ 
(Lyytinen et al., 1998). The term denotes a solution to a situation where all required information may 
not be available, and fits well with this research because ERP implementations will seldom provide all 
the necessary information due to their complexity (Markus & Tanis, 2000). Where similarities to 
other resolved situations are discernible, aspects of that solution can be used instead of a logarithmic 
approach which requires all conditions to be met. Lyytinen et al., further describe the process as both 
objective and subjective (1998). Objective analysis describes the process of acting upon what can be 
seen (Wolf, 1978), and is the trigger mechanism in the idea or principle of observation. Subjective 
analysis is based on continuous learning and experience (Wolf, 1978), and describes the process of 
matching risks to risk resolution and control techniques using heuristics as a lens to focus personal 
experience or interpretation (Lyytinen et al., 1998). A review of risk management literature in ERP 
implementations by Aloini et al., compiled a list of types of project failures and noted an intermediary 
of ‘effect’ in the correlation between risks and why they fail (2012). ‘Effect’ is used as an identifier 
for factors which could impact an implementation (e.g. budget exceeded) (Aloini et al., 2012), and is 
similar in definition to the Lyytinen et al., use of ‘impact’ (1998). These two terms are used 
interchangeably and denote a many-to-one relationship in which each risk may have many impacts on 
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a business and these will lead to specific types of project failure (Aloini et al., 2012). Impact is also 
used in risk registries in the calculation of risk severity by the assignment of a numerical value 
(Patterson and Neailey, 2002). Impact was chosen in this study as a descriptor of the interceding 
construct to avoid ambiguity through consistent use, and because PMs were already familiar with it 
and had used this analysis in their implementations. While no connection is made between risks, 
impacts and controls, the use of heuristics as a lens is an area where further research may increase our 
understanding and bridge the gap between risk identification and risk control. It is for this reason that 
the concept of heuristics marries so well with risk management encompassing risk control (Lyytinen 
et al., 1998), and is the reason why this model was chosen to examine the relationship of risks and 
controls in this research. 
3. Method 
In examining the control of risks within ERP implementations, a qualitative research design in line 
with previous research examining large IS implementations was selected (Kirsch, 2004; Sumner, 
2000) and will draw upon the processes described in Eisenhardt (1989).  A commonality between the 
studies of Kirsch (2004) and Eisenhardt (1989) is the use of ‘soft-positivism’ as their epistemological 
framework. Soft-positivism was defined by Kirsch as a means of revealing both “pre-existing 
phenomena and relationships...” as well as the ability to “...surface other constructs..., in the manner 
of interpretivists or grounded theorists” (2004, pp. 378).  As this research is designed to investigate 
pre-existing phenomena (e.g. ERP risks and controls) whilst retaining the ability to explore additional 
constructs (e.g. how risks and controls relate), this approach was deemed most appropriate.  A 
comparative case study strategy, as used by Robey et al., was adopted because of the difficulty found 
with identifying the boundaries between ERPs and their implementation contexts, and the enhanced 
ability to examine phenomena across different cases (2002).   
The main criteria used to identify suitable organisations and the applicable personnel was that the 
organisation had to have either completed (after 2007), or still be in the process of implementing a tier 
one or tier two ERP system, and the personnel had to have been involved in the risk control process at 
the tactical or operational levels.  In total, 16 face-to-face interviews were conducted comprising 13 
different personnel from 13 different organisations, and these interviews were divided into two 
groups.  Three exploratory interviews were conducted in the development of the interview protocol 
and were used to clarify the research questions, refine the scope of the research and remove any 
disconnect between the many different academic definitions used and those used in practice.  An 
example of this was the need to include more definitions (e.g. control and risk) and the preference of 
‘impact’ as opposed to ‘effect’ when describing how risks can influence the business.  The remaining 
13 interviews were conducted with either the IT Managers or external consultants who had assumed 
the PM role during the implementation, and incorporated Sumner’s risk categories (2000) and the 
Risk Management Approaches Model (Lyytinen et al., 1998).  The developed protocol was used to 
gather data about the individual, the organisation, previous experiences and how risks were controlled 
in their last ERP implementation. Each interview averaged two hours in duration and together with 
the internal documentation and transcriptions, were imported into NVivo.  Subsequent coding of risks, 
impacts, heuristics and controls was done and revealed a direct relationship between impacts and 
controls. Axial coding was then used to further refine the relationship between codes and concepts 
(Strauss and Corban, 1990), and the hierarchy of risks finding emerged. 
4. The Preliminary Findings 
As this is on-going research, these findings are derived from preliminary analysis of data gathered and 
compiled using the Lyytinen et al., Risk Management Approaches Model as a coding framework.  
Let us address the first research question: 
Is there a direct relationship between different risks in ERP implementations, and, if so, how? 
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While using the first idea or principle of the Lyytinen et al., Risk Management Approaches Model 
(risk identification and analysis) as an initial framework when performing axial coding on risks, it was 
found that certain risks appear to be interrelated, and formed a hierarchy of risks (Figure 1). This 
relationship was found in 11 of the 13 cases and consistently identified the flow-on effect to be the 
same risks. The importance of senior management support features prominently in ERP risk analysis 
(Aloini et al., 2007; Sumner, 2000), but no specific identifiable pattern was found in risk literature 
should senior management support be lacking. In 6 of the 11 cases, ‘Lack of Senior Management 
Support’ (Level 1) resulted in the manifestation of other risks later in the implementations, and 
reflected a direct relationship between risks as identified by Aloini et al., (2012). While the ERP 
implementation in one of the 11 cases was only in the initial planning stage, ‘Lack of Senior 
Management Support’ (Level 1) was identified as contributing to the manifestation of risks associated 
with negotiations to free staff for project activities, staff training, appointing a project champion, and 
determining how change would be managed (Level 2). ‘Ineffective communication’ (Level 2) was an 
additional by-product and resulted in high levels of misinformation (and lowered staff morale) 
regarding the organisations future structure and staffing level requirements. In two of the 11 cases, 
organisations experienced problems with their accounting departments which stemmed from the lack 
of project support from their senior accountant (a member of their senior management team). In one 
of those two companies, the continual effort required by the PM due to lack of senior management 
support was given as the reason why a third implementation within the business (after two successful 
implementations) failed. The effort required in the two successful implementations resulted in the PM 
burning-out and no longer being able to commit full time to the implementation. It was also found that 
when risks dealing with lack of full time commitment, insufficient training and ineffective 
communication were not addressed, user resistance increased (Level 3). Only two of 13 cases did not 
report experiencing any Level 2 risks, and felt strongly that they had achieved positive user 
acceptance (Level 3).   
 
Figure 1: Hierarchy of Risks model 
This preliminary analysis shows risks behaving hierarchically, where risks are able to influence other 
risks in lower nodes (flow-on effect) if not dealt with sufficiently. 
Question two asks 
How can PMs map risks to controls in ERP implementations at the tactical and operational levels? 
  
From the findings there appears to be no direct, observable relationship between risks and controls. 
What has emerged is the successful use of impact analysis as an intermediary construct to bridge this 
gap. While impacts as a consequence of risk have been noted (Aloini et al., 2012), the connection 
between impacts and controls has not. All PMs were questioned about their use of impact analysis, 
and all stated that it was conducted in some form. Of the 13 cases, three did not record any details and 
8 used this analysis as a numerical tool only, a practise in line with the literature review findings 
(Patterson and Neailey, 2002). The remaining two cases detailed impact analysis and successful 
controls used, but this was only as an internal reference document for future internal implementations. 
The relationship between impacts and controls can be seen when examining the following excerpts 
from the compiled risk registries (Table 1). In this table we have three different risks, Risks One and 
Two identify risks associated with lack of full time commitment, and Risk Three identifying 
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ineffective end-user communication. While Risks One and Two fall within the same risk factor, the 
impacts and subsequent applied controls are different. Risks Two and Three are different risk factors 
but have matching impacts, and subsequent matching applied controls. 
 
 
  Risk Factor Risk Impact Control Applied 
1. Lack of full-
time commitment 
of “customers” to 
PM and project 
activities 
Well-being of 
team members 
affected by 
workload  
Team members leave 
rather than hang around 
to suffer 
Stress levels lead to 
incorrect configuration. 
Realistic resource assessment performed 
prior to each phase to ensure that 
appropriate resource levels are put in 
place  
Have some fun 
2. Lack of full-
time commitment 
of “customers” to 
PM and project 
activities 
Ongoing changes 
from within the 
business resulting 
in key team 
members being 
unavailable  
New ERP system fails 
to enable world class 
performance objectives 
Negative perception 
of the system  
Delays could occur 
 
Work closely to ensure effective 
communication between the business and 
the project. 
 Document “easy wins” and positive 
feedback back into the business 
Ensure the project is seen to be “in the 
business” 
3. Ineffective end-
user 
communication 
Ad hoc 
communication to 
customers whilst 
sorting the system 
out 
Negative perception 
of the system 
Delays could occur  
Misinformation leading 
to a perception that the 
ERP implementation is 
a failure.  
Document “easy wins” and positive 
feedback back into the business 
Ensure the project is seen to be “in the 
business” 
Project Champion, PM and Marketing 
Manager to discuss ongoing messages as 
events develop 
Table 1: Sample data from compiled risk registries 
When applying these findings to the Lyytinen et al., Risk Management Approaches Model, a link can 
be seen between impacts relating to negative perceptions and delays, and the imposition of controls 
requiring the project team to portray themselves as a positive part of the business. Heuristically, these 
controls could now be applied to an ERP implementation should the impact to the business comprise 
negative perceptions or delays.  
5. Conclusion and next step 
Thus far the preliminary results suggest that a hierarchical relationship exists between different risks 
in ERP implementations. Although further research into these phenomena is required, the initial 
findings empirically confirm the importance of managing specific risks such as ‘Lack of Senior 
Management Support’ as identified in existing literature. Additionally, while there appears to be no 
clear and direct relationship detectable between ERP risks and controls, impacts derived from risks 
have been identified as a means to bridge this gap. This finding suggests that controls can be linked 
back to risks heuristically when the selection is based on impacts to the business, rather than the risk 
factors which cause the impacts. The extent of the inter-relationship between impacts and risks and 
hierarchically between risks themselves is not yet fully known. Although this research is ERP-
specific, the risks identified are not (Sumner, 2000). While the intention is to conduct further research 
using ERPs as the focus, it is hoped that these findings can be applied to a wider range of IS 
implementations in an effort to better understand the constructs and to strengthen the empirical basis 
for developing robust ‘real-world’ theory.  
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